The Political Economy of King Midas: Resource Abundance and Economic Growth by Papyrakis, E.
  
 
 
The Political Economy of King Midas 
Resource Abundance and Economic Growth  
 
 
 
Elissaios Papyrakis 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Political Economy of King Midas 
Resource Abundance and Economic Growth  
 
 
ISBN-10: 90-9020675-2 
ISBN-13: 978-90-9020675-2 
 
© Elissaios Papyrakis, 2006 
 
Cover design: Arjen Liefting 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing 
of the copyright holder, or as expressly permitted by law. 
 
Printed by PrintPartners Ipskamp, Business and Science Park, PO Box 333, 7500 AH 
Enschede, the Netherlands. 
http://www.ppi.nl 
  
 
 
 
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT 
 
 
 
The Political Economy of King Midas: 
Resource Abundance and Economic Growth 
 
 
ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT 
 
 
 
 
ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan 
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 
op gezag van de rector magnificus 
prof.dr. T. Sminia, 
in het openbaar te verdedigen 
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie 
van de faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Bedrijfskunde 
op donderdag 15 juni 2006 om 10.45 uur 
in de aula van de universiteit, 
De Boelelaan 1105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
door 
 
 
Elissaios Papyrakis 
 
geboren te Rethymnon, Griekenland 
  
 
  
 
 
promotor:        prof.dr. H. Verbruggen 
copromotor:    dr. R. Gerlagh 
 
  
  
 
The improvement of the understanding is 
for two ends: first, for our own increase of 
knowledge; secondly; to enable us to deliver 
and make out that knowledge to others. 
        John Locke (1632-1704) 
 
  
 
 
 i 
Acknowledgements 
 
There are indeed no gains without pains and this thesis was no exception of the general rule. It 
takes a lot of effort to put down your thoughts on paper, convey your ideas in a clear manner, 
and present them in an intriguing way. Nevertheless, the result is more than rewarding. 
Similar to the pride of an architect or sculptor when glimpsing his or her structure or sculpture 
when complete, I have to say I felt inundated with joy and satisfaction the minute I printed out 
the last version of my thesis. Writing a thesis is an extremely mind-intensive process, it is a 
mental seesaw. There are ups and downs, moments you feel extremely frustrated and want to 
give up and moments you feel really content with yourself and keep smiling to everybody 
around you. Sometimes, a paper gets rejected and sometimes it gets accepted. Sometimes, 
people give you fierce criticism and sometimes they provide flattering compliments. But 
overall, I consider this thesis an inseparable part of me and my life, and as such I bear much 
affection towards it. I would be, though, at least selfish not to acknowledge that I have to 
share fatherhood with many other persons that helped me shaping my ideas and approaching 
my research questions. And there is no better time to acknowledge their invaluable 
contribution than the very first page of the book.  
 First of all, I want to thank Reyer Gerlagh and Harmen Verbruggen for their supervision 
and constant encouragement throughout my doctoral research. Both of them have been 
extremely supportive and encouraging towards me. I do not think there are many PhD 
students that meet their supervisor as frequently as I did with Reyer. He generously devoted 
his time to me several times in a week for my “scientific upbringing”. I learned a lot from 
him, and I hope he also learned a little from me through my naïve questions. I am much 
indebted to Henri de Groot and Ragnar Torvik for their analytical advice and suggestions on 
earlier drafts of the chapters. 
 It is needless to say that everybody at the Institute for Environmental Studies deserves my 
gratitude for my pleasant stay and the hospitality I was offered. I especially want to thank 
Marja, with whom I shared my office (although the truth is rather that she shared her office 
with me) for putting up with my cluttered desk for four whole years. I am grateful to all my 
colleagues with whom I shared evening borrels, excursions and game nights. Special thanks 
to Dave and Harro for teaching me how to play Risk, to Lorenzo, for sharing together our 
PhD experiences and to the three muses of the Secretariaat for their early morning smile. I am 
grateful to Luke Brander for his language editing, but most of all for being a brilliant friend 
and neighbour. I would also like to thank Florian Eppink, without whom this thesis would 
lack a Dutch summary. Many thanks also to Arjen Liefting for designing the cover of the 
thesis. 
 My family deserves a special mention, for being there for me when I need them and for 
strongly believing in me. I know that both my parents are very proud of seeing me 
progressing in life and that they go through my publications with great pride, even if they still 
do not understand what all these strange equations and numbers stand for. Special thanks to 
ii 
 
 Amalia, Francesco, Kostas, Kyla, Vera and Ziv for the moments we shared all these years. 
Last, I want to thank Zak; I definitely learned a lot from him even if he does not realise it. 
 
 
 
 iii 
Contents 
 
 
Tables v 
 
Figures vii 
 
1. The Political Economy of King Midas 1 
 
1.1. Introduction 1 
1.2. Natural Resources and Economic Prosperity 3 
1.3. Explanations of the “Resource Curse” 9 
1.4. Sustainability under the Resource Curse Perspective 14 
1.5. Outline of the Thesis 17 
 
2. Natural Capital, Physical Capital, and the Resource Curse  23 
 
2.1. Introduction 23 
2.2. A Model on Natural Capital, Savings and Investment 27 
2.3. Resource Curse Scenarios 32 
2.4. Conclusions 36 
Appendix 2.1: Exogenous versus Endogenous Resource Rents 37 
Appendix 2.2: The Case of Intergenerational Distribution of Resource Rents 39 
 
3. Natural Resources, Innovation, and Growth 41 
 
3.1. Introduction 41 
3.2. A Model on Resources and R&D 44 
3.3. Analysis 48 
3.4. Conclusions 53 
Appendix 3.1: Derivation of Steady-State Dynamics 54 
 
4. Cross-Country Evidence and Explanations of the Resource Curse  57 
 
4.1. Introduction 57 
4.2. Basic Cross-Country Regressions 59 
4.3. Transmission Channels 63 
4.4. Conclusions 68 
Appendix 4.1: Long-term Income Effects 69 
Appendix 4.2: List of Variables 70 
Appendix 4.3: List of Countries in Samples 71 
Appendix 4.4: Replication of Table 4.1 with a Fixed Sample of 39 Observations 72 
Appendix 4.5: Replication of Table 4.2 for the Largest Possible Sample 73 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 5. Resource Abundance and Economic Growth in the U.S.                     75 
 
5.1. Introduction 75 
5.2. Natural Resource Abundance and Growth 79 
5.3. Conditional convergence 83 
5.4. Transmission Channels 85 
5.5. The Role of R&D 90 
5.6. Some Examples 93 
5.7. Conclusions 97 
Appendix 5.1: Robustness Checks 98 
Appendix 5.2: List of Variables Used in Main Analysis 123 
Appendix 5.3: Transmission Channels with Initial Income as an Additional            
Explanatory Variable 124 
Appendix 5.4: Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimation of Growth Regression (5.1) 125 
Appendix 5.5: Relative Importance of Transmission Channels with Alternative                                                                                
Specifications 126 
 
6. A Long-Term Institutional Perspective of the Resource Impact  127 
 
6.1. Introduction 127 
6.2. Patterns of Colonisation 130 
6.3. From Precious Metals to Resource Abundance 139 
6.4. Conclusions 141 
 
7. Conclusions 143 
 
7.1. Research Conclusions 143 
7.2. Policy Issues 146 
7.3. Future Research 149 
 
References 153 
 
Summary 165 
 
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 171 
 
Περίληψη (Summary in Greek) 179 
 
Name Index 187  
 
 
 v 
TABLES  
 
TABLE 1.1. Different cases of resource abundance and economic development 6 
TABLE 2.1. Savings and investment 26 
TABLE 4.1. Growth regressions as in equation (4.1) 63 
TABLE 4.2. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (4.5) 64 
TABLE 4.3. Growth regression, including indirect effects as in equation (4.6) 65 
TABLE 4.4. Relative importance of transmission channels as in equation (4.5) 67 
TABLE 4.5. Growth regressions as in equation (4.1) with a fixed sample                                  
of 39 observations 72 
TABLE 4.6. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (4.5) 73 
TABLE  5.1. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) 82 
TABLE  5.2. Income levels and resource abundance 83 
TABLE 5.3. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (5.2) 87 
TABLE 5.4. Growth regression, including indirect effects as in equation (5.4) 89 
TABLE 5.5. Relative importance of transmission channels as in equation (5.4) 90 
TABLE 5.6. Growth regression as in equation (5.1) with R&D spillovers 91 
TABLE 5.7. Indirect transmission channel as in equation (5.2): Innovation 92 
TABLE 5.8. Relative importance of transmission channels as in equation (5.2)                     
with regional R&D spillovers (Innovation) 93 
TABLE 5.9. Growth differentials from the average value among U.S. regions 95 
TABLE 5.10. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) (Bounded Influence Estimation) 100 
TABLE 5.11. Indirect transmission channels, as in equation (5.2)                                        
(Bounded Influence Estimation) 100 
TABLE  5.12. Growth regressions (Neoclassical specification) 101 
TABLE 5.13. Growth regressions (Reduced specification) 102 
TABLE 5.14. Growth regressions (Structured specification) 103 
TABLE 5.15. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) for all 51 states 104 
TABLE 5.16. Growth regressions as in equation (5.6) (Latitude, Access to Water) 106 
TABLE 5.17. Growth regressions as in equation (5.6)                                                    
(Latitude, Longitude, Access to Water) 107 
TABLE 5.18. Growth regressions as in equation (5.6)                                                     
(Distance from W DC, Access to Water)  108 
TABLE 5.19. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (5.7)                                  
(Latitude, Access to Water) 109 
 vi 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.20. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (5.7)                                               
(Latitude, Longitude, Access to Water) 109 
TABLE 5.21. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (5.7)                                               
(Distance from W DC, Access to Water) 110 
TABLE  5.22. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) with Openness 90-94 111 
TABLE  5.23. Indirect transmission channel as in equation (5.3) for Openness 90-94 112 
TABLE  5.24. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) with mineral production 113 
TABLE 5.25. Indirect transmission channel as in equation (5.2) with mineral production 114 
TABLE  5.26. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) (Natural Resources per Capita) 114 
TABLE 5.27. Growth regression as in equation (5.1) with advanced degree holders 116 
TABLE 5.28. Indirect transmission channel as in equation (5.2) with advanced                
degree holders as a proxy for schooling 116 
TABLE 5.29. Resource abundance and income growth for 1977-2000 117 
TABLE 5.30. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) for 1986-1994 119 
TABLE 5.31. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) for 1994-2000 120 
TABLE 5.32. Growth regression as in equation (5.1) with R&D spillovers for 1994-2000 121 
TABLE 5.33. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (5.2) for 1994-2000 121 
TABLE 5.34. Relative importance of transmission channels as in equation (5.2)                     
for 1994-2000 122 
TABLE 5.35. Relative importance of transmission channels as in equation (5.2)                   
with regional R&D spillovers for 1994-2000 122 
TABLE 5.36. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (5.3) 124 
TABLE 5.37. 2SLS regression of equation (5.1) with international migration in 1990 
(Openness90) as an instrument for average openness 125 
TABLE 5.38. Relative importance of transmission channels. Specification (5.3)              
adopted for the openness channel and specification (5.2) for the rest 126 
TABLE 5.39. Relative importance of transmission channels. Specification (5.3)              
adopted for all transmission channels 126 
TABLE 6.1.  GDP per capita and institutions 135 
TABLE 6.2.  GDP per capita and settlements 136 
TABLE 6.3. Current resource abundance and income per capita 137 
TABLE 6.4. Current resource abundance and institutions 139 
TABLE 6.5.  GDP per capita, institutions and settlements                                              
(Precious metals and plantations) 141 
 vii 
 
   
FIGURES 
FIGURE 1.1. Resource abundance and economic growth 4 
FIGURE 1.2. Resource abundance and development paths 6 
FIGURE 2.1. Resource abundance and savings 25 
FIGURE 2.2. Decrease in income following a 10% increase in resource revenues,     
dependence on the technology spillover (pi) and the capital share (α) 34 
FIGURE 2.3. Decrease in income following a 10% increase in resource revenues,    
dependence on the technology spillover (pi) and the rate of time preference (ρ) 35 
FIGURE 2.4. Stability of the share of primary exports in GDP over time 37 
FIGURE 2.5. Resource income g, man-made income y*, and total income y*+g 38 
FIGURE 2.6. Change in income following a 10% increase in resource revenues, under the 
scenario of equal intergenerational distribution, dependence on the technology    
spillover (pi) and the capital share (α) 40 
FIGURE 3.1. Resource abundance and R&D Expenditure 42 
FIGURE 5.1. Resource abundance in the U.S. 77 
FIGURE 5.2. Resource abundance and economic growth in the U.S. 77 
FIGURE 5.3. Absolute convergence in the U.S. 78 
FIGURE 6.1. Precious metals in colonised countries 129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
Part I 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ~ 1 ~
1. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KING MIDAS 
1.1.  Introduction 
The story of King Midas and his empowerment to transform all he touched into gold is a well-
known tale from ancient Greek mythology. One day, Silenus, an elderly satyr and companion 
of the wine god Dionysus was wandering off drunk close to the palace of King Midas. Some 
peasants captured him and brought him before the king. King Midas recognised Silenus, 
released him, and treated him kindly during his stay. When Dionysus heard about King 
Midas’ hospitality, he offered to grant the king any wish. King Midas, a cordial and gracious 
man but exceptionally greedy and fond of luxury and wealth, asked for the gift of the golden 
touch. Dionysus asked King Midas to reconsider his choice, foreseeing where this would 
inevitably lead. The king insisted and Dionysus granted him the gift of the golden touch, in 
order to honour his promise. King Midas, immensely delighted by his new powers, started 
immediately touching things in order to transform them into gold and increase his riches. His 
golden touch made him feel extremely fortunate and pleased with all the precious gold 
surrounding him. But his joy was not meant to last too long. After a while, the king’s clothes, 
friends, food, water, his precious daughter and the whole palace was transformed into gold. 
As he nearly starved to death, King Midas realised his error and begged Dionysus to grant 
him release of his glittering destructive powers. Dionysus took pity on the king and granted 
his request by having him bathed in the Pactolus River. 
 The story is reminiscent of the disappointing economic performance of resource-rich 
countries observed over the last decades. Resource-rich countries experience an increase in 
income at the time of the resource discovery and thus the economy benefits in the short run. 
This is the “golden touch” gift that mother nature provided to a few regions around the world. 
Resource wealth, however, may be nothing more than a momentary bliss for the economy and 
the overall level of welfare. Often, natural resources create a false sense of security and make 
people lose sight of the need for prudent and growth-promoting strategies. Governments 
misuse the resource revenues and do not exercise care when planning economic policies. They 
succumb to greed and cannot foresee that an intense exploitation of the resource base leads to 
stagnation and a deterioration in living standards. For several reasons, that will become 
apparent as the analysis proceeds, resource-rich economies often find themselves much 
worse-off in terms of income growth in the long run. King Midas begged Dionysus to relieve 
him of the power of golden touch, as soon as he realised that such a gift was a threat to his 
welfare. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia said once of his country that the way resource rents are 
being wasted, they would soon end up riding camels again instead of Cadillacs. Plentiful 
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fertile valleys, rich fishing stocks, diamond mines, and vast oil reserves do not necessarily 
guarantee a high level of economic prosperity, on the contrary they may inhibit it.  
 Recent empirical evidence and theoretical work provides strong support to a resource 
curse hypothesis; i.e. natural resource wealth tends to impede rather than promote economic 
growth (Auty 1994, Gylfason 2000, 2001a, 2001b, Leite and Weidmann 1999, Rodriguez and 
Sachs 1999, Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004a, Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997, 1999a, 1999b). 
One of the most striking manifestations of the hypothesis is undoubtedly the disappointing 
performance of the oil cartel countries. As Gylfason (2001b) notes, the significant injections 
of petrodollars into their local economies from the oil extractive industries did not prevent 
them from experiencing a negative rate of income growth over the last four decades. In a 
similar context, Argentina ranked among the ten wealthiest nations at the beginning of last 
century but its vast resource base did not prevent its continuous downgrade to a developing 
country (Diaz-Alejandro 1970). Oil rich Venezuela had the second highest GDP per capita in 
Latin America before the first oil boom but sustained an average income growth rate of –3% 
thereafter. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004b) note that Alaska is the only U.S. state with a 
negative growth rate over the last two decades despite its extensive oil reserves and fishing 
industry. 
 The expectations of many early development economists (such as Nurkse 1953, Rostow 
1960, and Watkins 1963) that resource endowments could support economic expansion and 
improve living standards proved to be wrong in most cases. In general, resource-dependent 
economies did not prosper by extracting and exporting their resource wealth, as long as their 
primary sector rents were not channelled into productive investments in order to build local 
infrastructure. Saying that, one should acknowledge that the resource curse hypothesis is 
though by no means an economic law without exceptions. Wright (1990) argues that the 
industrial expansion of the U.S. at the beginning of the 20th century was supported to a large 
extent by the discoveries of minerals. He stated on the conditional role of natural resources on 
economic development that “there is no iron law associating natural resource abundance with 
national industrial strength”. Sachs and Warner (1999a) argue, for instance, that Ecuador 
benefited from its oil boom between 1972-1986. The same authors (1995) point out that the 
vast deposits of iron ore and coal supported the industrial revolution in Great Britain and 
Germany. Wright (1990) associated the origins of rapid industrial expansion and 
technological transformation in the U.S. with the exploitation of mineral resources. More 
recently, Norway (the world’s second largest oil exporter) manages to convert its resource 
wealth into economic prosperity showing no symptoms of stagnation (see Gylfason and Zoega 
2001). This naturally raises the question of what determines whether or not a country escapes  
the resource curse. Why does the majority of resource-dependent countries fail to capitalise on 
the resource blessing and lag behind in terms of income growth and welfare compared to their 
resource-poor counterparts? 
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 The aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of the interplay between 
economic growth and resource abundance.1 The thesis investigates novel intermediary 
mechanisms that shed light on the “resource curse” hypothesis. Additionally, much emphasis 
is also given on testing existing explanations of the hypothesis and evaluating their relative 
importance. 
 Section 1.2 presents an introduction to the resource curse and the different economic 
experiences of resource-dependent economies. Section 1.3 reviews existing explanations of 
the negative association between resource income and economic growth. Section 1.4 briefly 
describes the relationship between the “resource curse” hypothesis and sustainability. Finally, 
the set up of the remainder of the thesis and the related research questions is presented in 
Section 1.5. 
 
 
1.2. Natural Resources and Economic Prosperity 
As discussed briefly in the introduction, most resource-abundant countries tend to be 
examples of development failures in terms of economic growth. Regions around the world 
with immense reserves of natural resources do not succeed in escaping crushing poverty. On 
the contrary, there seems to be a negative linkage between the two variables, implying that 
resource abundance impedes the efforts to increase per capita income and improve living 
                                                
1
 We notice that there is much confusion about the exact meaning of the concept “resource abundance”. The 
meaning may easily differ between sciences, and even between different areas of economics (for an extensive 
analysis of the confusion regarding precise terminologies of natural resources see Laroui and Van der Zwaan 
2002). For natural scientists or environmental economists, resource abundance typically refers to a large amount 
of potentially exploitable natural resources. For economists that study the Dutch Disease, resource abundance 
typically refers to the amount of already exploited natural resources and reserves proven to be economically 
exploitable. The proportion of potential resources that, in the end, becomes economically exploitable depends on 
many economic, political and technological factors. To provide an example, Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) show 
that there is a strong positive correlation between economic growth and (potential) resource wealth (forest cover) 
for a sample of 23 closed developing economies. They argue that forest-dependent communities tend to renew 
forest cover once they realise their economic dependence on forest products and the related long-term 
implications of deforestation. In this context, resource affluence refers to the exploitable resource stock rather 
than the exploited amount of resources. Sachs and Warner (1995), in contrast, find a strong negative correlation 
between economic growth and (already exploited) resource wealth (the share of primary exports in GDP) for 
their cross-sectional analysis of 95 countries. To use Patten’s own words (1889), in economics we often “really 
need new words more than we do new thoughts”. In our analysis, we focus on the already exploited natural 
resources. 
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standards. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, there is a clear negative correlation between the average 
annual growth of GDP per capita between 1975–1996 and the share of mineral production in 
GDP in 1971 for a sample of 103 countries. Data on income and mineral production are 
provided by the Penn World Tables 6.0 from the Center for International Comparisons at the 
University of Pennsylvania and by the Sachs and Warner database at the Center for 
International Development (CID) at Harvard University respectively. Most countries with a 
mineral production accounting for more than 20% of total production experience negative 
rates of income growth. King Midas almost died of starvation due to his golden touch, and the 
population in many resource-rich regions do not seem to suffer less.  
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FIGURE 1.1. Resource abundance and economic growth 
 
 Resource-abundant countries seem to embark on a different development path compared 
to resource-scarce ones, due to the fact that their governments often lose sight of the need for 
growth-supporting policies and efficient management of available resources. Resource 
exploitation damages the sound fundamentals of the economy and results in a lower or even 
negative rate of income growth. This is graphically represented in Figure 1.2, where we depict 
the different development paths an economy may experience over time. We assume that 
before exploiting its resource base, the representative economy grows at a constant and 
positive rate along the development path AD. At a certain point in time, resource revenues 
enter the economy causing an abrupt increase in total income. This is represented by a sudden 
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shift from a point A to B, indicating a positive income shock in the short term.2 After that 
point in time, different scenarios may evolve. Empirical evidence3 suggests that most 
resource-abundant countries shift to a different development path of lower income growth. 
Most of them either grow at a lower rate of economic growth, as suggested by the 
development path BE, or experience a negative growth rate, as depicted by the BF path.4 In 
the first case, growth simply slows down and the economy is better off for a short period of 
time (the time implied by the intersection of the lines AD and BE). In the latter case, 
economic contraction starts immediately and the resource curse is more acute. There is not 
only a relative loss of welfare and income, but also an absolute loss. As mentioned earlier, 
however, the resource curse is by no means an economic law and a few countries manage to 
escape from it. This is illustrated by the development path BC, corresponding to unaffected 
growth performance after the resource exploitation. It is also possible that resource wealth 
boosts income growth, and in this case, the slope of BC is larger compared to AD.5  
 In Table 1.1, we present representative examples of resource-dependent countries 
following each distinctive development path between 1975-1996. Next to each country, we 
present the average growth rate of GDP per capita over the 1975-1996 period. All countries 
have a share of mineral production and primary exports in GDP in 1971 above 10%. The first 
set of countries includes Zambia, Mauritania and Venezuela, that followed a development 
path, similar to BF in Figure 1.2. These countries, with a negative growth rate, represent 
regions where the manifestation of the resource curse is most acute. The second set of 
countries includes Algeria, Zimbabwe and Barbados that followed a development path similar 
to BE. These countries experienced moderate rates of income growth, but smaller than the 
sample average (1.3%). In that case, the resource curse results in downgrading the relative 
position of a resource-abundant country in welfare distribution at a global scale. Finally, the 
last set of countries includes resource-dependent nations such as the Netherlands, Norway and 
Botswana that outperformed many of their resource-scarce counterparts. These countries 
belong to the few exceptional cases of countries escaping the resource curse. Below, we 
discuss briefly the divergent experiences of some of these resource-dependent countries in 
terms of their resource management and resulting growth performance. 
 
 
 
                                                
2
 A constant rate of income growth implies that the economy is at a steady-state and we abstract from any 
transitional dynamics. 
3
 See, Papyrakis and Gerlagh  (2004a) and Sachs and Warner  (1995, 2001a, 2001b). 
4
 Gylfason (2000 and 2001b) provides a similar figure analysing the first case, depicted by the BE scenario. 
5
 We do not distinguish between the two cases, assuming that the BC development path characterises all those 
countries escaping the resource curse. 
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FIGURE 1.2. Resource abundance and development paths 
 
TABLE 1.1. Different cases of resource abundance and economic development 
Country GDP per capita Growth Primary Exports in GDP Development Path 
Zambia  
Mauritania  
Venezuela 
Algeria 
Zimbabwe 
Barbados 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Botswana 
–3.91 
–2.03 
–0.79 
  0.07 
  0.33 
 1.15 
 1.80 
  3.00 
  4.06 
0.54 
0.41 
0.24 
0.19 
0.17 
0.17 
0.15 
0.10 
0.10 
BF 
BF 
BF 
BE 
BE 
BE 
BC 
BC 
BC 
 
 
Norway 
 
Norway is probably the most famous example of a country that turned its abundant natural 
resources into an unambiguous blessing. As Røed Larsen (2005) notices, Norway’s economic 
growth accelerated after the discovery of oil in the late sixties and after catching-up with its 
neighbours Denmark and Sweden in the mid eighties, Norway maintained a higher pace of 
economic growth. During the seventies and eighties, Norway directed its resource revenues to 
debt repayments. As Norway shifted from being a net debtor to a net creditor in the nineties, 
the government established the Norwegian Petroleum Fund in order to shield the domestic 
A 
B 
time 
In
co
m
e 
Pe
r 
Ca
pi
ta
 
C 
E 
F 
D 
   The Political Economy of King Midas 
 ~ 7 ~  
economy from excessive spending. The fund invests the revenues from oil in foreign 
securities in order to prevent an overheated economy and achieve an equal distribution of 
resource rents across generations. A complementary policy, known as the “Spending Rule” 
requires that oil-funded public spending originates mainly from the financial returns of the 
fund’s assets (Røed Larsen 2005). In the years following its oil discovery, Norway invested 
heavily in high-tech industries and services complementary to the oil sector. Nowadays, 
Norway has developed great expertise in off-shore drilling and exploration techniques and 
becomes largely involved in establishing drilling platforms and identifying new reserves 
outside its territories (Wright 2001). 
 
The Netherlands 
 
After the discovery of extensive gas fields in 1959 in the province of Groningen, the 
Netherlands became one of the largest gas exporters globally. The consecutive appreciation of 
the Dutch guilder and decrease in the volume of non-resource exports spurred interest among 
economists in the negative implications of resource income shocks on currency rate 
movements and prompted the formation of the Dutch disease literature. Although, nowadays, 
the gas revenues accruing to the Dutch state are not as large as in the past, they still accounted 
for almost 4.5 billion Euros in 1999 (Huitema and Kuks 2004). In an attempt to improve the 
management of gas revenues, the Dutch government deposits the majority of gas rents into  
the Economic Structure Enhancing Fund (Fonds Economische Structuurversterking). The main 
idea behind this is that Dutch ministries can finance through the fund’s resources projects that 
support the main economic structure of the economy and increase productivity. Investments in 
know-how, education, environmental improvements and transportation belong to the category 
of such financed activities (as stated at the website of the Dutch government 
(www.government.nl)). Additionally, before commencing gas drilling in any Dutch provinces, 
it is legally required to discuss and address beforehand issues of after care and pollution of 
ground and surface water in order to minimise environmental damage (Huitema and Kuks 
2004). 
 
Venezuela 
 
Venezuela is often referred to as the complete antithesis of Norway, due to its failure to 
transform its oil-rich endowments into sustained economic growth (Karl 1997). It is a 
prominent “resource curse” example of a previously relatively rich country that downgraded 
itself over time in terms of relative income per capita. So, what went so wrong? Venezuela 
used in the sixties and seventies its oil reserves as collateral to borrow internationally, which 
resulted in large accumulated debts and a massive rise in interest rates. The peak of the 
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iceberg came with its 1983 default, but Venezuela’s position with respect to its debt burden 
did not improve much ever since (for a discussion see Hausman 2003). Venezuela also 
established an oil fund to improve revenue spending, but widespread corruption has 
obstructed plans for a prudent spending of oil rents (Birdsall and Subramanian 2004). There 
has been a recurring change of the fund’s rules stipulating the oil revenues spending. As a 
result the fund’s resources have practically dried up rather than successfully insulate the 
Venezuelan economy from excessive spending. Furthermore, especially after the 
nationalisation of the oil industry in 1976, oil revenues were largely seen by government 
officials as a means to substitute direct income taxes in public finances and help prolong their 
stay in power (Karl 1997). 
 
Botswana 
 
Botswana is an exceptional case of a poor country that managed to benefit from its mineral 
endowments (diamonds) and substantially improve the living standards of its population. 
Botswana with its highest rate of income per capita growth in Africa the last three decades 
(and one of the highest in the world) reveals that not only developed economies such as 
Norway and the Netherlands are capable of escaping the “resource curse”. So, what explains 
Botswana’s successful economic performance when compared to the dismal economic 
experience of other resource-rich African countries, such as Angola, Zaire, Sierra Leone, and 
Nigeria? Botswana emerged from British rule in 1966 as an independent country with strong 
institutions, based on pre-existing local traditions that encouraged broad political participation 
and placed restrictions on the political power of the elites. Colonial administration did not 
penetrate deeply into Botswana’s political system and therefore these pre-colonial institutions 
survived in the independence era (Acemoglu et al. 2003). The diamond rents were broadly 
distributed to all societal layers and no interest group was eager to incur the opportunity cost 
of undermining the good institutional framework in order to expand its share in the minerals 
rents at the expense of potentially destabilising the country. Good institutions of private 
ownership, an efficient bureaucracy and prudent investment of resource rents in infrastructure, 
health, and education made Botswana the “economic diamond” of the African continent. 
 
Zambia 
 
Zambia is one of the most famous economic failures of mineral-based development and 
visibly contrasts the succesful example of Botswana. Nowadays, the average Zambian has 
almost half the income level he or she relished back in the 1960s. This immediately poses 
questions on what went wrong in terms of economic development planning. Zambia’s 
disappointing economic performance over the last four decades is largely attributed to its past 
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economic reliance on the mineral sector (mainly copper) and respective lack of 
diversification. The overwhelming dependence of the state structure on the mining industry 
implied that any sustained fall in copper production or in the world price of copper 
consequently reduced government revenues, affected several development plans and resulted 
in widespread unemployment (Gupta 1974). The dominance of mining without a parallel 
effort to increase diversification inevitably made the Zambian political system extremely 
vulnerable and dependent on that sector. In that respect, mine workers often disturbed the 
production process having knowledge of their vital role in the Zambian economy and went 
repeatedly on strikes in order to demand wage increases. As a result, there was a widening of 
the wage gap with other sectors and soaring labour costs for the economy as a whole. Finally, 
while copper price fluctuations should signal officials to reduce dependence on copper, more 
wasteful resources were pumped into the mining industry rather than being directed into 
alternative sectors of production as a result of succumbing to the mining industry demands 
(Jones 1971).  
   
 
1.3.  Explanations of the “Resource Curse” 
It is hard to believe that any contracting effect of resource rents on either welfare levels or 
economic growth rates can be directly attributed to the resource revenues themselves. As 
Sachs and Warner (2001) argue, the resource curse is most possibly associated with the 
crowding-out effects of natural resources on several growth determinants. The remainder of 
this section provides a concise overview of leading explanations as to why resource 
dependency has resulted in sluggish economic performance. These explanations will be 
analysed within four categories: (i) Dutch disease, (ii) Institutions, (iii) Investment, and (iv) 
Policy Failures, although many existing theories could well belong to more than one of the 
aforementioned classes.  
 
(i). Dutch disease 
Many of the trade-related explanations are combined under the label “Dutch disease”, 
originally referring to the adverse effects of natural gas discoveries in the late 1950s on Dutch 
manufacturing through the appreciation of the Dutch guilder. Resource revenues often create a 
demand shock that triggers inflationary pressures and results in an overvaluation of the local 
currency (see Corden 1984, Neary and van Wijnbergen 1986). Increased income raises the 
prices of non-tradeable goods (which are not determined by international markets), the terms 
of trade deteriorate and the resulting loss of competitiveness reduces the level of exports 
(Fardmanesh 1991). If the magnitude of exports and openness are conducive to economic 
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growth, as suggested by Frankel and Romer (1999), resource wealth will indirectly inhibit 
income growth.  
 Apart from a decrease in the volume of exports, their composition often becomes skewed 
away from manufacturing goods and towards primary goods. Corden and Neary (1982) 
decomposed the impact of resource abundance into a resource movement and a spending 
effect. The resource movement effect focuses on the shift of man-made capital and labour into 
the primary sector due to a higher marginal productivity. This was the case, for instance, for 
the Faroes and Greenland, both of which offered wage premia within their fishing industries 
(Paldam 1997).6  The spending effect focuses on the relative increase of prices in non-export 
goods and the consequent shift of resources away from export production. In case the export 
sector consists mainly of manufacturing, the spending effect will lead to its contraction.7 
Linnemann et al. (1987), for instance, provide empirical evidence on the negative effect of 
resource abundance (in terms of arable land per person) on the export orientation of the 
manufacturing sector. 
 The contraction of the export sector and manufacturing in particular is a matter of concern 
due to the learning-by-doing externalities it offers. Matsuyama (1992) argues that a shift of 
labour from manufacturing deprives the economy from the growth-enhancing learning-by-
doing externalities found in that sector. Krugman (1987) claims that an increase in resource 
income may create a loss in comparative advantage for many manufacturing industries, which 
may be permanent in the case that resource exploitation lasts too long. Furthermore, 
Herberttson et al. (1999) relate resource revenue fluctuations to exchange rate volatility and 
increased risk for investors. To the extent that resource booms and busts are recurrent (due to 
the excessive price fluctuation of primary commodities), exchange price volatility can become 
an inherent element of the economy. Additionally, since natural resources often weaken the 
manufacturing sector, policy makers may also adopt a protectionist response and impose 
quotas and tariffs in order to protect domestic producers.  
 It is needless to say that the extent of any Dutch disease implications closely depends on 
the degree to which resource rents enter the local economies. In most cases, the majority of 
resource revenues generated in the primary sector increase domestic consumption and to a 
lesser extent investment. In only a few cases, such as Norway, governments shield the 
economy from abrupt income shocks through establishing investment funds that channel 
domestic rents into portfolios of foreign assets. Similarly, nowadays, the Netherlands deposits 
                                                
6
 This also implies that the Dutch disease is not confined to currency-related issues, since both countries use the 
Danish krone for their international transactions. 
7
 Torvik (2001) argued that the tradeable sector may consist of either manufacturing or primary goods depending 
on the country examined. Therefore, the spending effect does not always result in a contraction of manufacturing 
activities. 
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part of the gas revenues in an investment fund, from which ministries draw resources to 
finance infrastructure projects (Scholtens 2004).  
   
(ii). Institutions 
There is an extensive literature on the beneficial role of institutions in economic development 
(see, for example, Knack and Keefer 1995, Mauro 1995, and Murphy et al. 1993).  Good 
standards in terms of rule of law, bureaucratic efficiency, corruption constraints, political 
stability, democratic liberties and transaction transparency are strongly associated with 
economic prosperity. Nobel laureate Douglas North (1981) emphasised the importance of 
intellectual property rights and contract enforceability in modern economic growth. This 
implies that any negative direct effect of natural resources on institutions will indirectly 
frustrate economic growth.  
 Many scholars have claimed that resource rents tend to erode the sound institutional base 
of the economy. Resource rents may tempt individuals to engage in rent-seeking competition 
rather than productive activities (see Baland and Francois 2000, Krueger 1974, Tornell and 
Lane 1999, and Torvik 2002). This is much related to the nature of natural resources 
themselves, especially in the case of minerals. In most cases, there is limited access to 
resource usage rights due to their limited physical availability, granted to a few public or 
private companies or even individuals. Such sector conditions that restrain intense 
competition create excessive profits accruing to a few agents in the economy. The larger the 
amount of resource rents (or the stricter the access to them), the fiercer is expected to be the 
rent-seeking competition. In a similar context, Sachs and Warner (2001) claim that wage 
premia in the natural resource sector are likely to crowd out entrepreneurial activities in the 
economy.  
 As detrimental to economic development as it may be, rent-seeking is not an illegal 
activity.  Resource revenues also tend to increase unlawful informal activities that generate 
wealth for a few economic actors. For instance, resource rents often induce agents to bribe the 
administration in order to gain access to them (Leite and Weidmann 1999). In most cases, 
even in market economies, resource management is not granted through an open-access 
auction but through the intervention of public officials. 
 Another institutional aspect of the “resource curse” lies in the manner in which resource 
rents are utilised in the economy. A large share (if not all) of the resource revenues remains 
property of the government. Government officials are likely to utilise rents to reward either 
the electorate belonging to their party or interest groups that favour it. For instance, as Auty 
(1994) and Ross (1999) point out, domestic firms often achieve protection against 
international competition in the means of import substitution supported by resource transfers. 
In the case that resource revenues favour particular groups within the society, a widespread 
feeling of inequality may result in continuous disputes between different groups and inhibit 
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income growth.8 Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that resource dependence hinders 
democratic reforms. Ross (2001a) argues that oil and mineral revenues make governments 
less accountable to society by relieving social pressure in the means of increased public 
spending (which consecutively increases public satisfaction). Robinson and Torvik (2005) 
argue that rents can be channelled into “white elephant” projects of low social return as a 
politically appealing way of canvassing votes.  
 Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue that resource abundance is also harmful to political 
stability. Since resource wealth is often geographically concentrated, it may trigger ethnic or 
regional conflicts or exacerbate existing tensions. De Soysa (2000) finds, for instance, that 
resource wealth increases statistically the probability of a civil war. 
 
(iii). Investment 
The positive role of investment in economic development has been well documented in recent 
literature (see Barro 1991, Grier and Tullock 1989, Kormendi and Meguire 1985, Sachs and 
Warner 1997). Levine and Renelt (1992) found investment in their regression analysis to be 
one of the few robust determinants of economic growth independent of the conditioning set of 
explanatory variables. Furthermore, recent empirical research has identified the crowding out 
impact of resource abundance on investment rates and consequently on economic growth.9 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004a) estimated that 40% of the total negative impact of mineral 
income on economic growth is attributed to the investment channel. 
 Several explanations justify the negative relationship between resource abundance and 
investment. World prices for primary commodities tend to be more volatile than world prices 
for other goods. Therefore, an economy based on primary production will shift relatively often 
from booms to recessions creating uncertainty for investors (see Herbertsson et al. 2000). This 
argument may provide substance to the strong negative correlation between resource 
abundance and foreign investment rates over the last three decades (Gylfason 2001b). 
Additionally, natural resource wealth decreases the need for savings and investment, since 
natural resources provide a continuous stream of income wealth that makes future welfare less 
dependent on capital accumulation (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004c). Gylfason and Zoega 
(2001) argue that resource rents may decrease the need for financial intermediation and the 
development of related financial institutions that foster investment. Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, resource abundance often leads to a contraction of the manufacturing 
sector, which is mainly responsible for the accumulation of capital goods. Often, 
complementarities in investment or positive externalities in manufacturing result in a further 
                                                
8
 Aghion et al. (1999) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) give an extensive overview on the role of inequality in 
impeding economic growth.  
9
 See Sachs and Warner (1995) and Gylfason and Zoega (2001). 
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decrease in the profitability and productivity of investment (Milgrom et al. 1991). Last, even 
if the level of investment in physical capital is of similar magnitude between resource-
abundant and scarce regions, there are differences in its quality and the efficiency of 
investment use. Investments often fail to reach the productive base of the economy (Usui 
1997). Resource transfers often provide protection to many infant manufacturing industries 
that subsequently fail to mature (Bell et al. 1984).  Instead, resource-abundant governments 
often invest in military and internal security sectors or engage in prestigious and popular 
projects with very low rates of return (Ascher 1999 and Robinson and Torvik 2005).  
 
(iv). Policy Failures  
Acknowledging that the demarcation line for categorising “resource curse” explanations is 
somewhat abstract, we incorporate as policy failures those explanations closely related to 
economic policy planning that do not belong to the other three groupings.  The common 
theme of such explanations lies in the fact that resource wealth often creates a false sense of 
economic euphoria and overconfidence. Governments lose sight of the need for cautious 
planning and prudent policies (see Gylfason 2001a).  
 Resource-abundant countries tend to be myopic, have irrationally optimistic expectations 
on future resource revenues, and accumulate foreign debt to a greater degree than resource-
scarce countries. Manzano and Rigobon (2003), for instance, argue that the “resource curse” 
may be related to excessive debt, accumulated using natural resources as collateral. Any 
volatile or falling primary commodity prices would then lead to a debt crisis, as many 
resource-dependent countries would face severe constraints in repaying their debts. 
 It is also likely that easy riches lead to sloth, both for individuals and governments. 
Natural wealth may enhance idleness, bureaucracy and discourage people from innovation 
and efficiency improvements (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004d). This might be because resource 
wealth leads people to believe they have a larger margin of error when planning ahead. As 
already mentioned, governments also tend to use resource rents through subsidies and 
transfers to support uncompetitive established industries rather than promote further 
diversification (see Auty 1994).    
 Educational policies often seem to be neglected in resource-dependent countries. This is 
largely due to the fact that the primary sector generally demands a less-skilled and educated 
labour force (Gylfason 2001a). Therefore, the need to accumulate human capital may appear 
less urgent in a resource-dependent economy. This would also imply that workers released 
from the primary sector are likely to experience greater difficulties in seeking employment 
elsewhere.  
 Auty (2001) and Auty and Mikesell (1998) argue that since resource revenues often 
accrue to governments, the decision making of their management lies in a few hands. A 
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limited number of people involved in resource management implies less accountability and 
control of the ways resource rents are utilised. 
 We should acknowledge at this point that similar arguments are found in the literature on 
the impact of aid on economic growth. This is unsurprising, since both aid and natural 
resources distort economic incentives by creating positive income shocks. Younger (1992), 
for instance, states that abundant foreign exchange loans can result in overvalued currencies of 
the recipient countries. Boone (1996) argues that aid tends to augment consumption rather than 
investment in developing countries. Finally, Knack (2001) claims that conflict over the control of 
aid funds encourages rent-seeking and corruption in the economy. 
 
 
1.4. Sustainability under the Resource Curse Perspective 
Since the launch of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1972 and the 
United nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the notion of sustainable development 
emerged as an essential part of policy analysis and a challenging field of environmental and 
growth economics. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to probe into issues of 
sustainability in depth, we believe that a brief comment on sustainability under the resource 
curse perspective deserves our attention due to the close association between resource 
management and sustainable development.  
 One of the most well-known definitions of sustainability is described in the report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development, popularly known as the Brundtland 
report: 
 
 Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). 
 
Many economists adopted and adapted the above concept, formulating a number of criteria 
for sustainable development. There is, however, no universally agreed criterion of 
sustainability and there is a vast array of different interpretations (Pezzey 1997a, 1997b), 
although some concepts of sustainability have become more popular and have distinguished 
themselves from others. Pezzey’s sustainability criterion, requiring utility (welfare) to be 
non-declining over time, is one of them (Pezzey 1992). Hartwick (1977) is an advocate of 
this sustainability notion, interpreting, though, utility strictly in terms of consumption.10 
Solow (1974), espousing the ideas of Rawls on intergenerational equity, interpreted 
                                                
10
 In the case that utility depends solely on consumption, Pezzey’s and Hartwick’s sustainability criteria are 
identical. 
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sustainability even more strictly in terms of constant intertemporal utility. In his later work, 
Solow (1986) also defined sustainability as a way of distributing natural resources over time 
by maintaining production opportunities for the future. All these different sustainability 
notions are compatible with the depletion of the resource base, as far as certain compensation 
rules exist to sustain human welfare over time. In that respect, exploiting natural resources is 
sustainable, provided that future generations do not find themselves worse off in the long run. 
This sustainability view is also known as the “weak sustainability” notion, since it assumes 
there is no inherent difference between natural and man-made capital in determining human 
welfare (see Atkinson et al. 1997). As long as we replace exhausted natural resources with 
physical, human or social capital so that we can sustain our level of welfare, we find 
ourselves on a sustainable development path. 
 Figure 1.2 can be useful in identifying unsustainable development paths based on 
resource exploitation.11 Both the BC and BE paths are considered sustainable according to 
the weak sustainability criterion. This certainly does not imply that both paths are equally 
desirable. The BC development path offers a strictly higher level of income compared to BE 
at each point in time. Provided that the economy does not experience decreases in income, 
both development paths satisfy the weak sustainability criterion. Thus, countries such as 
Trinidad and Tobago and Zimbabwe that are on the BE-type path, being examples of the 
more gentle manifestation of the resource curse, cannot be deemed unsustainable. 
 Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that income is an imperfect approximation for 
welfare. Economists often use income levels as a proxy for welfare standards, simply for 
reasons of convenience. The welfare of a population is undoubtedly not strictly determined in 
monetary terms. The availability of material goods, as captured by income indices, certainly 
contributes to a large extent to our welfare levels. We also, though, value largely intangible 
goods and services, such as the quality of education, social equality, political stability, and 
diversity in choices. In that direction, we also value ecological services and become 
discontent with environmental degradation. Therefore, paths such as the BC and BE may be 
less sustainable when we interpret utility more broadly to account for the detrimental impact 
of resource exploitation. 
 An aspect of sustainability, though often ignored in the literature, lies in its 
intragenerational rather than intergenerational dimension (see Rao 2000). Although the 
Brundtland report explicitly addresses the intragenerational aspect of resource distribution, 
this issue often seems to be neglected. 
 
                                                
11
 This analysis makes most sense in the case of an exhaustible resource base (e.g. oil and mineral production). In 
case of agriculture, forestry and fishery, there is always the possibility there is enough time for the resource base 
to replenish itself.  
Chapter 1 
 ~ 16 ~ 
It [Sustainable development] contains within it two key concepts; the concept of “needs”, 
in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should 
be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social 
organisation on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). 
 
Addressing the intragenerational dimension of sustainability provides some additional insights 
into identifying unsustainable development paths. Countries on the BE-type path, (the so 
called examples of the gentle manifestation of the resource curse) do not experience income 
decreases over time. In that respect, they are intergenerational-wise on a sustainable path. In 
terms of relative income and poverty, however, they continuously downgrade themselves with 
respect either to most of their resource-scarce counterparts (on the AD development path) or 
the few resource-rich countries that escaped the resource curse (on the BC development path). 
In that case, all resource-rich countries being either on the BE path (the gentle resource curse) 
or the BF path (the acute resource curse) will shift over time to the lower end of the world 
income distribution. For the second set of countries, the increase in relative poverty will 
obviously be more intense. Therefore, from an intragenerational point of view both the BE 
and BF paths can be thought of as unsustainable. In such a context, sustainability can be 
broadly interpreted in terms of missed opportunities, where economies on unsustainable paths 
do not necessarily contract but rather miss the chance to follow the example of front-runner 
countries. 
 To imagine the distinction between two different development paths in practical terms, we 
can think of the following hypothetical example. Between the year 2000 and 2020, a country 
on the AD or BC path (with high rates of income growth) may shift from a standard word-
processing software (such as the Microsoft Word 2000) to a word-processing software with 
voice recognition. By 2050 the same country uses a technologically advanced word-
processing software with voice recognition and characteristics of artificial intelligence that 
automatically correct syntactical and grammatical errors of the person dictating. The country 
following the BE path simply shifts from a standard word-processing software to a better 
version of it by 2050 that does not allow voice recognition (e.g. from Microsoft Word 2000 to 
Microsoft Word 2003 software). On the other hand, a country on the BF path may reverse 
from using the standard word-processing software to using early electric typewriters by 2020 
(such as the IBM Electromatic of the 1930s) and then manual typewriters by 2050. Perhaps, 
individuals in the BE-type economy will be able to produce and earn more by shifting from 
Microsoft Word 2000 to Microsoft Word 2003 software. But individuals of an AD-type 
country will be able to produce and earn much more thanks to their noteworthy technological 
advancements. Comoros in Africa, for instance increased its GDP per capita level from 560 
dollars in 1950 (1990 international prices) to 574 dollars by 2001. Spain increased its GDP 
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per capita level from 2189 to 15659 dollars in the same period. The income ratio between the 
two countries fell from 1/4 in 1950 to 1/30 by 2001.12 Taking account of the intragenerational 
aspects of sustainability implies that Comoros’ development path was unsustainable in terms 
of relative poverty. 
  Another notion of sustainability, known broadly as the “strong sustainability” criterion, 
assumes that increases in the stock of man-made capital cannot fully compensate for decreases 
in the stock of natural capital. In other words, this sustainability criterion assumes the 
existence of complementarities to some extent between the two types of capital. In that case, it 
is not only the level of the total capital stock that is important in terms of welfare, but also its 
composition. A non-declining stock of natural capital becomes a prerequisite of a sustainable 
development path.13  
 The preservation of natural capital may be important for two reasons. First, there may be 
valuable and non-substitutable environmental services to the economic process. Secondly, a 
declining natural capital may reduce welfare by upsetting ecosystem stability and resilience 
(see Arrow et al. 1995). According to the strong sustainability criterion, none of the three 
resource-dependent development paths are sustainable in the long term. In this case, resource-
based development is simply unsustainable, independent of whether it achieves its goal of 
increasing income levels. 
  
  
1.5. Outline of the Thesis 
The study aims at enhancing our understanding of the “resource curse” phenomenon and the 
transmission mechanisms through which this occurs. The focal point of investigation can be 
formulated as follows: 
 
Which crowding-out mechanisms of resource abundance can substantiate the poor 
performance of resource-dependent countries and regions in terms of economic growth? 
 
The thesis explores the issue both theoretically and empirically. The first part of the analysis 
focuses on developing novel theoretical explanations of the resource curse. The theoretical 
part makes extensive use of insights found in the endogenous growth literature. The second 
part evaluates empirically the relative importance of different transmission channels in 
explaining the paradoxical negative association between resource affluence and economic 
                                                
12
  For historical data see Maddison (2003). 
13
 It is likely that certain components of natural capital are important in maintaining future levels of consumption 
and welfare and others are not. In that case, the strong sustainability criterion refers to the former kind of natural 
capital, also known as critical natural capital. See Atkinson et al. (1997). 
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growth. At the same time, it aims at justifying the theoretical mechanisms exposed before. In 
that respect, the formal and empirical parts complement each other in terms of findings. The 
specific research question addressed in each chapter is as follows: 
 
Is there a tendency for resource revenues to induce reductions in savings for future 
consumption?  How likely is it that resource rents can compensate for the consecutive 
loss in investment and manufactured output? 
  
Chapter 2 deals analytically with this research question. We develop an OverLapping-
Generations (OLG) model, to show how savings adjust downwards to income from natural 
resources. This is a natural consequence of the tendency of resource income to reduce the 
necessity to save. Successively, a decrease in savings ultimately reduces investment and 
manufactured output. The reduction in income from manufacturing is exacerbated when 
labour productivity (through technology or education) depends on the level of physical 
capital. We show that any positive short-term impact of natural resources on income is likely 
to be outweighed by its contracting indirect effect on physical capital in the presence of strong 
knowledge spillovers. To a large extent, the distribution of resource rents over generations 
determines their effect on savings. The reduction in savings (and thus manufactured output) is 
larger, when resources are considered public property and the rents are used to pay for public 
expenditures such as social security. Savings adjust to a smaller extent when resources are 
considered common property and the rents are equally distributed over all consumers.  
 
Do resource rents crowd-out innovation and entrepreneurship in the economy ultimately 
frustrating the most decisive determinants of long-term growth? 
  
In Chapter 3 we develop a variation of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with endogenous 
growth features in order to provide insights into the impact of resource booms on innovation 
activities. The potential crowding-out effect of resource abundance on innovation is much 
neglected in the literature and for that reason a study of this nature becomes particularly 
promising and appealing. Many scholars have explored formally the negative relationship 
between resource affluence and economic growth, focusing on learning-by-doing activities 
and positive externalities across sectors (e.g. Elíasson and Turnovsky 2004, Matsuyama 1992, 
and Torvik 2001). In contrast to these studies, we do not consider innovation as a by-product 
of any economic activity and we explicitly model an R&D sector. We assume individuals 
trade-off consumption and leisure in terms of utility and show how an increase in resource 
wealth induces a reduction in the steady-state labour supply. This is a consequence of the fact 
that resource revenues allow agents to pay for extra consumption without additional work 
effort. Furthermore, we illustrate how resource rents induce a smaller proportion of the labour 
   The Political Economy of King Midas 
 ~ 19 ~  
force to engage in innovation. Both the impacts on work effort and the R&D labour base can 
decrease the growth potential of the economy. 
  
Is there any direct effect of resource abundance on economic growth across countries? 
Which indirect mechanisms can account for the negative impact of resource rents on 
growth as implied by the resource curse hypothesis?  
   
In Chapter 4 we examine empirically the direct and indirect impact of resource abundance on 
economic growth between 1975-1996. As suggested by recent findings in the resource curse 
literature, we explore the contracting effect of resource rents on a number of growth 
determinants, namely on institutional quality, investment, openness, terms of trade, and 
education. We estimate cross-country growth regressions as in Barro (1991) incorporating 
initial income and a vector of these resource-related growth variables. We find that the 
negative impact of resource affluence on growth disappears when we account for the 
aforementioned indirect channels. This implies that natural resources are not bad for economic 
growth per se. The analysis allows us to calculate the relative importance of each transmission 
channel in explaining the negative correlation between resources and growth. We find 
investment to be the most significant intermediate mechanism through which the resource 
curse takes place, followed by openness and terms of trade. 
  
Is the resource curse relevant in regional economics; namely do resource-dependent 
regions within the same country underperform in terms of economic growth?  
   
Chapter 5 contains an empirical analysis of regional economic growth utilising a novel U.S. 
state-disaggregated database. A merit of the analysis lies in the fact that regional economies 
are likely to be more homogeneous than sovereign countries in dimensions such as language, 
the quality of institutions, and cultural characteristics that are difficult to control for in growth 
regressions. Such an advantage is likely to be reflected on the precision of our estimations. 
Our approach challenges the absolute convergence hypothesis that focuses on initial income 
levels as the sole determinant of growth rate variation across regions. We investigate whether 
a number of growth-relevant variables including resource abundance have a significant impact 
on growth rates, as found across sovereign countries. We verify the existence of a U.S. state 
resource curse and confirm that several crowding-out mechanisms identified in our cross-
country analysis apply across regions. Similarly to our cross-country analysis, our findings 
reveal that the U.S. regional resource curse is mainly attributed to intermediate channels. 
Contrary to our prior results, though, we find that the knowledge-based channels of schooling 
and R&D play a much larger role than investment in elucidating the resource curse. This 
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implies that even if the resource curse exists at a regional level, it is likely to be of a different 
nature.  
  
Has the resource impact always been of a negative nature? Are there indications pointing 
to a beneficial role of resource abundance on sustaining higher income levels in the past?  
   
In Chapter 6 we examine the impact of natural resources on income levels from a long-term 
historical perspective.  Our approach extends the analysis by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) on 
the relationship between current income levels, institutions, and colonisation policies. In 
places where Europeans settled in large numbers, they imported the investment-conducive 
institutional framework found in their countries of origin, largely based on the protection of 
private property rights. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) investigated the endogenous character of 
settlement decisions and found that Europeans had a preference for areas with a mild disease 
environment and low urbanisation. We build on the same framework and investigate whether 
primary commodities influenced the settlement planning of Europeans. We find regions rich 
in precious metals (gold and silver) to be prominent settlement destinations and in addition to 
be fortunate enough to inherit better institutions. On the other hand, we find the production of 
agricultural commodities exported to Europe at the time of colonisation (coffee, tea, cocoa, 
and sugar), to discourage European immigration, but nonetheless, to be positively correlated 
to better institutions. This finding suggests that, even though current resource abundance has a 
contracting growth impact as suggested by the resource curse hypothesis, in the past natural 
resources have been beneficial for income improvements. 
 In Chapter 7 we elaborate upon the main conclusions and draw policy recommendations 
and suggestions for future extensions. 
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2. NATURAL CAPITAL, PHYSICAL CAPITAL, AND THE 
RESOURCE CURSE * 
This chapter focuses on the savings-investment transmission channel through which resource rents 
affect income, and develops an OverLapping-Generations (OLG) model with features from 
endogenous growth theory to study this mechanism. In this model, savings adjust downwards to 
income from natural resources, investments adjust to savings, and subsequently the level of overall 
productivity falls. Natural resources have two counteracting effects on income. In the short term, 
resource wealth augments income, but in the long term, it decreases income through a crowding-
out effect on knowledge creation. 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
There has been a large interest recently in the failure of resource-based strategies to foster the 
economic development process (Gylfason 2000, 2001a, 2001b, Leite and Weidmann 1999, 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004a, Rodriquez and Sachs 1999, Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997, 
1999a, 1999b, 2001). Resource rents do not seem to translate into higher levels of income for 
the majority of resource-dependent countries. The first regression of Table 2.1 illustrates the 
negative relationship between natural resources and income for a sample of 82 countries. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 2002 (LnY2002), while we use 
the share of natural capital in total wealth in 1994 (NatK) as a proxy for resource abundance.14 
Data on natural capital and GDP per capita are provided by the World Bank (WB 1997 and 
2004, respectively). There is a significant negative statistical association between the two 
variables. A one percentage increase in the share of natural resources in the total capital stock 
is associated with a 7% lower income level. An increase in the natural capital share by a 
standard deviation (0.11) is associated with a decrease in the natural log of income by 0.84, 
which implies a decrease in income by 57%. 
 As we discussed in Chapter 1, explanations of the tendency of resource-affluent regions to 
fail in generating high income levels are associated with extensive corruption, unfavourable 
                                                
*
 This chapter is a slightly revised version of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004c). 
14
 1994 is the first year for which data on natural capital are available from the World Bank Database. Gylfason 
(2001) argues that the share of natural capital is a good proxy for resource abundance, since resource abundance 
is not varying substantially over time. Indeed, the results in all tables can be reproduced by using alternative 
measures of resource abundance, such as the Sachs and Warner (1995) measure of the share of primary exports 
in GDP in 1971 or the share of agricultural production in GDP for the same year.  
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terms of trade, low educational attainments, and policy failures among others. As an 
alternative mechanism this chapter is concerned with the role of resource abundance in 
reducing investment in physical capital. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004a, Table 4) argue that the 
investment channel is probably the most important channel in terms of its contribution to the 
resource curse. Usui (1997) claims that Mexico’s underperformance after its oil boom was 
related to a large extent to the policy bias towards current spending rather than capital 
investment. Similarly, Trinidad and Tobago utilised their oil rents extensively (especially after 
the 1970s oil price shocks) as subsidies to consumers and unprofitable firms (see Velculescu 
and Rizavi 2005).  
 There are various mechanisms that can explain the crowding out of investment. In the 
Dutch disease literature (see Corden 1984, Neary and van Wijnbergen 1986), positive 
resource shocks and consecutive factor relocations result in a contraction of the manufacturing 
sector, mainly responsible for the production of capital goods. Volatile primary commodity 
prices provide a disincentive to foreign investors to direct their funds to resource-related 
projects. As another mechanism, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) show that governments often 
spend resource rents on public consumption. The few countries that use resource rents to 
finance investment projects are those that have avoided the resource curse. 
 Our analysis combines the insights from the various studies mentioned above. We 
develop an overlapping-generations model to demonstrate how public spending of resource 
rents decreases national savings. Figure 2.1 depicts the strong negative correlation between 
savings in GDP in 1994 and natural capital for the same year (data on savings are provided by 
the World Bank (WB 2004). We show that the decrease in the level of investment following 
the decline in savings is exacerbated when, in turn, labour productivity (through technology or 
education) depends on the level of investment. The decline in income may more than offset 
the increase in resource revenues, when we take account of the decrease in savings and the 
responsiveness of technology to investment. 
 Our analysis provides a theoretical justification for the empirical observation that 
resource-dependent countries generally do not reinvest resource rents in other forms of 
capital. Lange (2004), for example, claims that Namibia – and the majority of resource-
abundant countries – liquidate rather than reinvest their resource revenues and therefore find 
themselves on a development path of declining welfare. On the other hand, in a few cases 
where a prudent investment of resource revenues takes place (as in the case of Botswana), 
people relish a higher level of wealth over time (Lange and Wright 2004). In that respect, our 
analytical framework provides an explanation of the reasons that lead most resource-
dependent countries not to direct resource rents into capital accumulation. 
 Table 2.1 reveals the contracting impact of natural capital both on savings and investment 
in physical capital. Regression (2.2) depicts the strong negative correlation between natural 
capital and savings. Regression (2.5) extends the correlation to investments (data on 
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investment in GDP for 1994 are provided by the World Bank (WB 2004). Furthermore, 
countries that save less tend to invest less, as regression (2.8) demonstrates (although the 
coefficient on savings (smaller than unity) suggests substantial capital mobility, contrary to 
the findings by Feldstein and Horioka 1980). 
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FIGURE 2.1. Resource abundance and savings 
 
 We notice that the growth-impeding crowding-out logic is not restricted to natural 
resource income. There is a resemblance observed with aid as income (Baland and Francois 
2000, Dalmazzo and de Blasio 2003, Stevens 2003). Aid has a similar significant contracting 
effect on savings as shown in regression (2.3), though it has no negative impact on 
investment, shown in regression (2.6) (data on aid in GDP for 1994 provided by the World 
Bank (WB 2003). The difference with the effect of aid on savings and investment may be due 
to the fact that aid is often provided and monitored by international agencies with the 
condition that is utilised for investment projects. In that respect, conditional aid may indeed 
support capital accumulation, or – what seems more probable given the insignificant 
coefficient – decrease the need for domestic savings. Finally, in regressions (2.4) and (2.7), 
we test the negative correlation between natural capital and savings and investment, and show 
that it is robust when we control for aid as an additional regressor. 
 The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents the OLG model, and explains 
how resource abundance crowds-out savings and investment. Section 2.3 compares the steady 
states of the OLG model under different parameter scenarios and provides numerical 
examples of the resource curse hypothesis under alternative assumptions. Section 2.4 
concludes. 
  
 
 
TABLE 2.1. Savings and investment 
Dependent variable:
 
LnY2002 Savings (Sav94) Investment (Inv94) 
 
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.8)  
Constant      9.30       0.23       0.21       0.24      0.24       0.24      0.26     0.14 
NatK  
(0.11) 
   –7.61*** 
    (0.01) 
    –0.39*** 
      (0.08) 
 
 
   –0.22** 
     (0.10) 
   –0.23*** 
     (0.07)  
    –0.25*** 
      (0.09) 
Aid94 
(0.17, 0.18, 0.17, 0.18)   
    –0.20*** 
      (0.08) 
   –0.23*** 
    (0.06)  
    –0.06 
     (0.06) 
    –0.07 
     (0.06)  
Sav94 
(0.09)        
    0.43*** 
   (0.06) 
R 2 adjusted 0.43 0.24 0.05 0.33 0.12 0 0.18 
N 82 
 
83 
 
111 63 83 117 63 
0.27 
134 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses. For Aid94, standard deviations refer to regressions (2.3), (2.4), (2.6), and (2.7) respectively; 
robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts ** and *** correspond to a 5 and 1% level of significance.
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2.2. A Model on Natural Capital, Savings and Investment 
The model employed in this chapter extends the usual OLG models with discrete time steps, 
t=1,…,∞, by containing reference to a primary sector that provides the consumers with pure 
resource rents. As a second extension of the standard OLG model, we include a technology 
spill-over from the capital stock to a labour productivity variable. This second extension is 
essential to our analysis. As we will show in Section (iv), Proposition 2.2, capital-knowledge 
spillovers increase the crowding out effect of natural capital on man-made capital. In Section 
2.3, we show that in a standard OLG model with a narrow definition of capital (excluding 
knowledge as part of the broad capital stock) and in the absence of spillovers from investment 
to labour productivity, resource-dependent countries can escape the resource curse. With 
capital-knowledge spillovers, however, as captured in our extended model, resource 
dependence is prone to lead to a substantial reduction in overall income levels. 
 
(i). Demography 
We assume that in every interval two generations exist, an old and a young generation. At the 
beginning of a period, a new generation enters the model and the previously old generation 
leaves the model, so that there is a turnover in population. Each generation is indexed by their 
date of entering the model t (as a subscript). Each individual’s lifetime consists of two 
periods. The generations work when young and live from savings when old. We thus only 
examine the adult part of the life-cycle, i.e. from the age of 20 onwards, and each interval 
consists of a period of about 30 years. Population grows exponentially at a rate n: 
L t  = (1+n)L t -1 ,   (2.1) 
where Lt stands for the population size. Each individual provides inelastically one unit of 
labour during her youth and retires at the second period of her lifetime. Therefore Lt also 
measures the supply of labour. 
 
(ii). Producers 
There is a simple production sector for a man-made consumer good Yt, where physical capital 
Kt, technology ht, and labour Lt are combined to produce output Yt. We assume a constant 
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function for the economy: 
Y t  = K t
α
 (h tL t)1–α ,  0<α<1.  (2.2) 
Setting yt=Yt /Lt and kt=Kt /Lt we can rewrite the production process in its intensive form: 
Chapter 2 
 ~ 28 ~ 
y t  = k t
α
h t
1–α
. (2.3) 
We assume a simple form of learning-by-doing based on the endogenous growth models 
developed by Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), where human capital or 
technology ht is a by-product of physical capital production. The rate of knowledge or 
technological accumulation depends directly on the rate of physical capital accumulation. We 
assume the following specification for the level of technology or knowledge: 
h t  = k t
pi
,  0<pi<1.  (2.4) 
In that respect, the model is essentially a semi-endogenous growth model, where the long-run 
growth rate depends on exogenous parameters (as in Jones 1995a, Jones 1995b, Jones and 
Williams 2000, and Young 1998).15 Since each period covers about 30 years, we assume that 
the capital of the previous period fully depreciates, and we set the capital stock equal to the 
level of investment of the previous period, 
k t  = i t–1/(1+n).  (2.5) 
Markets for labour and capital are competitive so that the interest rate and labour wage per 
labour unit are given by:  
r t  = αk t
α–1
h t
1–α
 – 1, and (2.6)  
w t  = (1–α)k tαh t1 –α , (2.7) 
respectively. Taking account of the endogenous channel for human capital (eq.(2.4)) the 
output, interest, and wage equations become: 
y t  = k t
α+( 1–α )pi
,  (2.8) 
r t  = αk t
(1 –α ) ( pi– 1)
 
– 1, (2.9) 
w t  = (1–α)k tα+ pi ( 1–α ) . (2.10) 
 
(iii). Consumers 
Each generation maximises its lifetime utility derived from its two-period consumption 
scheme. Its utility function U(c tt  ,c tt + 1(1+n)) only depends on consumption per capita in the 
two periods c
t
t and c
t
t +1(1+n) and is assumed to be logarithmic, which implies a unitary inter-
temporal elasticity of consumption. The variable c
t
t+1  denotes the consumption of the old in 
                                                
15
 The long-run growth rate of income is equal to n(α+ pi(1-α ) ).  
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period t+1, divided by Lt+1, whereas c t
t
 is defined as the consumption of the young in period t 
divided by Lt; the multiplication with (1+n) corrects for this change in unit of measurement. 
Thus: 
U t  = ln c
t
t  + [1/(1+ρ)]  ln [c tt +1(1+n)] ,  (2.11) 
where ρ>–1 is the pure rate of time preference. Higher values of ρ represent a larger 
preference for current compared to future consumption. The restriction ρ>–1 rules out a 
negative weight on second-period consumption. Notice that the utility function is 
differentiable, concave, and strictly increasing in its arguments.  
 Each generation divides its labour income (wages) in the first period between its first-
period consumption and savings, st. These savings are used to finance their second period 
consumption.  
c
t
t  + s t  = w t  , (2.12) 
c
t
t + 1  = [(1+r t+ 1)/(1+n)]s t  . (2.13) 
where wt, rt+1 , c
t
t ,  and c
t
t+ 1  indicate the first-period wage, the interest rate between the first 
and second period, and the level of consumption per capita during her two lifetime periods. 
Notice that when writing variables in intensive form, we correct for population growth. Over 
the two periods, the present value of an individual’s consumption stream is equal to labour 
income: 
c
t
t  + c
t
t +1  (1+n)/(1+r t+ 1) = w t  . (2.14) 
 Now, we extend the economy with a natural-resource base (e.g. oil reserves) that 
generates resource rents Gt, or gt  per person at period t. For convenience, these rents are 
assumed to be a proportion q of that period’s total income Yt. In the appendix, we show that 
results do not change much when resource rents are assumed independent of the income level 
Yt. The distribution of resource rents over generations will determine their effect on savings. 
We distinguish two resource policies. First, resources are considered public property and the 
rents are used to pay for public expenditures such as social security. Second, resources are 
considered common property and the rents are equally distributed over all consumers. The 
analysis focuses on the first resource policy, when resource rents are used for public 
expenditures. In the appendix, we briefly analyse the second case. 
 We assume that the resource rents are used for social security; i.e. in every period, 
resource rents are paid to the retired generation. The second-period budget constraint 
becomes: 
c
t
t + 1  = [(1+r t+ 1)/(1+n)]s t  + qyt+1. (2.15) 
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The inter-temporal budget constraint adjusts to: 
c
 t
t + c
t
t+1 (1+n)/(1+rt+1) = wt + qyt+1(1+n)/(1+rt+1).  (2.16) 
 Each generation maximises utility subject to the budget constraint. The first order 
conditions with respect to consumption provide us with the Euler equation for the inter-
temporal consumption allocation: 
c
t
t+1 = c
t
t [(1+rt+1)/(1+n)(1+ρ)] . (2.17) 
The distribution of consumption over time does not depend on resource-income or labour 
income. It only depends on the interest rate, population growth, and the pure rate of time 
preference. 
 Substitution of the Euler equation in the budget constraint (eq.(2.16)) gives consumption 
c
t
t  as a function of the interest rate, the rate of time preference, population growth, and labour 
and resource income. Thus: 
c
t
t  = [(1+ρ)/(2+ρ)][(w t  + qyt+1(1+n)/(1+r t+ 1)].  (2.18) 
Savings, st, will be given by: 
st = wt – c
t
t  = [1/(2+ρ)] wt – [(1+n)(1+ρ)/(2+ρ)(1+rt+1)] qyt +1 .  (2.19) 
The savings curve is upwards-sloping with respect to the interest rate. An increase in the 
interest rate lowers the net present value of the resource revenues and increases the need for 
savings. When substituting for yt, rt, and wt from equations (2.8), (2.9), and (2.10), the savings 
equation becomes: 
s t  = [(1–α)/(2+ρ)]  k tα+ pi (1 -α )  – [(1+n)(1+ρ) /(2+ρ)α]  qk t+1 . (2.20) 
 
(iv). Equilibrium 
The commodity balance is given by: 
c
t
t
–1
 + c
t
t  +  i t   = (1+q)y t ,  (2.21) 
where c
t
t
– 1
, c
t
t ,  and i t  stand for total consumption of the older and younger generation and 
total investment, respectively. Equation (2.21) indicates that total production inclusive of 
resource rents can be used for either consumption or investment. The value of consumption of 
the older generation is equal to the value of capital rents, αy t, plus resource rents, qy t. Thus, 
(2.15) can be restated as: 
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c
t
t
–1
 =  (α+q)y t .  (2.22) 
The remainder of the manufactured income (1–α)yt is used by the younger generation to both 
consume and save. Thus, equation (2.12) becomes: 
c
t
t   + s t  =(1–α)y t .   (2.23) 
Equations (2.21)-(2.23) combined reveal the saving-investment balance: 
i t  = s t . (2.24) 
The savings-investment balance, together with the capital identity (2.5) and the savings 
equation (2.20), enables us to write the equilibrium as a recursive dynamic equation for kt:  
(1+n)k t+ 1  = [(1–α)/(2+ρ)]  k tα+ pi (1 -α )  – [(1+n)(1+ρ)/(2+ρ)α]qk t+ 1 .  (2.25) 
Rearranging terms provides kt+1 as a function of kt: 
[ ]
)1(
1 )1()2()1(
)1()( αpiα
ραρ
αα
ψ −++ ++++
−
== ttt kqn
kk , (2.26), 
where ψ ′>0, ψ ′′<0, ψ(0)=0, ψ ′(0)=∞, ψ ′(∞)=0. This implies that the sequence kt is 
convergent, and there is a unique non-trivial equilibrium level of capital per person denoted 
by k*.  We set kt+1 =  kt in equation (2.26) in order to calculate the steady-state value of capital 
per capita. This provides us with:  
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Similarly, the steady-state value of man-made output per capita is given by: 
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As the parameter q positively enters the denominator and the power coefficients are positive, 
it follows immediately from these equations that both the capital stock and output are 
decreasing in the resource wealth parameter q, as stated in the next proposition.  
 
PROPOSITION 2.1. An increase in the share q of resource rents in income results in a decrease 
in the steady-state levels of capital and output. 
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The responsiveness of output to resource rents depends, to a large part, on the spill-over 
effects of capital on technology, pi. From equation (2.28), we derive the relative change of 
steady-state output y* with respect to the resource share q, that is the semi-elasticity:  
0)1()2(
)1(
)1)(1(
)1(1
<
+++
+
−−
−+
−=
∗
∗
qydq
dy
ραρ
ρ
αpi
αpiα
.
16 (2.29) 
In turn, taking the derivative of (dy*/dq)/y* with respect to pi, we find, 
( ){ } 0// <∗∗
pid
ydqdyd
. (2.30) 
That is, a larger value for pi intensifies the negative effect of resource revenues on the steady 
state levels of capital and man-made income. This result is stated in the next proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 2.2.  A large responsiveness of technology to capital accumulation,
 
as
 
captured 
by pi, enhances the negative impact of resource wealth on the steady-state levels of capital and 
man-made income per person.  
 
Furthermore, as we can see from (2.29), the impact of resource rents on long-term output is 
independent of population growth.  
 
 
2.3. Resource Curse Scenarios 
For the resource curse to take effect, the decrease in output should exceed the increase in 
income brought by the resource rents. In order to investigate the effect of resource rents on 
total income, (1+q)y*, we compare an initial situation, denoted with subscript ‘0’, in which 
resource rents constitute a negligible proportion of man-made income q0 = 0, with an 
alternative situation after a resource boom, denoted with subscript ‘1’, when a resource base is 
discovered and resource revenues account for 10% of man-made income, q1 = 0.1.  
 We use a set of parameter values to test the dependence of the resource curse thereon. In 
the baseline, we set the discount factor ρ equal to one, which implies that individuals value 
their first period consumption twice as much as their second period consumption. In terms of 
pure time preference, for periods of 30 years, this assumption is equivalent to a pure rate of 
time preference of 2.3 % annually. We assume an annual population growth rate of 1%, which 
is approximately equivalent to a rate of 35% for a period of thirty years.17 We consider ranges 
                                                
16
  The level of steady-state consumption c*
 
can either increase or decrease depending on the parameters of the 
model. 
17
 This is the population growth rate for Canada and the U.S. in 1999 (World Bank (WB), 2003). 
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for both parameters as the analysis proceeds. We allow the capital share α to vary between 
0.30 and 0.70. The lower value is a reasonable approximation for a narrow concept of 
physical capital (see, e.g. Romer 1996 ch.3), while the latter parameter value is reasonable if 
we interpret capital kt broadly to consist of human capital as well (e.g. see Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil 1992 and Romer 1996 p.134).18 In the first case, ht can be thought of as a measure of 
both technological and educational improvements induced by capital investments. In the latter 
case, ht stands for technological advancement rather than educational quality.  
 As the occurrence of a resource curse depends to a large extent on the value for the 
technological parameter pi, we investigate which is a plausible range of values for it. 
Linearising equation (2.20) around k* shows that the economy converges to its balanced 
growth path at a rate α+pi(1–α): 
k t +1  – k*   [α+pi(1–α)](k t  – k*). (2.31) 
Most econometric studies find an annual convergence speed in the range between 0.005 and 
0.025, depending on the set of additional variables included and the time span under 
investigation (e.g. Gylfason 2001a p.856, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992a p.242, Kormendi 
and Meguire 1985 p.149, Mo 2000 p.72, Sachs and Warner 1995 p.24).19 For a 30-year 
period, we calculate that the factor α+pi(1–α) should lie in the range [0.47,0.85]. For α = 
0.3, this range is consistent with pi∈[0.24,0.79]. For α = 0.7, this range is consistent with 
pi∈[0.0,0.46]. For all possible pairs (α,pi) that produce a rate of convergence in the 
abovementioned range, the resource curse is minimal for the pair α = 0.30, pi = 0.24, when it 
has the value 0.078. It is maximal for the pair α  = 0.3, pi  = 0.79, when it has the value 0.657. 
The numerical calculations confirm the presence of a resource curse for the plausible range of 
parameters. Therefore, we let the technological parameter pi of the endogenous technological 
channel vary between 0 and 0.8.  
 We evaluate the steady-state values for total income (1+q)y* before and after the resource 
boom, assuming the above parameter values. We calculate the steady-state income differential 
created by the resource exploitation. The resource curse is defined as the negative relative 
income change,  
)1(
)1(1
00
11
qy
qy
RC
+
+
−=
∗
∗
.
 (2.32) 
The results are depicted in Figure 2.2. The vertical axis presents the steady-state income 
differential defined by (2.32). Positive values imply that resource exploitation results in a 
                                                
18
 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992 p.226) set α equal to 0.80 for an augmented measure of capital. 
19
 See Abreu et al. (2005) for an extensive survey of studies of convergence and a meta-analysis approach to 
estimating it.  
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lower steady-state income per capita. The legend on the right hand side of the figure divides 
the figure area according to the magnitude of the resource curse. 
 As Figure 2.2 depicts, for almost all parameter values, the steady-state income per capita 
decreases when resource rents enter the economy. For example, for α = 0.3 and pi = 0.5, we 
find total income (including resource rents) to decrease by about 25% when the resource 
windfall accounts for 10% of man-made income. Only for the lowest values of pi and α, 
assuming a narrow concept of capital and the absence of capital spill-over effects, the 
economy benefits from the resource rents. For α  = 0.3 and pi = 0, total income increases by 
just 1%. 
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FIGURE 2.2. Decrease in income following a 10% increase in resource revenues, dependence 
on the technology spillover (pi) and the capital share (α) 
  
 As a further check of our results, we also investigate how changes in the discount factor ρ 
affect the resource curse effect. An increased value of ρ enhances the resource curse, as can be 
calculated by equation (2.29): 
( )( ){ } 0)1()2()1)(1(
)1(/1/
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qραρ
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αpi
αpiα
ρd
ydqdyd
. (2.33) 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992a p.226) assume a rate of pure time preference of 0.05 per year 
for their calibrations for the U.S. This approximates a parameter value ρ of 3.35 for a period 
of 30 years. One could claim that for a developing country this parameter value could be even 
higher, since consumers in the developing world tend to value current consumption more 
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compared to uncertain future consumption. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) assume a range of 
(0.02, 0.07) for their yearly discount factor for their calibrations, which implies that the 
parameter value ρ lies approximately in the (0.8, 6.6) range for a 30-year period. For our 
robustness check, we set the capital share α and the population growth rate n equal to 0.3 and 
0.35, respectively, and let the technological parameter pi vary as aforementioned. We allow 
the discount factor ρ to vary between 1 and 6, so that the values remain in the range adopted 
by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981). We calculate the resource curse effect and present our 
results in Figure 2.3. For increased values of ρ, the resource curse becomes more acute. For 
instance, for a pi value of 0.5, an increase of the discount rate from 1 to 6 amplifies the 
resource curse from 0.242 to 0.316.  
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FIGURE 2.3. Decrease in income following a 10% increase in resource revenues, dependence 
on the technology spillover (pi) and the rate of time preference (ρ) 
 
 Finally, it is of interest to explore whether our measurements in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 
conform with empirical findings on resource revenues and income behaviour. Table 2.1 
confirms the contracting impact of resource rents on income, savings, and investment. In 
Chapter 4, we specifically estimate the resource curse effect for revenues from mineral 
production, for the 1975-96 period, for a sample of 39 countries. We conclude that an increase 
in resource income of 10% decreases long-term income per capita by 60%, about half of 
which (30%) is due to a drop in investment in capital and education. The 30% decrease can be 
reproduced by our model for a set of parameters; e.g. for (α, pi, ρ) = (0.3,0.5,4), or (0.5,0.6,1), 
or (0.7,0.4,1). 
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2.4. Conclusions 
Resource-rich countries tend to neglect the necessity to save and direct their resource 
windfalls into productive investment. There is ample evidence of policy failures across 
developing countries related to underinvestment of resource revenues. Mexico, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Venezuela, among others, are notorious examples of countries mismanaging 
their resource rents in order to relieve internal pressure from domestic interest groups. 
Motivated by such evidence, we exposed in this chapter a theoretical mechanism explicating 
the tendency of resource income to decrease incentives to save and invest. The main intuition 
lies in the potential of resource revenues to reduce the urgency to save for future consumption 
to the extent that future income levels may be supported by accrued resource rents. 
 In this context, we developed a stylised model in which technology (or education) 
depends endogenously on the level of investment. In this setting, increasing resource rents 
lead to a decrease in savings and investment that multiply over time, and long-term income 
substantially diminishes. For most of the reasonable parameter values, the effect of the decline 
in investment more than offsets the increase in income through resource revenues. Our 
analysis also reveals that the resource curse worsens with an increasing elasticity of output to 
capital and with a larger inter-temporal pure rate of time preference.  
 The mechanism described here provides an explanation of the resource curse hypothesis 
that is an alternative to the mechanisms described in earlier literature. From the literature, we 
know that resource-rich countries tend to suffer from currency overvaluations and loss of 
competitivess (Corden 1984), enhanced corruption and rent-seeking (Krueger 1974, Torvik 
2002), bad-decision making (Sachs and Warner 1999b, Auty 2001), political instability 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 1998), low levels of educational quality (Gylfason 2001a), and low 
capital investment (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003). In Chapter 4, we claim that the last-
mentioned channel is the most important in explaining the resource curse phenomenon across 
countries. In this chapter, we describe a mechanism to explain this transmission channel, 
focusing on the role of resource abundance in crowding-out savings by enhancing future 
income for which no savings are required. The assumption that labour productivity depends 
endogenously on the level of investment is critical in the model. Under this presupposition, 
the decrease in savings and investment leads to a decline in output that exceeds the increase in 
resource income, thus producing the resource curse. Such a mechanism can provide a formal 
explanation of why resource-abundant countries are characterised by smaller shares of savings 
and investment in their GDP and lag behind in terms of long-run income. 
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APPENDIX 2.1. EXOGENOUS VERSUS ENDOGENOUS      
RESOURCE RENTS 
The dynamics of our analysis are much simplified by assuming a constant share of resource 
rents in man-made income over time, G = qY, for constant q. It can be the case, however, that 
resource revenues are an either increasing or decreasing proportion of man-made income y as 
time evolves. Figure 2.4 depicts the relationship between the share of primary exports in GDP 
in 1990 and 2001. Data are compiled from the United Nations (UN, 2003) Database of 
Human Development Indicators. As the figure shows, the share of primary exports remained 
fairly stable over a period of eleven years. For instance, the share of primary exports in GDP 
fell from 30 to 29% for Panama and rose from 42 to 44% for Kuwait. 
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FIGURE 2.4. Stability of the share of primary exports in GDP over time 
 
Still, the objective of this appendix is to show that our steady state model results carry over to 
an economy where total resource rents G are exogenous with an adjusting share in total 
income q, instead of the opposed assumption made in the main text. Figure 2.5 is helpful in 
this respect; as it depicts the relation between q, y*, and g. It shows the steady state levels of 
man-made income y*, resource income g, and total income y* + g = (1+q)y*,  as functions of q. 
We adopt the following values for the capital share, α  = 0.4, the discount factor, ρ  = 2, the 
population growth rate, n=1 and the technological externality, pi = 0.5. The figure shows that, 
as q increases, the steady-state man-made income y* decreases (Proposition 2.1). Furthermore, 
steady-state income per capita y*+g*=(1+q)y* strictly decreases in q. Resource rents g*  
(equal to qy*) increase initially, and then decrease after a certain value of q, that is, when the 
decrease in output y* more than offsets the increase in q. 
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FIGURE 2.5. Resource income g, man-made income y*, and total income y*+g 
Graph based on α=0.4, pi=0.5, ρ=2, n=1. 
 
 Consider the case that a resource starts to be exploited and revenues G are constant and 
independent of other income sources y. The steady-state per capita income level y* decreases 
due to the resource revenues, and as the economy shifts to the new equilibrium, the share of 
resource revenues in total income q will gradually increase over time. Consequently, for fixed 
total resource revenues G, the resource curse will turn out worse when compared to a situation 
where q is constant. 
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APPENDIX 2.2: THE CASE OF INTERGENERATIONAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCE RENTS 
As an alternative scenario of distribution of the resource rents Gt, we assume that the rents are 
equally distributed between the young and the old generation. Since population increases at an 
exogenous growth rate n, this implies that (1+n)/(2+n) share of the resource rents accrues to 
the younger generation and the rest 1/(2+n) to the older one. The commodity balance for the 
consumer good is the same as in equation (2.21). The older generation consumes in period t 
the resource rents [1/(2+n)]Gt and the savings from period t–1, which is a share α  of 
manufactured income. Thus, equation (2.22) becomes: 
c
t
t
– 1
 =  (α+q /(2+n))y t .   (2.34) 
The remainder of manufactured income (1–α)yt and resource rents [(1+n)/(2+n)]Gt are used by 
the younger generation to both consume and save. Thus, equation (2.23) becomes 
c
t
t   + s t  =(1–α+q(1+n)/(2+n))y t .  (2.35) 
Equations (2.21), (2.34) and (2.35) combined reveal that the saving-investment balance (2.24) 
is maintained. By considering the intertemporal budget constraint for each generation, as in 
equation (2.12)-(2.19), we can adjust the savings equation (2.20), and reproduce the recursive 
dynamic equation for kt as in (2.25): 
 (1+n)k t+ 1  = [(1–α)/(2+ρ) ) + (1+n)q /(2+ρ)(2+n)]k tα+ pi ( 1 -α )  
 – [(1+n)(1+ρ)/(2+ρ)(2+n)α]qk t+ 1 .  (2.36) 
We set kt+1 =  kt in order to calculate the steady-state value of capital per capita. This provides 
us with the equivalent of (2.27):  
)1)(1/(1
)1)(1()2()1)(2(
)1()2)(1( piα
ραρ
ααα
−−
∗




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++++++
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qnnn
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.
 (2.37) 
For q=0, the two equations (2.27) and (2.37) produce the same steady state capital stock k*. 
Under the scenario of equal distribution of resource rents, however, the steady-state level of 
capital is larger compared to the social security scenario in the presence of resource rents. 
Resource revenues may even have a beneficial impact for specific parameter values (for lower 
values of physical capital share α for instance). Thus, an equal distribution of resource rents is 
less harmful to investment when compared to an allocation under a social security scheme. 
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Figure 2.6 replicates Figure 2.2 for the case of an equal distribution of resource rents among 
generations. The resource curse now takes effect only for the highest values of technological 
spillovers pi and lowest values of the capital share α.  
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FIGURE 2.6. Change in income following a 10% increase in resource revenues, under the 
scenario of equal intergenerational distribution, dependence on the technology spillover (pi) 
and the capital share (α) 
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3. NATURAL RESOURCES, INNOVATION, AND GROWTH * 
This chapter investigates the connection between resource abundance and innovation as a 
transmission mechanism that can elucidate part of the resource curse hypothesis. We develop a 
variation of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with endogenous growth to explain the 
phenomenon. In this model, consumers trade off leisure versus consumption, and firms trade off 
innovation efforts versus manufacturing. We show that an increase in resource income frustrates 
economic growth in two ways: directly by reducing work effort and indirectly by inducing a 
smaller proportion of the labour force to engage in innovation.  
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Directing work effort towards entrepreneurial activities is an important driving force of 
economic development. To some extent and in parallel, technological progress and 
improvements in labour productivity come as a by-product of other economic activities, such 
as investment in educational quality or physical capital. In that respect, in the trade literature 
in particular, the link between learning-by-doing and the Dutch disease has been exploited in a 
number of papers. The main motivating idea (going back to Arrow, 1962) is that as firms 
produce goods, they inevitably think of ways to improve their production techniques. 
Krugman (1987) assumes in his model that learning-by-doing (as a side effect of capital) 
occurs only in the export sector. A discovery of tradeable natural resources will lead to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate and a crowding out of other export sectors. Such a shift 
in the production of tradeable sectors from a home country to abroad will result in declining 
relative domestic productivity. Similarly, Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999b) assume that 
learning-by-doing (as a side effect of employment) takes place only in the export sector. A 
resource boom in their model will drive labour away from the traded sector to the non-traded 
one and reduce the steady-state growth rate in the economy. Torvik (2001) develops a model 
of learning-by-doing and the Dutch disease, in which it is assumed that learning-by-doing (as 
a side effect of labour) can occur in both the traded and the non-traded sectors and that 
positive spillover effects between the two sectors may also take place (although weaker than 
the direct effects). In this way, the occurrence of the Dutch disease phenomena depends on the 
relative magnitude of learning-by-doing effects among sectors.  
To a large extent, however, we learn to produce more efficiently by taking active steps 
in that direction. Booming primary sectors are likely to distort innovative activities in the 
                                                
*
 This chapter is a slightly revised version of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004d). 
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economy and relocate entrepreneurial talent elsewhere. Individuals may prefer to become 
engaged in rent-seeking rather than productive activities, as described in Lane and Tornell 
(1996), Tornell and Lane (1999), Baland and Francois (2000), and Torvik (2001). They may 
even direct their skills and talent into parasitic activities such as warfare and robbery in order 
to improve their rent appropriation techniques (see Mehlum et al. 2003). In that respect, the 
crowding out of innovation or entrepreneurship is often neglected in the resource curse 
literature. Sachs and Warner (2001) point out that wage premia in the resource sector may 
encourage innovators to engage in the primary rather than the R&D sector, but they do not 
further develop this idea. They claim that average weekly earnings in the oil industry may be 
more than twice the size of those in other manufacturing sectors in oil-producing countries 
such as Trinidad and Tobago. In Zambia, a labour aristocracy backed up by powerful trade 
unions preserved higher wages in the copper industry in the 1960s and 1970s (Burger 1974 
and Gupta 1974). The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) claims 
that the potential rent on Russian fossil fuels averaged 26% of GDP during 1992-2000, one 
third of which is estimated to have accrued to exporters (European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) 2001). Figure 3.1 depicts the strong negative correlation between 
R&D expenditure in GDP in 1994 and natural capital for the same year (data on R&D are 
provided by the World Bank (WB 2004). 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1. Resource abundance and R&D Expenditure 
  
In our model, the crowding-out effect of resource wealth on innovation and 
entrepreneurial activity is not an outcome of informal or illegal rent-seeking competition. It 
simply stems from formal possibilities of skilled employees to direct their work effort 
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between alternative sectors. Furthermore, resource affluence does not only affect innovative 
activities by distorting the distribution of the labour force among sectors, but also by 
encouraging individuals to work less intensively. Resource transfers reduce the need for 
labour income and increase the demand for leisure. For instance, it is highly likely that 
resource transfers in the form of unemployment benefits will discourage participation in the 
labour market. This rationale is consistent with the general tendency of resource-dependent 
countries to underutilise their factors of production (Gylfason 2001a).  
 In Section 3.2, we develop a variation of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with 
endogenous growth, where individuals trade off consumption and leisure in terms of utility. 
Contrary to previous approaches (Krugman 1987, Sachs and Warner 1995, Torvik 2001), 
technological progress does not come as a side-effect (learning-by-doing) without resources 
being devoted to R&D activities. Innovation is the outcome of intentional actions rather than 
the by-product of other activities. The analysis is novel in that respect, since it attempts to 
elucidate how resource abundance may distort the incentives to engage in R&D production. 
Section 3.3 derives the dynamic equilibrium and main propositions linking resource 
abundance to innovation and economic performance. We show that an increase in the resource 
base of the economy induces a reduction in the steady-state labour supply. Resource rents 
allow individuals to reduce their work effort (and related disutility) and use the resource 
revenues to pay for extra consumption. Furthermore, we show that resource abundance affects 
growth indirectly by inducing a smaller proportion of the labour force to engage in innovation. 
Finally, Section 3.4 concludes. 
 Our formal analysis bears resemblance to recent work by Elíasson and Turnovsky (2004), 
who also examine the resource curse within an endogenous growth model. In both their and 
our approach, labour movements between sectors play an important role, but our study differs 
from their analysis with respect to the underlying mechanisms of economic growth. In their 
model, economic growth is based on increasing returns to scale in the manufacturing sector, 
due to capital spillover effects on labour productivity. A shift of labour and capital away from 
manufacturing towards the resource sector reduces the spillover effect and restricts economic 
expansion. In our model, we specify R&D explicitly through a third sector that produces 
innovations, and this works as the engine of economic growth. The negative relationship 
between resource affluence and economic growth arises due to both a decrease in labour 
supply and a shift of labour away from R&D.  
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3.2. A Model on Resources and R&D 
(i). Consumers 
In this section we analyse a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans type of model, where infinitely-living 
households choose both the level of consumption and the share of time devoted to leisure over 
time in order to maximise their intertemporal utility. We also incorporate in our analysis an 
endogenous growth channel, where returns to technology investments (which can alternatively 
be conceived as knowledge or labour quality) depend positively on the level of labour input in 
the economy. The intuition is straightforward; innovation and education become more 
productive when work effort increases. In other words, the harder we work, the more efficient, 
innovative and knowledgeable we become. 
 We assume that the economy consists of identical infinitely-lived agents. Population N(t) 
remains constant at each point in time. Thus, 
N(t) =N. (3.1) 
For the type of model we employ, a stable population level is a convenient assumption that 
precludes an ever-increasing growth rate for income per capita and allows the economy to 
converge to a balanced growth path. 
 Individuals divide their available time between work and leisure. A proportion l(t) of their 
time is devoted to work and the rest to leisure activities. Therefore, the level of labour input 
L(t) in the economy is determined respectively by: 
L(t) = l(t)N. (3.2) 
  Each representative household maximises the following intertemporal utility function: 
    
0
[ ( ), ( )] tU u c t l t e dtρ
∞
−
= ∫ , (3.3) 
where c(t)=C(t)/N denotes consumption per person at time t, C(t) stands for total consumption 
and ρ is the rate of time preference, which is assumed to be time-invariant and positive, 
implying that agents value future utility less comparatively to current utility. Thus, U(t) is a 
weighted sum of all future discounted utility flows u[c(t),l(t)], where u[c(t),l(t)] represents the 
instantaneous utility function (also referred to as the felicity function) of each agent at a given 
time.  
 We assume that the instantaneous utility function u[c(t),l(t)] is separable with respect to 
its two arguments and depends positively on the consumption level c(t) and negatively on 
work intensity l(t). Thus, we assume that there is a disutility of work effort, or in other words, 
that agents obtain satisfaction from leisure activities. For convenience, we assume a 
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logarithmic consumption utility function and a labour disutility function with constant 
elasticity σ. Furthermore, we omit time references for the rest of the analysis, unless there is 
need for clarification. Utility’s functional form is now: 
u(c , l) = lnc  – l1 +σ. (3.4) 
Each household faces the following budget constraint when maximizing utility: 
Q
v wl rv c
N
= + + −& ,  (3.5) 
where v=V/N stands for the total value of assets held per person, the dot denotes the 
derivative over time, wl and Q/N stand for wage and resource income per person, and r for 
the real interest rate obtained per unit of asset value. Each household, thus, maximises utility 
subject to the budget constraint of equation (3.5). Therefore, we set up the following 
Hamiltonian: 
 
1
0
(ln ) [ ]t QH c l e wl rv c
N
σ ρ µ∞ + −= − + + + −∫ . (3.6) 
The first order conditions with respect to the control variables c and l, and the dual variable µ 
lead to the Ramsey Rule (3.7) and equation (3.8), which describe the evolution of 
consumption over time and the substitution possibilities between consumption and leisure 
respectively: 
ρ−= r
c
c&
, (3.7) 
(1+σ)lσ /c  = w .  (3.8) 
(ii). Producers 
It is assumed that there are four sectors in our economy.  First, there is a manufacturing sector 
with constant returns to scale with respect to its inputs; labour and intermediates. The price of 
the final good produced in the manufacturing sector is normalised to unity. Following Romer 
(1990), we adopt the conventional specification of a continuum of intermediate capital goods, 
indexed by i∈[0,A]. Each intermediate capital good i represents a distinctive design, and the 
number of designs, A, measures the total stock of knowledge. All designs are imperfect 
substitutes, whose level of substitution is captured by a parameter 0<α<1. Together, this 
leads to the following Cobb-Douglas production function for the manufacturing sector:  
YM = (γL)1-α 
0
A
ix di
α
∫ , (3.9) 
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where 0<γ<1 is the share of workers employed in the manufacturing sector, and xi is the input 
of capital of type i. 
 Firms in the manufacturing sector produce competitively and choose the level of labour 
and intermediate capital goods that maximise their profits: 
1
0 0,
max( )
i
A A
i i iL x
L x di w L p x diα α
γ
γ γ− − −∫ ∫ , (3.10) 
where w and pi denote the labour wage (in the manufacturing sector) and the price of the 
durable good i, respectively. The first order conditions imply that each firm in the 
manufacturing sector faces the following demand equations for labour and durable goods: 
w
 
= (1– α)(γL)-α
0
A
ix di
α
∫ = L
YM
γ
α )1( −
, (3.11) 
pi = α(γL)1–αx iα– 1 .  (3.12) 
The first order conditions, given by equations (3.11) and (3.12), illustrate that firms pay 
labour and capital the value of their marginal products. 
 Secondly, there is a capital goods sector, where all capital intermediates are produced. 
Every durable good xi is produced by a unique firm using a distinct patent (idea). This implies 
that all manufacturers of intermediate goods can exert monopolistic power, since their goods 
are imperfect substitutes, whose characteristics are determined by a specific design. Patent 
and copyright laws allow the specific firm that purchases and owns the design to use 
exclusively the corresponding idea and produce the related intermediate good. After incurring 
the fixed cost of innovation or the design purchase, each firm in the intermediate sector 
produces each durable good proportional to its capital input. In this way, intermediates can 
also be understood as durables, implying that
0
A
iK x di= ∫ , where K is a measure of the total 
capital stock. 
 Firms producing in the intermediate-goods sector buy the ownership for a design at price 
PA, and after incurring the fixed cost of the design purchase, maximise profits pi :  
max ( )
i
i i i i i
x
p x x rxpi = − , (3.13) 
where pi(xi) is the demand function for each durable good from the side of the manufacturing 
sector firms, as shown in equation (3.12). Therefore, pi(xi)xi equals the revenues of each firm 
operating in the intermediate-goods sector. The second part of the maximisation represents the 
interest cost firms face when producing each durable good xi. As stated above, each firm in 
the intermediate sector transforms one unit of raw capital into one unit of intermediate good.
 The first order condition with respect to xi provides us with: 
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( ) ( )i i i i i
i
dp x
x p x r
dx
+ = , 
and after taking account of the demand function for durables (3.12), we can see that the 
monopolistic price of each durable good is a mark up over marginal cost that is equal for 
every design: 
 pi  = p = r/α . (3.14) 
 As equation (3.14) reveals, all intermediate capital goods sell at the same price. Since the 
demand function (3.12) refers to each individual intermediate good produced, equation (3.14) 
implies that each durable good is purchased and employed by the manufacturing sector by the 
same amount x. Therefore, we have: 
0
A
iK x di Ax= =∫ . (3.15) 
The profits make the ownership of a design a valuable asset with price PA, and, as such, they 
constitute a return to this asset value: 
rPA = pi + P
·
A . (3.16) 
On a balanced growth path, equation (3.16) simplifies to rPA = pi . 
 Third, we assume an R&D sector where designs for new intermediate goods are produced 
as in Romer (1990). This sector adds to the knowledge base. It employs a fraction 1–γ of the 
labour input, which is the remainder of the labour force not employed in the manufacturing 
sector. The production function of knowledge has constant returns to scale with respect to 
labour. This specification abstracts from duplication of effort; nor is there a positive spillover 
between researchers in the R&D sector. Furthermore, the production of designs depends 
positively on the stock of knowledge already discovered on a one-to-one basis. This implies 
that the growth rate of innovation (the rate of design accumulation) is independent of the level 
of knowledge. The stock of knowledge is freely available to all researchers in the R&D sector 
as a public good, and this fosters innovation. This specification suggests that there is 
endogenous growth with a scale and a composition effect (as in Smulders and van de Klundert 
1995, and Peretto 1996). The larger the labour force and its share employed in the R&D 
sector, the faster the accumulation of new ideas. Thus, designs evolve according to: 
 A 
·   
= LA )1( γ− .   (3.17) 
 Knowledge is produced in the innovation sector, where labour earns its marginal value. 
Every design invented is sold to a firm in the intermediate goods sector for a price PA. 
Marginal productivity of labour in the innovation sector thus becomes: 
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w = APA.  (3.18) 
 Last, we assume there is a resource sector exploiting the natural resource endowment of 
the economy (e.g. oil reserves, mines, fishing stocks, timber etc.). The production of the 
resource sector Q depends on the resource endowment available G (for instance the oil 
reserves discovered or the stock of fish) and the stock of physical capital K. The first 
component is apparent. The larger the resource base available, the larger is the potential to 
process and exploit the resource endowment. Resource booms make a larger amount of 
natural resources available for the resource sector to be exploited. The second component 
assumes that as a side effect of capital accumulation, natural resources are exploited more 
effectively. We take the simple proportional production function, 
Q(K, G) = GK. (3.19) 
(iii). Closure 
The production function for the manufacturing sector, after taking account of the capital-
intermediate identity (3.15), becomes: 
YM = (γL)1 –α  Axα = (AγL)1 –αKα .  (3.20) 
Equation (3.20) reveals that production in manufacturing resembles the neoclassical Solow 
model. The commodity flows are closed by setting total output, or income, Y,  from the 
manufacturing and resource sectors, equal to consumption C plus capital accumulation  K· : 
Y = (AγL)1 –αKα  + KG  = C + K· . (3.21) 
 
3.3. Analysis 
(i). Dynamic Equilibrium 
In this sub-section, we determine the equations governing the dynamics of consumption, the 
capital stock, labour supply, and the share of labour involved in innovation. 
 First, we determine the share of labour employed in the manufacturing sector versus the 
innovation sector. We compare wages for labour employed in the innovation sector and 
manufacturing sector, and the rate of returns to the two assets, knowledge A and capital K. 
Labour arbitrage between the manufacturing and innovation sector ensures equal wages. Thus 
(3.11) and (3.18) make:
 
L
Y
AP MA γ
α )1( −
= . (3.22) 
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 Next, we determine the level of the interest rate r for capital K. From the demand function 
(3.14), we know that the interest rate is the product of the parameter α and the durables price 
p. After substituting for the price p from (3.12), the amount of each durable demanded and 
produced x from (3.15), and taking account of the production function in the manufacturing 
sector (3.9), we know that the level of interest rate r is proportional to the ratio of the 
manufactured output to capital: 
K
Y
αr M2= . (3.23) 
We then proceed to calculate the interest earned on knowledge.  
 The immediate profits of each firm in the intermediate-goods sector are calculated by 
incorporating equations (3.12), (3.14), and (3.15) into (3.13): 
A
Y
ααxLγααpipi Mααi )1())(1( 1 −=−== − . (3.24) 
Taking account of equations (3.24) and (3.16) determining the price of patents PA and the 
level of monopolistic profits pi, in balanced growth, equation (3.22) becomes: 
r  = αγL. (3.25) 
After incorporating equation (3.23) into (3.25), we can express the share of the labour input 
engaged in the manufacturing sector in terms of the ratio of the output (in manufacturing) to 
capital: 
K
Y
lNK
Y
L
MM ααγ == .  (3.26) 
For the analysis of dynamics, it is useful to write equations in intensive form. From equation 
(3.21), we can derive the intensive form of total income in the economy by dividing the left-
hand-side by labour in effective terms AL : 
kGky ˆˆˆ 11 += −− ααγ , (3.27) 
where lower letter variables with hats denote variables expressed relative to effective labour 
supply: ŷ = Y/AL, kˆ = K/AL, ĉ = C/AL. 
 Substituting for the output in the manufacturing sector from equation (3.20) into (3.23) 
allows us to express the interest rate in terms of capital per effective labour, 
αα γα −−= 112 ˆkr , (3.28) 
and the share of labourers in the manufacturing sector from (3.26) as 
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We rewrite equation (3.7) in its intensive form, and substitute (3.17) and (3.28): 
l
llNk
l
l
A
A
r
c
c &&&&
−−−−=−−−=
−− )1(ˆ
ˆ
ˆ 112 γργαρ αα . (3.30) 
Subsequently, we rewrite equation (3.21) in its intensive form substituting (3.27):  
lNγ
l
l
k
cGkγ
k
k αα )1(
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
11
−−−−+= −−
&&
. (3.31) 
These two equations show that consumption and capital dynamics depend on labour supply 
dynamics. To solve for l· / l , we first express the level of labour wage in terms of capital per 
labour k. From equation (3.11) and (3.20), we can calculate: 
w=(1–α)kα γ –αA1 –α .  (3.32) 
Combining equations (3.8) and (3.32) provides us with the following equation: 
(1+σ)lσc = (1- α)k αγ -αA1-α ,  (3.33) 
 which can be expressed in terms of effective labour as: 
αασ γkαclσ −+ −=+ ˆ)1(ˆ)1( 1 . (3.34) 
Together, we have four equations that determine the dynamics of cĉ (3.30), kˆ  (3.31),  and the 
levels of γ (3.29) and l  (3.34). For use in the steady state analysis, we also derive equations that 
describe the labour supply l and use γ dynamics. Equation (3.34) implies that l evolves according 
to:  
γ
γ
σ
α
c
c
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ˆ
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ˆ
1
. (3.35) 
From equation (3.29) we see that γ evolves according to: 
l
l
αk
k
α
α
γ
γ &
&
& 1
ˆ
ˆ1
−
−
= . (3.36) 
Combining equations (3.35) and (3.36), we see that l evolves according to: 
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(ii). Steady State 
Along a balanced growth path, capital K, consumption C, output Y, and technology A grow at 
the same rate, which implies that the levels of kˆ , ĉ and ŷ remain constant along the path. It 
can be seen from equations (3.36) and (3.37) that the work intensity l and the labour input 
share γ remain constant as well. Therefore, along the balanced growth path equations (3.30) 
and (3.31) become: 
0)1(ˆ 112 =−−−−− Nlγργkα ssssαssαss ,  (3.38) 
0)1(
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ 11
=−−−+−− Nlγ
k
cGkγ ssss
ss
ssα
ss
α
ss , (3.39) 
where the subscript SS denotes the steady-state value of each variable along the balanced 
growth path. 
 Equations (3.29) and (3.34) evaluated at the steady-state, give the following levels of 
labour supply l and the share of workers employed in innovation, 
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Along with equations  (3.38) and (3.39), these two equations constitute a system of four 
equations depending on the four steady-state levels sskˆ , ĉss, lss and γ ss. Substitution of these 
four equations produces a single equation linking resource income to labour supply lss: 
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The right-hand-side of equation (3.42) is strictly decreasing in labour supply, lss, so that there 
is a unique steady-state value, and we can derive that 
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This shows that an increase in resource abundance as captured by G results in a decrease of 
labour intensity at the steady state. Individuals trade off consumption and leisure in terms of 
utility. An increased amount of resource wealth gives them the opportunity to enjoy the same 
level of utility for a reduced work effort. In other words, resource abundance increases leisure 
and reduces man-made output. We state this finding as the first proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 3.1. The steady state level of labour supply lss is decreasing in the resource base 
G. 
 
 The rate of knowledge accumulation at the steady-state is given by equation (3.17). We 
label the steady state rate of knowledge accumulation as )/( ssssss AA&=χ , 
χ s s  =  (1–γs s) l ssN .  (3.44) 
From equations (3.40) and (3.51), in the appendix, we derive the ratio of the labour force 
engaged in the R&D sector (1–γss): 
Nα
lρN
γ ssss +
+
−=−
−
1
11
1
 (3.45) 
Equation (3.45) implies that a decrease in labour intensity at the steady-state due to an 
increase in resource endowments, as indicated by equation (3.43), decreases the ratio of the 
labour force engaged in the R&D sector.20 Therefore, the accumulation of knowledge 
decreases for two reasons. First, the reduction in labour intensity directly retards knowledge 
accumulation. Secondly, the decrease in labour intensity reduces the rate of knowledge 
accumulation indirectly by lowering the percentage of the labour force engaged in the R&D 
sector. From equation (3.44), we see that technological progress depends negatively on the 
level of resource endowment (both directly and indirectly): 
dG
dl
lNα
ρNγ
dG
χd ss
ss
ss
ss



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
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+
+−= )1()1( < 0, (3.46) 
where the derivative 
dG
dlss
 is negative from equation (3.43).  
 Therefore, a resource-abundant country with a large natural resource base G will 
experience a lower labour intensity lss at the steady state and a lower rate of knowledge 
accumulation χss. The economy will grow at a slower pace. This is our major finding: 
 
                                                
20
 The equalisation of wage levels in the manufacturing and R&D sectors requires a negative adjustment of γss in 
response to an increase in lss. 
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PROPOSITION 3.2. Steady state R&D effort and implied economic growth χss is decreasing in 
the resource base G. 
 
 
3.4. Conclusions 
Technological progress is one of the main driving forces behind economic growth, and as 
such it deserves particular attention. Countries grow faster over time as they invest in projects 
that improve their productivity of capital and labour. Directing work effort towards R&D 
activities is an obvious way to support productivity growth. In that direction, it is of particular 
interest to explore the resource curse hypothesis from an endogenous growth perspective. 
 In this chapter, we investigate a resource curse mechanism not extensively discussed in 
the literature: the relationship between resource abundance and innovation. The pursuit of new 
ideas and designs by innovators is motivated by their interest in profiting from them. In our 
model, natural resources reduce the incentives of innovators to engage in R&D. This happens 
for two reasons. First, the discovery of resource reserves reduces the need to support 
consumption through labour income and therefore increases leisure and reduces work effort. 
Secondly, resource wealth negatively affects the allocation of entrepreneurial activity between 
the manufacturing and the R&D sector in favour of the former. In Chapter 5 we claim that 
knowledge-based mechanisms such as education and innovation are the most relevant 
intermediate channels to explain the slow growth rates of resource-dependent regions within a 
developed country such as the U.S. 
 Extensions of the analysis should take into account the possibility that work effort may 
also be allocated to the primary sector, as suggested by Sachs and Warner (2001). In this case, 
the share of the labour force employed as researchers in the R&D sector will be directly 
affected by the amount of resource rents, rather than indirectly (through labour intensity) as 
happens in our model. Furthermore, a more extensive database should allow us to examine the 
effect of particular components of resource income on R&D activities. It is possible that 
specific categories of natural resources, such as minerals and ores have a stronger (or weaker) 
crowding-out effect on innovation than others. Additionally, we believe that as soon as there 
is a collection of reliable data on innovation for a large number of countries (especially 
developing ones), it would be particularly interesting to identify a similar growth-frustrating 
mechanism of resource abundance across countries. 
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APPENDIX 3.1: DERIVATION OF STEADY-STATE DYNAMICS 
Incorporating equation (3.40) into equations (3.38), (3.39) and (3.41) yields: 
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Incorporating equation (3.49) into (3.48) yields: 
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Rearranging equation (3.47 yields: 
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Incorporating equation (3.51) into (3.50) solves for the steady-state value of labour intensity 
in equation (3.42). 
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4. CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
RESOURCE CURSE ∗ 
We examine empirically the direct and indirect effects of natural resource abundance on economic 
growth. Natural resources have a negative impact on growth if considered in isolation, but a positive 
direct impact on growth if other explanatory variables, such as corruption, investment, openness, 
terms of trade, and schooling, are included. We study the transmission channels, that is, the effect of 
natural resources on the other explanatory variables, and calculate the indirect effect of natural 
resources on growth for each transmission channel. The negative indirect effects of natural resources 
on growth are shown to outweigh the positive direct effect by a reasonable order of magnitude. 
 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
Countries differ largely in terms of both their resource endowments as well as their economic 
performance. In recent years, there has been a great interest in the association between 
resource affluence and economic growth. Many scholars have expressed concerns over the 
potential negative impact of being a resource producer (Gylfason 2000, 2001a, 2001b, Leite 
and Weidmann 1999, Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004a, Rodriquez and Sachs 1999, Sachs and 
Warner 1995, 1997, 1999a). Countries, such as Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela, and the so-called 
Oil States in the Gulf became examples of development failures despite their extensive 
reserves of natural wealth. The World Bank recently set up an “Extractive industry Review” 
in order to assess the impact of its involvement in oil and mining projects in host countries.21 
Similarly, Oxfam America in its study “Extractive Sectors and the Poor” expresses concern 
over the impact of minerals on poverty levels (Ross 2001b). At the same time, a number of 
recent papers dispute the ferocity of a resource curse in economic development. Davis (1995) 
claims that mineral dependence did not deter developing nations from achieving 
improvements in a series of human development indicators. In a similar context, Manzano and 
Rigobon (2003) and Stijns (2001a) contest the significance of a statistical association between 
resource abundance and economic growth. Torvik (2001) also criticises how assumptions on 
endogenous productivity and learning spillovers across sectors can bias our understanding of 
the impact of resources on productivity growth.  
                                                
∗
 This chapter is a slightly revised version of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004a). 
21
 See http://www.worldbank.org/ogmc. 
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 The main interest lies undoubtedly on the sign of the resource impact: are natural 
resources ultimately a blessing or a curse? The aim of this chapter is to investigate the effect 
of resource wealth on economic growth across countries for a period of 21 years and test for 
the presence of the resource curse. There is a large literature pointing to the frustrating impact 
of resource-riches on investment, competitiveness, trade openness, institutional quality, and 
schooling (see Stevens 2003 for a literature review). Sachs and Warner (2001) argue that the 
resource curse is an indirect effect of natural wealth: namely resources retard economic 
growth by crowding out the aforementioned growth-related activities. Economies that 
maintain growth-promoting activities may be less vulnerable to the resource curse. Norway, 
for instance, converts its rich oil reserves mostly into foreign securities and, thus, protects its 
economy from abrupt income increases (Gylfason 2001a). Diamond-rich Botswana (in 
contrast to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone) experienced high income 
growth during the last three decades supported by good institutions of private ownership, 
constraints on political elites, an efficient bureaucracy, and prudent investment of resource 
rents in infrastructure, health and education (Acemoglu et al. 2003). This provides an 
additional research question to investigate. We explore whether resources affect growth 
directly or solely through intermediate channels. It is of particular importance to evaluate the 
different transmission mechanisms exposed in the literature and their relevance in explaining 
the association between resource wealth and economic growth. 
  Our analysis follows the methodology set out by Mo (2000 and 2001), who investigates 
the transmission channels through which income inequality and corruption affect growth. We 
use cross-country regressions to show that, on average, natural resources are associated with 
phenomena that impede the economic process. Taking account of the relation between natural 
resources and other indices used for growth regressions, we highlight the curse of natural 
resources. Specifically, we find that, if the negative indirect effects are excluded, natural 
resources contribute positively to economic growth. However, if the negative indirect impacts 
are included, these outweigh the positive direct contribution of natural resources to economic 
growth. We emphasise that this is an empirical finding and not an economic theory. If the 
government were to succeed in preventing the occurrence of these indirect phenomena, the 
country would benefit from its natural wealth. 
 The next section is devoted to the basic growth regressions. We verify that, in general, 
natural resource abundance impedes economic development rather than stimulates it. We also 
find, however, that if other indices such as corruption, investment, openness, terms of trade, 
and schooling are taken into account as independent variables, resource abundance has a 
positive direct impact on growth. Section 4.3 studies empirically the transmission channels 
and compares their relative weights in the overall negative impact of natural resources on 
economic growth. Section 4.4 concludes. 
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4.2. Basic Cross-Country Regressions 
 To identify the dependence of growth on natural resource abundance, we estimate cross-
country growth regressions following the empirical work of Kormendi and Meguire (1985), 
Grier and Tullock (1989), Barro (1991), and Sachs and Warner (1995 and 1997). We base our 
equations on the conditional convergence hypothesis, i.e., different growth rates between 
different countries are explained by various characteristics of these countries; however, high-
income countries have lower growth rates than low-income countries, all things being equal. 
Thus, per capita economic growth from period 1975 (t0) to 1996 (tT), denoted by 
G i=(1/T)ln(YTi /Y0 i),  depends negatively on initial per capita income Y0i. It also depends on 
natural resource abundance R i ,  and on a vector of other explanatory variables Zi. Hence, we 
have: 
G i  = α0  + α1  ln(Y0 i) + α2R i  + α3Z i  + ε i ,  (4.1) 
where i corresponds to each country in the sample. Our focus is on the sign of the coefficient 
for resource abundance, α2, and its relation to the vector of other variables Z. 22 
 Before we turn to the data, let us first assess the long-term income effects of a change in a 
country’s resource income R i,  as described by growth equation (4.1). We consider two 
scenarios for this country: one scenario in which the current value of resource abundance R 
and other characteristics Z persist, labelled i and another one labelled j that assumes a 
permanent change in characteristics from R i to R j and from Z i to Z j. We denote the change in 
the levels of R i or Z i  by ∆R=R j–R i ,  and ∆Z=Z j–Z i . As we show in Appendix 4.1, a 
permanent difference in R or Z has a long-term effect on expected income given by: 
E(∆ln(Y∞)) = –(α2/α1)∆R – (α3/α1)∆Z, (4.2) 
where ∆ln(Y∞)= ln(Y∞)j–ln(Y∞)i. 
 Taking exponentials, we can rewrite equation (4.2) and calculate the relative long-term 
income effect as: 
E(∆Y∞/Y∞)  = exp[–(α2 /α1)∆R – (α3 /α1)∆Z]–1. (4.3) 
For small values of (α2/α1)∆R  and (α3/α1)∆Z, we can use the following approximation: 
E(∆Y∞/Y∞)  ≈ –(α2/α1)∆R – (α3/α1)∆Z. (4.4) 
                                                
22
 We should acknowledge at this point, that every econometric analysis suffers to a certain extent from 
endogeneity and omitted variable bias; for that reason all regression results should always be interpreted with 
some caution. 
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The ratio –(α2/α1) captures the long-term income effect of changes in resource endowments. 
Similarly, the ratio –(α3/α1) captures the long-term impact of changes in other explanatory 
variables. Assuming conditional convergence, i.e., α1<0, four different situations may arise. 
A ratio –(α2/α1)=1 indicates that an immediate one percent increase in current income based 
on natural resource exploitation, i.e., ∆R=0.01, also raises the long-term income level by one 
percent, i.e.,∆Y∞/Y∞=0.01. If –(α2/α1)>1, resource abundance is so beneficial to growth that a 
one percentage increase in current resource income raises long-term income by more than one 
per cent. On the other hand, if –(α2/α1)<1, a one per cent increase in resource income results in 
less than a one percentage raise in long-term income. In the latter situation, the economy 
benefits from resource expansion but the permanent income effect is smaller than the 
temporary resource income effect. Finally, if α2<0 and α1<0, resource expansion leads to only 
a short-lived increase in income because growth is affected negatively. Hence, in the long 
term, the level of permanent income is actually less than it would be without the increase in 
natural resources. This corresponds to the curse of natural resources23. 
 We estimate growth equation (4.1) using ordinary least squares (OLS)24 and increase 
gradually the set of variables Z i . Appendix 4.2 lists all variables and data sources. As a 
starting point, we include only initial income per capita in year 1975 (LnY75) and natural 
resource abundance, for which we take the share of mineral production in GDP in 1971 (SNR) 
as a proxy.25 The results, presented in column (4.1) of Table 4.1, indicate a highly significant 
and negative relationship between economic growth and natural resources. A one percentage 
point increase in income from mineral resources relative to total income decreases growth by 
0.075% per year. An increase in income from mineral resources of one standard deviation 
(0.07), decreases the growth rate by about half of one per cent per year. Hence, natural 
resources appear to be an impediment to economic growth. 
                                                
23
 The latter situation refers to development paths BE and BF of reduced economic growth in Figure 1.2 of 
Chapter 1. 
24
 Alternatively, the method of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) can be used to estimate simultaneously 
the basic cross-country regression, given by equation (4.1), and the indirect transmission channels, given by 
equation (4.5) in the following section, as a system of equations. The specification of our system of equations 
allows us to use OLS because the OLS and SUR estimates coincide in this system. Incorporating all transmission 
channels into the basic growth regression and allowing all indirect transmission channels to have identical 
explanatory variables implies that no possible correlation among individual error terms is assumed. Hence, the 
correction in SUR is unnecessary. 
25
 The value of mineral production is calculated in national accounts after subtracting the cost of intermediate 
inputs (e.g. extraction costs). Although beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth mentioning that environmental 
national accounting attempts to correct national accounts for environmental externalities (see Perman et al. 
2003). 
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 We now turn to the possible crowding-out effects of natural resources (Sachs and Warner 
2001). Let us assume that the vector Z i  in growth equation (4.1) captures a set of growth-
promoting activities. If resource abundance (R i) crowds-out the activities captured by Z i ,  
then natural resources will indirectly harm economic growth (G i). In other words, a negative 
statistical relationship between R i  and Z i  may explain the negative correlation between R i 
and G i  in the first regression of Table 4.1. Furthermore, when the vector Z i  is sufficiently rich 
to fully capture most of the indirect negative effects of resource abundance on growth, we 
expect that its inclusion in our regressions would eliminate the negative coefficient of 
resource abundance on growth. In other words, if resource abundance affects growth solely 
through the intermediate transmission channels captured by the vector Z i , we expect the 
coefficient of resource abundance to drop to a value close to zero (α2 ≈ 0). In the case that 
either natural resources frustrate economic growth directly or that not all intermediate 
transmission channels through which resource abundance affects growth are accounted for, 
the coefficient of resource abundance is expected to sustain its negative sign. As our next step, 
we thus extend the vector Z i, by adding progressively variables commonly used to explain 
growth, such as corruption, investment, openness, terms of trade, and schooling, and we 
examine the magnitude and significance of the resource abundance coefficient α2.26  
 In the next regression, we include a measure of corruption for the 1980 to 1985 period 
from Transparency International. Higher values of the index correspond both to higher levels 
of corruption and to lower levels of institutional quality. The period 1980-85 is the earliest for 
which the index is available. In our regressions, we try to choose variables that refer either to 
the beginning of the overall period or to average values for the entire period to avoid 
endogeneity problems that may arise between variables. Mo (2001) argues, however, that 
endogeneity is less likely for the corruption variable because institutions tend to evolve 
slowly. The second regression in column (4.2) shows a negative sign for the coefficient α1, 
which supports the conditional convergence hypothesis. Furthermore, corruption affects 
economic growth negatively, as expected. An increase in the corruption level of one standard 
deviation decreases growth by 1.17 %, which is 2.68 multiplied by 0.44. In the long term, this 
leads to a permanent income decrease of 74 %,27 indicating that corruption impedes growth 
considerably. The coefficient for natural resources is almost unaffected, although its 
significance is reduced substantially. An increase in resource income (as a share of GDP) by 
one percent decreases growth by 0.07% per year and reduces long-term total income by about 
6.4 % from equation (4.4). This regression illustrates the point that, although natural resources 
                                                
26
 Acemoglu et al. (2002) use the same argument to give substance to their claim that income levels around 1500 
(proxied by measurements of urbanisation and population density) affected long-term income per capita solely 
through institutions. 
27
 exp(–1.17/1.16) –1= –0.74. 
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increase wealth in the short term, the economy loses more in long-term growth than it gains in 
the short run. 
 In the subsequent columns of the table, we include as independent variables the ratio of 
real gross domestic investment to real GDP averaged over the period from 1975 to 1996, an 
index of openness, measured by the percentage of years during the period 1970 to 1990 in 
which the country is considered to be an open economy by Sachs and Warner (1995), a terms 
of trade index measuring the average annual growth in the ratio of the export price index 
divided by the import price index over the period from 1970 to 1990, and a schooling index 
proposed by King and Levine (1993), measuring the log of the average number of years of 
secondary schooling from 1970 to 1989, as a proxy for educational quality. As we include 
more explanatory variables, the coefficient on natural resources decreases gradually and 
becomes less significant in columns (4.3) and (4.4). In columns (4.5) and (4.6), the coefficient 
becomes positive but remains insignificant. Hence, natural resources may not be harmful to 
growth per se. The final regression indicates the effects of natural resources, corruption, 
investment, trade policies, terms of trade, and schooling on economic growth. Hence, the 
indirect effects of all transmission channels are taken into account by the coefficients of these 
variables. The coefficient on natural resources measures the direct effect on growth; excluding 
the indirect effects, we find an almost one-to-one relation between natural resource income 
and long-term income, from the ratio of their coefficients. Hence, an increase in resource 
income is permanent, although the low statistical significance of the direct effect of natural 
resources on growth suggests a cautious interpretation. Nonetheless, since resource abundance 
does not have a significantly negative direct effect on economic development, the indirect 
effects must be responsible for the overall harmful impact of natural resources on economic 
growth. We investigate the transmission channels for the indirect effects in the next section. 
 The coefficient for corruption also decreases as more explanatory variables are added but 
it remains negative, although eventually insignificant. Mo (2001) shows that corruption 
affects growth negatively through several indirect channels and that the corruption coefficient 
loses significance as these channels are included in the regression. However, corruption has 
no direct positive effect on income, because its coefficient remains negative. Furthermore, the 
coefficients for investment, openness, terms of trade, and schooling do not vary much. Their 
signs accord with intuition and are similar in value to those found in the literature. An 
economy characterised by a high investment ratio, a higher openness index, a lower initial 
income per capita, a decrease in terms of trade, and high educational standards is expected to 
experience a relatively high growth rate (Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997 and 1999b, Sala-i-
Martin 1997, and Mo, 2001). Finally, we run a series of growth regressions equivalent to 
those in Table 4.1 using only the 39 countries that are used to estimate column (4.6) and find 
that the coefficients do not change qualitatively, nor do they change in an appreciable 
quantitative manner. Appendix 4.3 provides a list of the whole sample of countries, as in 
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column (4.1) of Table 4.1, as well as the ones that constitute the core sample of 39 countries 
used in the last regression. Appendix 4.4 replicates all results for the final sample of 39 
observations. 
  
TABLE 4.1. Growth regressions as in equation (4.1) 
Dependent 
variable: G75-96 
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) 
Constant    –2.62   10.03   11.66   12.87   12.33   12.03 
LnY75  
(0.89) 
    0.52*** 
   (0.17) 
  –1.16*** 
   (0.39) 
  –1.61*** 
    (0.29) 
  –1.77*** 
   (0.31) 
  –1.76*** 
   (0.33) 
  –1.61*** 
   (0.33) 
SNR 
(0.07) 
  –7.57*** 
   (1.50) 
  –7.39** 
   (2.95) 
  –4.41** 
   (1.95) 
  –3.11 
   (1.96) 
    0.93 
   (2.22) 
    1.59 
   (2.11) 
Corruption 
(2.68)  
  –0.44*** 
   (0.13) 
  –0.30*** 
   (0.10) 
  –0.26*** 
   (0.10) 
  –0.19* 
   (0.11) 
  –0.09 
   (0.11) 
Investments 
(8.06)   
     0.16*** 
    (0.03) 
    0.13*** 
   (0.02) 
    0.15*** 
   (0.02) 
    0.16*** 
   (0.02) 
Openness 
(0.45) 
  
 
 
    1.26*** 
   (0.45) 
    1.64*** 
   (0.48) 
    1.26** 
   (0.53) 
Terms of Trade 
(1.90)   
 
  
  –0.27** 
   (0.11) 
  –0.31*** 
   (0.10) 
Schooling 
(0.61)      
    0.58 
   (0.56) 
R 2 adjusted 0.18 0.25 0.51 0.55 0.62 0.66 
N 
 
103 47 47 47 46 39 
Notes: 1. The standard deviations for the independent variables are in parentheses, based on the 
sample of 39 core countries used in the regression in column (4.6). 2. Robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. 3. The superscripts *, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of 
significance, respectively. 
 
 
4.3. Transmission Channels 
 To analyse the magnitude and relative importance of the transmission channels, we 
estimate the effect of natural resources on corruption, investment, openness, terms of trade, 
and schooling to capture their indirect effects on economic growth. First, we estimate the 
dependence of these variables on resource income from the following: 
Z i  = β0  + β1R i  + µi ,  (4.5) 
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where Z i , β0,  β1 ,  and µi  are vectors of which each element is associated with the indices of 
corruption, investment, openness, terms of trade, and schooling. To avoid having different 
sample sizes due to data availability and the corresponding sample bias, we confine the 
transmission analysis to only those 39 countries used in the last regression of Table 4.1. As 
Table 4.2 indicates, most of these coefficients are not highly significant due to small sample 
size. In Appendix 4.5, we run the same sequence of regressions for the largest possible sample 
available for each transmission channel. We find significant coefficients at the 10% level for 
the terms of trade and openness indices and at the 1% level for the investment, openness and 
schooling indices. Additionally, using the larger sample increases the R2 for each transmission 
channel.28 
 
TABLE 4.2. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (4.5) 
 
Corruption 
(4.7) 
Investments 
(4.8) 
Openness 
(4.9) 
Terms of Trade 
(4.10) 
Schooling 
(4.11) 
Constant       5.87 20.77      0.68 –0.74 –0.70 
SNR 
(0.07) 
      7.21 
    (4.74) 
–28.83* 
(17.38) 
   –1.82*** 
    (0.59) 
 7.75 
 (6.36) 
–2.16 
  (1.44) 
R 2 adjusted 
     0.01 0.03       0.05 0.05  0.03 
N 
 
39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. 2. The superscripts * and *** 
represent 10% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 Since natural resources explain part of the variation in investment and other variables, we 
compute the direct and indirect effects of natural resources on growth. Substituting equation 
(4.5) into equation (4.1) yields: 
G i  = (α0+α3β0 ) + α1  ln(Y0 i) + (α2+α3β1)R i  + α3µ i  + ε i ,  (4.6) 
where α2R i  is the direct effect of natural resources on growth, α3β1R i  is the indirect effect of 
natural resources on growth, and µ i
 
are the residuals of equation (4.5). The estimated values 
for the coefficients α1 ,  α2+α3β1 , and α3  of equation (4.6) are given in Table 4.3. The 
coefficient of natural resources includes both direct and indirect effects. A one percent 
increase in natural resource income leads to a decrease in the growth rate of 0.096 percent, 
                                                
28
 The values of the coefficients are generally robust against the sample size, as can be seen in Table 4.6. The 
coefficient on natural resources on investment decreases significantly for the largest sample, but as a 
counteracting effect the coefficient on investment in growth regression (4.3) also substantially increases when we 
abstract from corruption and thus increase the sample to 103 observations.  
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and a decrease in long-term income of about 6 percent from equation (4.4), which is 
consistent with column (2) of Table 4.1.29 An increase in the share of mineral production in 
GDP of one standard deviation would directly and indirectly lead to a reduction in annual per 
capita growth of 0.67%, which is equal to 0.07 times –9.60, and a long-term income decrease 
of 33% from equation (4.3). 
 
TABLE 4.3. Growth regression, including indirect effects as in equation (4.6) 
Dependent variable: G75-96 (4.12) 
Constant                            16.53  
LnY75 
(0.89) 
                           –1.61*** 
                           (0.33) 
SNR 
(0.07) 
                           –9.61*** 
                           (1.34) 
µ1 (Corruption) 
(2.63) 
                           –0.091 
                            (0.11) 
µ2 (Investments) 
(7.82) 
                             0.16*** 
                            (0.02) 
µ3 (Openness) 
(0.43) 
                             1.26** 
                            (0.53) 
µ4 (Terms of Trade) 
(1.82) 
                           –0.31*** 
                           (0.10) 
µ5 (Schooling) 
(0.59) 
                             0.58 
                            (0.56) 
R2 adjusted                              0.66 
N  39 
Notes: 1. The standard deviations for the independent variables are in parentheses. 2. Robust 
standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. 3. The superscripts ** and *** represent 5% and 
1% levels of significance, respectively. 
  
 In addition, we can estimate the relative importance of each transmission channel in 
explaining the indirect negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. The results 
are presented in Table 4.4. The effect of natural resources on corruption is depicted in the first 
                                                
29
 This regression in Table 1 is, however, based on a larger sample.  
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column of Table 4.2.30 Natural resources tend to increase the level of corruption, but the 
indirect effect on growth is relatively small compared to the other transmission channels. Yet, 
although the contribution of corruption to the overall negative impact of natural resources 
seems minor – only 7% – corruption is, nonetheless, a significant resource curse mechanism 
since it alone cancels out about 40 per cent of the positive direct effect of natural resources on 
economic growth (which is 0.65 from Table 4.4 divided by 1.59 from Table 4.1).  This finding 
is consistent with recent empirical work by Sachs and Warner (1995) and Gylfason (2000). 
Explanations of the effect of natural resources on institutional quality and, more specifically 
on corruption, are found in the literature. Krueger (1974) argues that natural resources are 
associated with large amounts of appropriable rents, and therefore they tend to promote rent-
seeking competition rather than productive activities. Moreover, rents induce economic agents 
to bribe the administration in order to gain access to them (Sachs and Warner 1995, Gray and 
Kaufmann 1998, Ascher 1999, Leite and Weidmann 1999, Sachs and Rondriguez 1999, 
Gylfason 2001a). Furthermore, Mauro (1998) claims that natural resource abundance is often 
associated with the emergence of politically powerful interest groups that attempt to influence 
politicians to adopt policies that may not favour the general public interest. 
 The second transmission channel, investment, is the most important as it accounts for 
48% of the indirect negative impact of natural resources on growth. In Chapter 2, we argue 
that natural resource wealth decreases the need for savings and investment, since natural 
resources provide a continuous stream of wealth that enhances future income levels. 
Furthermore, world prices tend to be more volatile for primary commodities than for other 
goods. Therefore, an economy based on primary production will fluctuate from booms to 
recessions, which creates uncertainty for investors in these natural resource economies (Sachs 
and Warner, 1999b). Additionally, during a natural resource boom, increased rents in the 
primary sector cause a reallocation of factors of production from manufacturing towards the 
booming primary sector. Since the manufacturing sector is often characterised by increasing 
returns to scale and positive externalities, a decrease in scale of manufacturing decreases the 
productivity and profitability of investment, which further accelerates the decrease in 
investment (Sachs and Warner 1995 and 1999a Gillis et al. 1996, and Gylfason 2000 and 
2001a). Finally, Gylfason and Zoega (2001) conclude that the rate of optimal savings and the 
maturity of the financial system are negatively related to the share of natural resources in 
national output. 
                                                
30
 An extensive literature considers the endogeneity of social capital and institutions and concludes that 
institutions are not affected by other factors in the short run, but they are in the long term. We link institutional 
quality to natural resource abundance. Acemoglu et al. (2001), Mauro (1995) and Hall et al. (1999) relate 
institutions to the mortality rate of settlers during colonisation, ethnolinguistic fragmentation, and geographical 
characteristics respectively. See also Chapter 6 for a more elaborate discussion. 
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 The international transmission channel consists of the effects of natural resources on the 
degree of openness of the economy and its terms of trade. Taken together these two channels 
account for another 49% of the total impact of natural resources on growth. Natural resource 
abundance reduces openness and has negative effects on the terms of trade. Since natural 
resources weaken the manufacturing sector, policy makers may impose import quotas and 
tariffs that, in the short run, protect domestic producers (Auty 1994 and Sachs and Warner 
1995). In the long run, however, such measures reduce the openness of the economy and 
retard its integration into the global economy. In addition, natural resource booms increase 
domestic income and, consequently, the demand for goods, which generates inflation and an 
overvaluation of the domestic currency. Hence, the relative prices of all non-traded goods 
increase and the terms of trade deteriorate, so that exports become expensive relative to world 
market prices and decline. This phenomenon is known as the Dutch disease (Sachs and 
Warner 1995, Torvik 2001, Gylfason 2000, 2001a and 2001b, and Rodriguez and Sachs 
1999). 
 Finally, the schooling transmission channel is almost twice as important as the corruption 
channel. Natural resource booms lead to a decline in the manufacturing sector for which 
human capital is an important production factor. Hence, Gylfason (2001a) argues that the need 
for high-quality education declines and, with it, the returns to education. Sachs and Warner 
(1995) claim that natural resource abundance creates a false sense of confidence and that easy 
riches lead to sloth. An expanding primary sector does not need a high-skilled labour force, so 
that spending on education need not increase. Hence, the future expansion of other sectors that 
require educational quality is restricted (Gylfason 2000, 2001a and 2001b, and Sachs and 
Warner 1999b) and technological diffusion is retarded (Nelson and Phelps, 1966). Our result 
that schooling is a more important and more significant transmission channel than corruption 
contrasts with the empirical results in Sachs and Warner (1995 and 1999a).  
 
TABLE 4.4. Relative importance of transmission channels as in equation (4.5) 
Transmission channels 
α3  
(Table 4.1) 
β1  
(Table 4.2) 
Contribution to 
α2+α3β1  
Relative 
Contribution 
SNR             1.59        –17% 
Corruption        –0.09          7.21         –0.65            7% 
Investment          0.16      –28.83         –4.61          48% 
Openness          1.26        –1.82         –2.29          24% 
Terms of Trade        –0.31          7.75         –2.40          25% 
Schooling          0.58        –2.16         –1.25          13% 
Total           –9.61        100% 
 
Chapter 4  
 
 ~ 68 ~ 
4.4. Conclusions 
When used in a prudent manner, natural resources can be an important asset for governments 
and societies. For some countries resource wealth is a blessing, which has accelerated their 
economic growth rate. For most resource-dependent nations, however, resource affluence has 
become a curse of poor economic performance and underdevelopment. Our findings in this 
chapter suggest that a natural resource-based economy that suffers from corruption, low 
investment, protectionist measures, deteriorating terms of trade, and low educational standards 
will probably not benefit from its natural wealth due to these adverse indirect effects. 
 Our empirical analysis indicates that natural resource wealth increases growth, if negative 
indirect effects are excluded. However, if these transmission channels are included, the overall 
effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth is strongly negative. Moreover, the 
investment channel is shown to be the most important of these transmission channels, 
accounting for almost half of the negative correlation between resource income and economic 
growth. This substantiates our argument in Chapter 2 on the contracting role of resource rents 
on savings and investment. Furthermore, it suggests that such a crowding-out mechanism is 
highly relevant in explaining the resource curse, since we found the rest of the transmission 
channels to bear a smaller significance in explaining the phenomenon. 
 Extensions of this analysis can expand the sample used for the empirical analysis and 
identify additional transmission channels through which natural resources affect growth. It 
would be of interest to extend the vector of institutional proxies, in order to account for 
alternative institutional measures that capture the degree of rule of law or bureaucracy in the 
economy. Additionally, an appealing extension would be to account for variation in 
technological intensity across countries, although there is a lack of credible data for most of 
the developing countries. Furthermore, we should attempt as a next step to overcome the 
scarcity of data on institutional and protectionism measures and expand the dataset to perform 
panel data analysis for subperiods in order to reinforce our findings. In addition, the 
mechanisms behind the transmission channels can be investigated more thoroughly. The 
analysis is so far exploratory in nature and more elaborate transmission mechanisms can be 
tested. A better understanding of these mechanisms is essential for developing policy 
measures to reduce the negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. 
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APPENDIX 4.1: LONG-TERM INCOME EFFECTS 
In this appendix, we derive the long-term income effects of equation (4.2), using the 
description of economic growth in equation (4.1). Since Gi represents income growth in 
country i over a period of T years, we rewrite equation (4.1) as: 
(ln(YTi ) – ln(Y0i))/T= α0 + α1 ln(Y0i) + α2Ri + α3Zi + εi. (4.7) 
After rearranging terms, we derive income for country i at the end of the period, i.e., in year T 
as: 
ln(YTi) = α0T + (α1T+1) ln(Y0i) + α2TRi + α3TZi+ Tεi. (4.8) 
 We use this equation to calculate the difference in expected income from a permanent 
change in R and Z from R i to R j and from Z i to Z j, where i and j correspond to the value 
before and after the change correspondingly. We denote the change in the levels of R i or Z i  by 
∆R=R j–R i ,  and ∆Z=Z j–Z i . Since the level of initial income has not changed, we abstract 
from any convergence impacts on long-term growth (∆ln(Y0)=ln(Y0 j)–ln(Y0 i )=0).  This 
allows us to focus on income differences generated either by the resource abundance factor or 
the vector of the other explanatory variables Z. Hence, we have: 
E(∆ln(YT)) = α2T ∆R  + α3T ∆Z , (4.9) 
where ∆ln(Y t)=ln(Y t j)–ln(Y t i).  To assess the long-term effects of R and Z on income, we 
assume that ∆R and ∆Z are constant over time and study the propagation of income 
differences over time. After two periods of T years, income differences are equal to:  
E(∆ln(Y2 T))  = (α1T+2))(α2T∆R + α3T∆Z). (4.10) 
After three periods, we have: 
E(∆ln(Y3T)) = (1+(α1T+1)+ (α1T+1)2))(α2T∆R + α3T∆Z) . (4.11) 
Since 0<α1T+1<1, as t goes to infinity, the first term on the right hand side reduces to:  
(1 + (α1T+1) + (α1T+1)2 + (α1T+1)3 + …) = 1/(1–(α1T+1)) = –1/(α1T). (4.12) 
Hence, equation (4.2) is derived. 
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APPENDIX 4.2: LIST OF VARIABLES  
G Average annual growth in real GDP per person from 1975 to 1996, calculated as 
G=(ln(Y1996 /Y1975)/21)x100%. Source: Center for International Comparisons at 
the University of Pennsylvania (CIC), 2002. 
LnY75 The log of real GDP per capita in 1975 at 1985 international prices. Source:  Center 
for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CIC), 2002. 
SNR The share of mineral production in GDP for 1971. Source: Center for International 
Development at Harvard University (CID), 2002. 
Corruption The Corruption Perception Index from 1980 to 1985 from Transparency 
International. The index means the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist 
among public officials and politicians. Source: Center for Globalisation and 
Europeanisation of the Economy (CeGE) of the Georg-August-University of 
Goettingen and Transparency International Organisation (TI), 2002. 
Investment Average real gross domestic investment, private and public, at 1985 international 
prices, from 1975 to 1996. Source: Center for International Comparisons at the 
University of Pennsylvania (CIC), 2002. 
Openness The fraction of years from 1965 to 1990 in which the country is rated as an open 
economy according to the criteria imposed by Sachs and Warner. Source: Center 
for International Development at Harvard University (CID), 2002. 
Terms of Trade The average annual growth in the log of external terms of trade between 1970 and 
1990, where the terms of trade is given by the ratio of an export price index to an 
import price index. Source: Center for International Development at Harvard 
University (CID), 2002. 
Schooling The log of average secondary schooling from 1970 to 1989, known as the King and 
Levine Index. Source: Center for International Development at Harvard University 
(CID), 2002. 
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APPENDIX 4.3: LIST OF COUNTRIES IN SAMPLES 
1. Algeria        36. Ghana           71. Norway*          
2. Angola          37. Greece*          72. Pakistan*        
3. Argentina       38. Guatemala       73. Panama          
4. Australia*       39. Guinea-Bissau   74. Papua-New Guinea 
5. Austria*         40. Guyana          75. Paraguay        
6. Bangladesh      41. Haiti           76. Peru            
7. Belgium*         42. Honduras        77. Philippines*     
8. Benin           43. Hong Kong*       78. Portugal*        
9. Bolivia*         44. Iceland         79. Rwanda          
10. Botswana        45. India*           80. Senegal         
11. Brazil*          46. Iran            81. Seychelles      
12. Burkina Faso    47. Ireland*         82. Sierra Leone    
13. Burundi         48. Israel*          83. Singapore*       
14. Cameroon*       49. Italy*           84. South Africa*    
15. Canada*          50. Jamaica         85. Spain*           
16. Cape Verde      51. Japan*           86. Sri Lanka       
17. Central African Republic 52. Jordan          87. Sweden*          
18. Chad            53. Kenya*           88. Switzerland     
19. Chile*           54. Korea 89. Syria           
20. China           55. Lesotho         90. Taiwan          
21. Colombia*        56. Madagascar      91. Tanzania        
22. Comoros         57. Malawi          92. Thailand*        
23. Costa Rica      58. Malaysia*        93. Togo            
24. Cyprus          59. Mali            94. Trinidad and Tobago 
25. Denmark*         60. Mauritania      95. Tunisia         
26. Dominican Republic 61. Mauritius       96. Turkey*          
27. Ecuador*         62. Mexico*          97. Uganda*          
28. Egypt*           63. Morocco         98. United Kingdom*  
29. El Salvador     64. Mozambique      99. Uruguay         
30. Ethiopia        65. Nepal           100. United States             
31. Fiji            66. Netherlands*     101. Venezuela*       
32. Finland*         67. New Zealand*     102. Zambia          
33. France*          68. Nicaragua       103. Zimbabwe        
34. Gabon           69. Niger            
35. Gambia  70. Nigeria          
∗ Base sample of 39 core countries. 
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APPENDIX 4.4: REPLICATION OF TABLE 4.1 WITH A FIXED 
SAMPLE OF 39 OBSERVATIONS 
TABLE 4.5. Growth regressions as in equation (4.1) with a fixed sample of 39 observations 
Dependent 
variable: G75-96 
(4.13) (4.14) (4.15) (4.16) (4.17) (4.18) 
Constant    –2.31     7.31   10.22   11.80    8.99   12.03 
LnY75 
(0.89) 
  –0.03 
   (0.45) 
  –0.77 
   (0.48) 
  –1.40*** 
    (0.37) 
  –1.61*** 
   (0.33) 
  –1.31*** 
   (0.33) 
  –1.61*** 
   (0.33) 
SNR 
(0.07) 
  –8.98*** 
   (2.46) 
  –7.05*** 
   (2.68) 
  –3.52 
   (2.27) 
  –2.15 
   (2.05) 
    0.64 
   (2.09) 
    1.59 
   (2.11) 
Corruption 
(2.68)  
  –0.31** 
   (0.15) 
  –0.20* 
   (0.12) 
  –0.18* 
   (0.11) 
  –0.08 
   (0.12) 
  –0.09 
   (0.11) 
Investments 
(8.06) 
  
     0.16*** 
    (0.03) 
    0.13*** 
   (0.02) 
    0.16*** 
   (0.02) 
    0.16*** 
   (0.02) 
Openness 
(0.45)   
 
 
    1.27*** 
   (0.44) 
    1.48*** 
   (0.45) 
    1.26** 
   (0.53) 
Terms of Trade 
(1.90)   
 
  
  –0.31*** 
   (0.10) 
  –0.31*** 
   (0.10) 
Schooling 
(0.61) 
     
    0.58 
   (0.56) 
R 2 adjusted 0.10 0.17 0.51 0.56 0.66 0.66 
N 
 
39 39 39 39 39 39 
 Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=39 of 
regression (6); robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** 
correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
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APPENDIX 4.5: REPLICATION OF TABLE 4.2 FOR THE LARGEST 
POSSIBLE SAMPLE 
TABLE 4.6. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (4.5) 
 
Corruption 
(4.19) 
Investments 
(4.20) 
Openness 
(4.21) 
Terms of Trade 
(4.22) 
Schooling 
(4.23) 
Constant       5.81 15.80      0.68 –0.86 –1.17 
SNR 
(0.06, 0.11, 0.11, 0.11, 0.10) 
      8.78* 
     (5.02) 
    –15.24*** 
 (5.61) 
   –1.11*** 
    (0.22) 
 6.65* 
(3.80) 
     –2.17*** 
  (0.76) 
R2 adjusted 
      0.03 0.04       0.07 0.07  0.05 
N 
 
47 103 96 98 84 
Notes: 1. The sequence of standard deviations for SRN for all regressions provided in parenthesis. 
2. Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. 3. Superscripts * and *** correspond to 
a 10 and 1% level of significance. 
.
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5. RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH                  
IN THE U.S. * 
It is a common assumption that regions within the same country converge to approximately the 
same steady-state income levels. Empirical data seem to support the absolute convergence 
hypothesis for U.S. states, but the data also show that natural resource abundance is a significant 
negative determinant of growth. We find that natural resource abundance decreases investment, 
schooling, openness, and R&D expenditure, and increases corruption; and we show that these 
effects can fully explain the negative effect of natural resource abundance on growth. In particular, 
our findings point to a significant role of innovation in explaining growth differentials, once we 
account for spatial spillovers across states.  
 
 
 “Do we value this land and are we prepared to protect it, or are we going to desecrate it, diminish it, 
change it forever for a small amount of oil?” 
 Senator Joseph Lieberman speaking for Alaska, International Herald Tribune, March 21 2003.31 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The influx of economic data at a regional level in the 1990s stimulated the interest of 
economists to investigate empirically the behaviour of regions within countries. The regional 
empirical analyses by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992a, 1992b, 1995), Barro et al. (1991), and 
Johnson (2000) claimed that differences in growth rates at a regional level are fully driven by 
initial income. In other words, poorer regions tend to catch up with richer ones. But then an 
important issue remains unresolved. Do they fully catch up? Or do they simply cover part of 
the distance inbetween, as income differences are never fully eliminated due to diversity in 
steady-state levels? Are U.S. states, such as Maine and California fundamentally different in 
any socio-economic features apart from initial income that may influence their future income 
levels? Will Sicily and the poorer southern part of Italy’s mainland catch up with the richer 
North? Eurostat statistics (www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat) reveal that even in relatively 
small countries, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, large income differentials are observed. 
For example, there is approximately a 10,000 dollars-equivalent difference between the GDP 
                                                
*
 This chapter is an extension of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004b).  
31
 The quote should not be perceived by any means as a political statement or an endorsement of the Senator’s 
general political viewpoint. 
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per capita levels in the poorer region of Hainaut and the wealthier Antwerpen region in 
Belgium for the year 1999. Similarly the GDP per capita level in the province of Noord 
Holland in the Netherlands exceeded that of Friesland by approximately 50% for the same 
year. Are such income differentials permanent or do they reflect temporary deviations from a 
common steady state? There is undoubtedly no single answer to all the aforementioned 
questions. Some regions enjoy more political and economic autonomy than others, some are 
more populous than many independent countries (e.g. California has approximately the 
population of Spain or Poland), while others are larger in size compared to most sovereign 
states (Nunavut in Canada with a size of 2 million square metres is as large as Indonesia).  
 In this context, it is interesting to test whether variables that are considered to be 
important growth determinants at a cross-country level (such as resource abundance, 
investment, schooling, innovation, openness, and corruption) have an important explanatory 
power when addressing regional variation in economic growth performance. More 
importantly, within the context of this thesis, it is appealing to investigate whether resource 
curse type phenomena are relevant at a regional level; an issue that has received very little 
attention so far. Do resource-rich regions have a comparative disadvantage in economic 
development compared to their resource-scarce counterparts? 
 In this chapter, we contribute to this strand of the literature by studying the natural 
resource curse and its transmission channels on a U.S.-state level. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, 
there is substantial variation across U.S. states with respect to the importance of the primary 
sector within their local economies. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis 
performed at a regional level focusing on the negative relationship between economic growth 
and resource abundance and the indirect mechanisms through which this occurs. A particular 
merit of our analysis is that whereas countries often differ in dimensions – such as language, 
the quality of institutions, and cultural characteristics – that are difficult to control for in 
growth regressions, these differences are likely to be smaller across regions within a country 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). The U.S. is a relatively homogeneous country and therefore a 
regional U.S. analysis may provide more precise estimates (compared to cross-country 
studies) of the effect of resource wealth on growth and the indirect channels through which 
this takes place. 
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FIGURE 5.1. Resource abundance in the U.S. 
  
Figure 5.2 depicts the negative correlation between resource abundance and economic growth 
over the period 1986-2001 for the 49 states for which data were available for all the variables 
of our analysis (all U.S. states excluding the District of Columbia and Delaware). The 
correlation is significant at the 1% level. Data are compiled from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce. 
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FIGURE 5.2. Resource abundance and economic growth in the U.S. 
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 Our analysis contributes to growth theory in a wider perspective, as it examines the 
conditional convergence hypothesis for different regions (the U.S. states) within a country. As 
aforementioned, most empirical analyses on (intra-country) regional data sets (e.g. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992a, 1992b, 1995), Barro et al. (1991), and Johnson (2000)) focus on the 
absolute convergence hypothesis. In these studies, an implicit assumption is that different 
regions within the same country are characterised by the same fundamental economic features 
(tastes, technologies, institutions etc.) and therefore that they all must converge to the same 
steady state. Then, differences in growth across regions are fully driven by initial income 
differentials.32 Figure 5.3 depicts the negative correlation between economic growth and 
initial income for our sample of 49 U.S. states. At a second stage, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992a) include education and immigration as regressors in their analysis, only to show that 
the convergence rate they calculate remains stable. We believe that more can be said about the 
role of these independent variables. Finding the coefficients significant implies that regions 
converge to different steady-state levels, or stated differently, that regions with the same 
initial income level but different education and immigration levels will experience different 
growth rates. Johnson and Takeyama (2001) claim, for instance, that the set of U.S. states 
with a higher density of capital stock experienced stronger convergence since 1950. Though 
differences in human capital, investment rates, resource abundance, openness, and institutions 
across regions are likely to be smaller than those across countries, in our analysis we find 
them to be non-negligible and significant in explaining economic growth.  
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FIGURE 5.3. Absolute convergence in the U.S. 
 
                                                
32
 To give justice to the literature, there are studies that examine a series of growth determinants for regions 
within Europe. For an extensive survey, see Fingleton (2003). 
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 Our analysis on the resource curse transmission channels follows the same methodology 
described in Chapter 4. Through cross-state regressions (for the United States), we investigate 
in a similar manner to the previous chapter the effect of natural resources on investment, 
schooling, openness, innovation (R&D), and institutional quality, and we estimate the share of 
each transmission channel in the overall negative effect of resource abundance on growth. 
 The next section is devoted to the empirical evidence on resource abundance and 
economic growth for the U.S. We verify our main proposition that natural resource abundance 
impedes economic development at a regional level. Section 5.3 focuses on other growth 
determinants (investment, schooling, openness, innovation, and corruption) and the existence 
of conditional convergence. Section 5.4 studies empirically the transmission channels and 
compares their relative weight in the overall negative impact of natural resources on economic 
growth. Section 5.5 pays special attention to the role of innovation and regional R&D 
spillovers in explaining the diverse economic performance across states. Section 5.6 analyses 
the differing growth experience of U.S. states individually and attributes their above (below)-
average growth performance to their resource endowments and other specific characteristics 
of their economies. Section 5.7 summarises our main results and offers concluding remarks. 
Finally, as we have carried out an extensive set of robustness checks to test our findings, we 
do not report on all these throughout the text, but separately in Appendix 5.1. 
 
 
5.2. Natural Resource Abundance and Growth 
To identify the dependence of growth on natural resource abundance and other economic 
factors, we estimate cross-state growth regressions for the U.S. states in a similar analysis to 
Chapter 4. We include initial income per capita in our regressions to check for the conditional 
convergence hypothesis, which predicts higher growth in response to lower starting income 
per capita keeping the other explanatory variables constant. Thus, per capita economic growth 
from period t0=1986 to tT=2000, denoted by G i=(1/T) ln(YTi /Y0 i),  depends on initial per 
capita income Y0i, natural resource abundance, R i  (the sign of dependence is the subject of 
our analysis), and a vector of other explanatory variables Zi: 
G i  = α0  + α1  ln(Y0 i) + α2R i  + α3Z i  + ε i ,  (5.1) 
where i corresponds to each U.S. state.33 
  We now estimate growth equation (5.1) using OLS, gradually increasing the set of 
variables Z i . As a starting point, we estimate growth dependent only on initial income per 
capita in 1986 (LnY86). Data on income levels are provided by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce, and we use the real Gross State Product (GSP) 
                                                
33
  Appendix 5.2 lists variables and data sources.  
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database, which is the state equivalent to GDP. As a second step we include natural resource 
abundance, for which we take the share of the primary sector’s production (agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, and mining) in GSP in 1986 (Natural Resources) as a proxy (values in the 
range of 0 to 1). The results are listed in column entry (5.1) and (5.2) of Table 5.1. Our 
findings support the hypothesis that poorer regions tend to grow faster than richer regions (a 
result that still holds when conditioning on any other characteristics of the regions).34 The 
second column reveals that there is a highly significant and negative relationship between 
economic growth and natural resources. It is apparent that regions within the U.S. differ 
substantially in economic features that are important for economic growth, apart from initial 
income levels. A one percentage point increase in income from the primary sector relative to 
total income decreases annual growth by 0.047%. An increase in income from natural 
resources of one standard deviation (0.06) decreases the annual growth rate by about 0.28%. 
This is an effect of substantial magnitude. As a comparison, we observe that a one percentage 
point increase in initial income, other than through the primary sector, decreases growth by 
0.018% per year. 
 Our results can easily be misinterpreted as suggesting that resource-rich states are 
growing slower due to closer proximity to their steady-state levels after a positive resource 
income shock. But such convergence effects of income shocks are captured through the initial 
income variable, as we can see through the analysis of long-term income effects (see 
Appendix 4.1). When the negative effect of natural resources on growth persists, the long-
term effect of an increase in natural resource income of one percent amounts to 4.77/1.77=3 
per cent (see equation (4.4)). A persistent one standard deviation increase in natural resource 
income leads to a decrease in long-term income by about 16 percent. The numbers illustrate 
the argument that whereas in the short term natural resources may increase wealth, in the long 
term the economy can fall back more than it gained. This is consistent with Alaska’s 
experience. It has vast oil reserves and fishing stocks, but it is the only region in the U.S. with 
a negative rate of income growth over the last two decades. 
 When using the natural logarithm of income per capita in 2000 as the dependent 
variable rather than the average growth rate over the period 1986-2000, we find the same 
                                                
34
 For our sample of 49 regions, we find an estimated convergence rate of 0.022 per year. In the final regression 
of Table 5.1, where we account for all explanatory variables captured in vector Zi, we estimate a much higher 
rate of conditional convergence (close to 0.033). In that respect, our results contradict Barro and Sala-i-Martin’ 
analysis, which predicts a common rate of absolute and conditional convergence. Furthermore, as expected, the 
estimated convergence rate for our cross-state analysis is larger than those estimated at a cross-sectional level for 
different countries (e.g. Barro 1991 and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). At a cross-country level, the absolute 
convergence rate is usually close to zero and the conditional convergence rate close to 0.018. This implies that 
within a country, it is relatively easy for poorer regions to catch up.   
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evidence of a negative correlation.35 Resource-abundant states tend to be poorer compared to 
their resource-scarce counterparts. Results are presented in Table 5.2. Our findings do not 
necessarily contradict but rather complement the findings by a number of recent studies that 
emphasise the positive role of resource endowments on income levels in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries both across U.S. states and for the country as a whole (Mitchener and McLean 
2003, Wright 1990, 2001, Wright and Czelusta 2003). Wright, in particular, (1990) associates 
the leading U.S. role in manufacturing at the turn of the twentieth century with technological 
progress and the learning potential within the American mining sector. Similarly, David and 
Wright (1997), Wright (2001), and Wright and Czelusta (2003) emphasise how, at the same 
historic period, mining promoted the establishment of prestigious educational institutions and 
diffused knowledge to other industrial sectors. In Chapter 6, we also argue that endowments 
in precious metals influenced the colonisation strategies of Europeans in the past and resulted 
in the institutional upgrade of resource-rich countries. It is not impossible that there has been a 
gradual reversal of the resource impact thereafter. Auty (2001), for instance, claims that the 
resource curse is a recent phenomenon of the last four decades. De Long and Williamson 
(1994) and Wright (2001) point out that past high transport costs for natural resources made 
their physical proximity essential for the introduction of new industries, technologies, and 
economic expansion. In a similar context, Matsuyama (1992) makes the point that natural 
resources are prone to become less beneficial to economic development over time as free 
trade and specialisation expands. 
                                                
35
 The coefficient remains negative even when we do not account for initial income in 1986. 
                                               
 
TABLE  5.1. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) 
Dependent variable: 
G1986-2000 
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) (5.7) 
Constant    21.50   20.44   19.34   20.54   27.43   26.97   27.97 
LnY86  
(0.19) 
  –1.90** 
    (0.93) 
  –1.77*** 
   (0.64) 
  –1.69*** 
    (0.61) 
  –1.83*** 
  (0.62) 
  –2.57*** 
   (0.73) 
  –2.53*** 
   (0.69) 
  –2.59*** 
   (0.66) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06)    
  –4.72** 
   (2.38) 
  –3.43 
   (2.44) 
  –2.66 
 (2.46) 
  –0.70 
   (2.36) 
  –0.34 
   (2.31) 
  –0.14 
  (2.16) 
Investment 
(0.78)    
    0.29*** 
   (0.09) 
    0.26*** 
   (0.09) 
    0.34*** 
   (0.09) 
    0.31*** 
   (0.08) 
    0.21** 
   (0.11) 
Schooling 
(0.44)    
    0.27** 
   (0.13) 
    0.35*** 
   (0.13) 
    0.29* 
   (0.16) 
    0.34** 
   (0.16) 
Openness 
(0.17) 
  
 
 
     
    1.43** 
   (0.64) 
    1.17* 
   (0.65) 
    1.28** 
   (0.62) 
R&D 
(0.97)   
 
       
    0.15 
   (0.10) 
    0.10 
   (0.10) 
Corruption 
(1.65)   
 
         
   –0.11** 
    (0.05) 
R 2 adjusted 0.22 0.33 0.40 0.41 0.46 0.48 0.52 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=49 of regression (7); robust standard errors for coefficients 
in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
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TABLE  5.2. Income levels and resource abundance 
Dependent variable: LnY00 (5.8) (5.9) 
Constant  3.01  2.86 
LnY86  
(0.19) 
     0.73*** 
(0.13) 
       0.75*** 
            (0.09) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06)  
   –0.66** 
            (0.33) 
R2 adjusted 0.69 0.73 
N 
 
49 49 
Note: Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts ** and *** correspond 
to a 5 and 1% level of significance. 
 
 
5.3. Conditional convergence 
We now turn to the possible crowding-out effects of natural resources (Sachs and Warner 
2001). Following the methodology in Chapter 4, we investigate whether resource abundance 
(R i) affects economic growth (G i ) solely by crowding-out growth-related activities captured 
by Z i .  As we argued in Section 4.2, when this is indeed the case and the vector Z i  is 
sufficiently rich to fully capture most of the indirect negative effects of resource abundance on 
growth, we expect that its inclusion in our regressions would eliminate the negative 
coefficient of resource abundance on growth. As our next step, we thus extend the vector Z i , 
by progressively adding variables commonly used to explain growth, such as investment, 
schooling, openness, R&D expenditure, and corruption, and we examine the magnitude and 
significance of the resource abundance coefficient α2. 
 In column entry (5.3), we include the share of industrial machinery production in GDP in 
1986 as a proxy for investment. Data are provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the 
U.S. Ministry of Commerce. The variable refers to the beginning of the period 1986-2001 in 
order to avoid endogeneity problems. Of those investment measures available, we find 
industrial machinery production most likely to be favourable to economic growth (rather than 
constructions for instance). This is in line with recent empirical evidence on the much stronger 
association of equipment production with productivity growth compared to other components 
of investment across countries (De Long and Summers 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, Jalilian and 
Odedokun 2000, and Temple 1998). Investment contributes positively and considerably to 
growth as expected. An increase in the investment level of one standard deviation increases 
growth by 0.78 x 0.29 = 0.23 percent. In the long term, this leads to a permanent income 
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increase of 13 percent.36 The coefficient for natural resources becomes smaller and less 
significant (the significance level falls to 17%). 
 In the subsequent column entry we include as independent variables, the contribution of 
educational services in GDP in 1986 (Schooling), which we consider a proxy for investment 
in human knowledge. Next, we include a proxy for Openness, for which we use the ratio of 
net international migration for the 1990-99 period for each state relative to the population of 
the state in 1990. We expect a more open economy to receive more foreigners compared to a 
closed economy. We observe that schooling and openness contribute positively to economic 
growth as expected, and when added as explanatory variables they strongly decrease the 
magnitude and significance of the coefficient on natural resources. In column (5.5) of Table 
5.1, where we take account of the first three transmission channels (investment, schooling, 
and openness), the coefficient of resource abundance has been reduced by a factor seven 
compared to column entry (5.2) and has become totally insignificant. This suggests that a 
large part of the resource curse hypothesis is explained through these indirect transmission 
channels.  
 Finally, in column entries (5.6) and (5.7) we incorporate two more explanatory 
variables in our regression analysis. In column (5.6) we include the share of R&D expenditure 
in GSP for 1987 as a proxy for innovation and endogenous technological progress. In column 
(5.7) we include the number of prosecuted corrupt public officials over the period 1991-2000 
per 100,000 citizens as a proxy of corruption in the economy. Data are provided by the 
Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice. The coefficients on both 
variables have the expected sign. Innovation promotes growth and corruption inhibits it. The 
coefficient on R&D is, however, not highly significant and of small magnitude. This finding is 
in line with earlier work by Griliches et al. (1990), who argue that in accounting for labour 
productivity differentials between Japan and U.S. in the 1970s, the contribution of R&D has 
been minor. Recent research has also claimed that the contribution of R&D to U.S. 
productivity growth has declined substantially over time (Mairesse and Hall 1996).  Similarly, 
in a calibrated stylised model with free entry to research and innovation embodiment, Comin 
(2004) finds that R&D accounts for only a tenth of total productivity growth in the U.S. in the 
post-war era. Yet we must keep in mind that spillover effects of R&D activities are not likely 
to be constrained by state boundaries. The coefficient on R&D will thus seriously 
underestimate the countrywide effect on growth. We come back to this in Section 5.5. Also, 
innovation may affect growth through some other indirect channels, such as investment, so 
that part of its positive effect is captured through this coefficient (their direct correlation is 
significant at the 5% level). We observe that the coefficient on resource abundance has 
approached zero in the last column entry and has become almost totally insignificant (84% 
insignificance level). 
                                                
36
 0.78 x (– 0.29) / (–1.69) = 0.13, see equation (4.4). 
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 Overall, the sequence of regressions in Table 5.1 reveals that adding explanatory variables 
steadily reduces both the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on resource 
abundance. This leads to two conclusions. First, natural resources are not harmful to growth 
per se. They tend to frustrate economic growth mainly through indirect channels (investment, 
schooling, openness, innovation, and corruption). Second, the list of indirect channels is rich 
enough to capture all indirect effects since the remaining coefficient shows a negligible 
impact of resource abundance on growth insofar as this is not captured through the other 
variables. 
 
 
5.4. Transmission Channels 
In this section we further investigate the transmission channels, following the methodology set 
out in Section 4.3. Specifically, we estimate the impact of resource abundance on investment, 
schooling, openness, R&D, and corruption, and the indirect effect, thereof, on economic 
growth, and subsequently we calculate the relative importance of each transmission channel 
compared to one another. 
 Before turning to our empirical investigation, we briefly discuss the variables that entered 
the regression analysis and their probability to act as a transmission channel. In Section 4.3, 
we extensively commented on the crowding out effect of resource rents on investment, 
education, and corruption. A contraction of the manufacturing sector following a resource 
boom and volatility in the prices of primary commodities discourage investment to a large 
extent (e.g. see Sachs and Warner 1999b). Additionally, due to a higher level of non-wage 
income, private and public incentives to accumulate human capital are reduced in resource-
affluent economies (Gylfason and Zoega 2001). Furthermore, natural resource rents entice 
individuals and interest groups into rent-seeking and corruption in order to gain access to 
them (e.g. Krueger 1974).  
 Another transmission channel that we consider is the impact of natural resources on the 
degree of openness in the economy, measured by the ratio of net immigrants during 1986-
2000 to the population at the beginning of the period. We acknowledge the fact that our proxy 
of openness is not obvious. A better measure might have been the amount of exports and 
imports in GSP for each region, but this measure is not available. Economies that are open to 
trade tend also to be open in terms of accepting immigrants: a well-known example is the 
Netherlands during their Golden Age; Markusen (1983) and Schmitz and Helmberger (1970) 
argue that relaxing the unrealistic assumptions of identical technologies and production 
functions amongst trading partners in a Heckscher-Ohlin type of model gives rise to 
complementarity between trade in goods and factor mobility. More recently, Ethier (1985) 
and Rodrik (1997, ch.2) claimed that open economies have a more elastic labour demand and 
therefore are more eager to accept immigrants. This theme has also been examined 
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empirically in the recent pioneering work by Collins et al. (1999), Kohli (1999), and Mundra 
(2005), who provide through data analysis support to a strong complementarity between trade 
openness and labour mobility (immigration). 
 Our data show that resource abundance is indeed negatively correlated with the degree 
of openness for our sample of U.S. regions. We recognise that the mechanisms that link 
resource abundance to openness must be different for the state level when compared to the 
country level. At a state level, resource abundance cannot lead to a raise in trade tariffs or to 
import quotas; a relation that is often found in cross-country analyses (Auty 1994, Sachs and 
Warner 1995). There is also no overvaluation of the local currency (Sachs and Warner 1995, 
Torvik 2001, Gylfason 2000, 2001a, 2001b, Rodriguez and Sachs 1999). Resource abundance 
may harm, however, the openness of regional economies within a country in a different 
manner. Resource-dependent sectors often suffer from uncertainty due to the high volatility of 
prices of primary commodities (following a negative trend over time, see Cashin et al. 2002). 
In order to protect regional employees working in these sectors, local governments may 
transfer funds to their support (or exert pressure to the central government to do so). If these 
funds were utilised for alternative purposes, this could create a temporary loss of jobs for the 
regional population (and voters). Local trade unions from the resource-based sectors may 
deter the development of an institutional and regulatory environment that fosters competition. 
If resource abundance is also related to rent-seeking and corruption, as it is often mentioned in 
the literature (Gray and Kaufmann 1998, Ascher 1999, Leite and Weidmann 1999, Gylfason 
2001), then a climate of shirking and opportunism may increase the potential hazards of trade 
(North 1991). In the literature, people in the coal-rich Appalachia region (Virginia, West 
Virginia, and Kentucky) are described as being relatively antagonistic towards the 
government and foreigners (Santopietro 2002, Hansen 1966). Essentially, the arguments show 
a similarity between regional and national governments; both have an increased incentive to 
protect the perceived interests of domestic people when natural resource income grows. 
 Another mechanism through which natural resources may affect openness is through 
labour opportunities. In the past, resource-affluent U.S. regions have witnessed increased 
immigration, as exemplified by the gold rush experience in California (Mitchener and 
McLean 2003). In an era where manufacturing and services were not sufficiently developed to 
provide large employment opportunities to a work force characterised by large unemployment 
and a need to achieve some minimal living standards, workers fled to resource-dependent 
sectors. More recently, the primary sector with its dependence on volatile resource prices does 
not provide extra employment opportunities. On the contrary, we used data on unemployment 
rates across states in 1986 (from the Bureau of Labour Statistics of the U.S. Department of 
Labour) to confirm that indeed resource-dependent states tend to suffer from increased 
unemployment (correlation at the 1% level of significance). 
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 As a next transmission channel we consider the effect of resource abundance on 
innovation (R&D). This linkage receives less attention in the “Dutch disease” literature, but 
our data unambiguously point to a link between natural resource abundance and R&D 
expenditures. Sachs and Warner (2001) suggest that resource abundance may crowd out 
entrepreneurial activity and innovation by encouraging potential innovators and entrepreneurs 
to engage in the primary sector. To the extent that entrepreneurial talent is limited, the 
crowding-out effect of innovation can be potentially large. Furthermore, as Murphy et al. 
(1991) point out, when talented individuals start firms, they innovate and foster growth. When 
they become rent seekers, they only redistribute wealth and reduce economic growth. In 
countries where rent-seeking activities give higher rewards to talent than entrepreneurship, 
innovation is likely to be crowded-out and the economy stagnates. 
 Now we turn to the data. Our basis specification of the dependence of the variables Zi on 
resource income is given by: 
Z i  = β0  + β1R i  + µi ,   (5.2) 
where Z i , β0,  β1 ,  and µi  are specified for investment, schooling, openness, R&D, and 
corruption. Table 5.3 lists the results for the estimated equation (5.2). Our results indicate that 
resource abundance leads to lower investment, schooling, openness, R&D expenditure, and 
higher levels of corruption. All coefficients are consistent with the negative correlation 
between resource abundance and economic performance. The schooling variable has the most 
significant relation to natural resource abundance at the 1% level, and resource abundance 
alone accounts for 17% of the variation in educational quality across different states. 
Interestingly, we also find a strongly significant coefficient on R&D, and natural resources by 
themselves explain more than 11% of variation in R&D expenditures. On the other hand, the 
corruption channel seems to be relatively weak, since it is only significant at the 10% level. 
 
TABLE 5.3. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (5.2) 
 
Investment 
(5.10) 
Schooling 
(5.11) 
Openness 
(5.12) 
R&D 
(5.13) 
Corruption 
(5.14) 
Constant  1.23 0.86 0.22 1.50 2.70 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
     –4.45*** 
      (1.14) 
   –3.32*** 
      (0.76) 
     –0.75*** 
      (0.30) 
    –6.16*** 
      (1.62) 
       5.96* 
      (3.57) 
R2 adjusted 0.09 0.17 0.04 0.11 0.02 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 
Note: robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to 
a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
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  To test the robustness of our results we use an alternative specification for the 
transmission channels by incorporating initial income, ln(Y0i), in equation (5.2). The 
specification describing the transmission variables becomes: 
Zi = γ0 + γ1ln(Y0 i) + γ2Ri + σi. (5.3) 
Estimations of equation (5.3) for all five transmission channels are provided in Appendix 5.3. 
Two findings stand out. First, the coefficient for initial income is insignificant in all 
transmission channels except for the openness channel, and second, the coefficients for 
natural resource abundance remain almost unchanged. From this, we conclude that income is 
not a major determinant for most of the variables captured by the vector Zi, and this reduces 
the probability of endogeneity for the same set of variables. It is more likely that the variables 
captured in the vector Zi affect income levels rather than the other way round. We choose 
equation (5.2) as the basis for our further analysis. 
 Since openness, however, appears to depend on income levels, we test an alternative 
specification adopting a measurement of openness based on 1990 data (Openness90) as an 
instrument for our index of Openness over the whole period. The two measures are strongly 
correlated at the 95% level and the instrumental variable is uncorrelated with the error term ε i  
of equation (5.1). In Appendix 5.4, we present a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimation of 
equation (5.1) including all explanatory variables and treating average Openness as 
endogenous. Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates of the coefficients on all growth-determining 
variables and Panel B gives the corresponding first stages. We find no major qualitative 
differences as compared to our previous results (reported in Table 5.1) but significance drops 
for most coefficients. 
 As resource abundance explains part of the variation in investment and other variables, by 
substitution of equation (5.2) into (5.1) we calculate the overall (direct and indirect) impact of 
natural resources on growth: 
G i  = (α0+α3β0 ) + α1  ln(Y0 i) + (α2+α3β1)R i  + α3µ i  + ε i ,  (5.4) 
where α2R i  denotes the direct effect of natural resources on growth, α3β1R i  indicates the 
indirect effect of natural resource abundance on growth,37 and µ i
 
are the residuals of (5.2). 
The estimated values for the coefficients α1 ,  α2+α3β1 , and α3  of equation (5.4) are listed in 
column (5.15) of Table 5.4. Alternatively, we adopt the specification provided by equation 
(5.3) for the openness channel (since openness is the only variable where initial income 
appears to be a significant factor) and maintain the transmission specification of equation 
(5.2) for the remaining variables. Results are provided in column (5.16) of Table 5.4. Finally, 
the last column of the table presents estimations when we substitute equation (5.3) into (5.1), 
                                                
37
 Note that α3β1 is an inproduct of two vectors of five elements. 
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in order to account for the possible impact of initial income on all transmission variables. 
Comparing the results presented in Table 5.4 reveals that the coefficient on initial income in 
equation (5.4) is likely to be slightly overestimated, when initial income is excluded as an 
explanatory factor for the various transmission variables. Additionally, the coefficient on 
natural resources is likely to be slightly underestimated, though the difference is small. 
Qualitatively, the conclusions derived from the second regression in Table 5.1 on the relative 
importance of initial income and natural resource abundance are consistent with the results of 
Table 5.4.  
 
TABLE 5.4. Growth regression, including indirect effects as in equation (5.4) 
Dependent variable:     
G1986-2000 
(5.15) (5.16) (5.17) 
Constant 28.66 22.20 20.44 
LnY86 
(0.19) 
    –2.59*** 
              (0.66) 
     –1.94*** 
             (0.50) 
     –1.77*** 
              (0.47) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
             –4.46** 
              (1.94) 
             –4.66** 
              (1.95) 
             –4.72** 
              (1.95) 
Investment (µ1; µ1; σ1) 
(0.74) 
    0.21** 
              (0.11) 
    0.21** 
              (0.11) 
    0.21** 
              (0.11) 
Schooling (µ2; µ2; σ2) 
(0.40) 
     0.34** 
              (0.16) 
   0.34** 
             (0.16) 
   0.34** 
             (0.16) 
Openness (µ3; σ3; σ3) 
(0.17) 
     1.28** 
              (0.62) 
    1.28** 
              (0.62) 
   1.28** 
             (0.62) 
R&D (µ4; µ4; σ4) 
(0.90) 
 0.10 
 (0.10) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
              0.10 
(0.10) 
Corruption (µ5; µ5; σ5) 
(1.62) 
  –0.11** 
              (0.05) 
 –0.11** 
             (0.05) 
            –0.11** 
             (0.05) 
R2 adjusted 0.52 0.52 0.52 
N  49 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. The parentheses next to the variable names represent the sequence of 
residuals used in each regression. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of 
significance. 
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 As in chapter 4, we quantify the relative importance of each transmission channel in 
explaining the overall negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. The direct 
effect is given by α2  and the indirect effect by α3β1 ,  as can be seen from equation (5.4). 
Results are listed in Table 5.5.38 Consistent with the drop in size and significance of the 
natural resource coefficient in Table 5.1, the largest part of the resource curse can be 
attributed to the indirect channels. 
 
TABLE 5.5. Relative importance of transmission channels as in equation (5.4) 
Transmission channels 
α3  
(Table 5.1)  
β1  
(Table 5.3) 
Contribution to 
α2+α3β1  
Relative 
Contribution 
Natural Resources   
        –0.14          3% 
Investment          0.21        –4.45         –0.93          21% 
Schooling          0.34        –3.32         –1.13          25% 
Openness          1.28        –0.75         –0.96          22% 
R&D          0.10        –6.16         –0.62          14% 
Corruption        –0.11          5.96         –0.66          15% 
Total 
  
        –4.46        100% 
 
 The knowledge-based channels of schooling and R&D appear to be the most important 
transmission mechanisms, accounting for almost 40% of the negative impact of resource 
abundance on growth for the U.S. states. This is a somewhat remarkable result, given the fact 
that resource affluence supported the establishment of prestigious educational institutions in 
the U.S. in the past and given the technological expansion in the field of oil drilling and 
exploration more recently in Norway (Wright 2001). It suggests that the crowding-out effect 
of natural resources on education is indeed related to policy failures rather than the resources 
themselves (e.g. Gylfason 2001a, p.851). 
 
 
5.5. The Role of R&D 
The insignificant correlation between GSP growth and innovation in Table 5.1 is somehow 
puzzling, since the rise in productivity growth after the mid 1990s is attributed to a large 
extent to technological improvements. For that reason, we substitute our innovation proxy 
(R&D) with a new variable taking account of regional spillovers. The new innovation variable 
we construct is an equally weighted sum of each region’s share of R&D expenditure in GSP 
                                                
38
 We also calculate the relative importance of each transmission channel for the alternative transmission 
specifications provided by equation (5.3). Appendix 5.5 lists the results. As illustrated in Tables 5.38 and 5.39, a 
slightly larger role for the openness channel is found when initial income is accounted for in the transmission 
specifications.  
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for 1987 and the average share of all neighbouring states, meaning Innovationi 
= nDRDR
n
j
ji /)&(2
1&
2
1
0






+ ∑
=
, where i represents the state of interest and n the number of 
neighbouring states. We keep in mind that this is an imperfect approximation of the regional 
R&D spillovers between the U.S. states. We assume an equal role for all neighbouring states 
in generating regional externalities to simplify the analysis. Alternatively, different weights 
could be applied for regional spillovers and domestic R&D. As seen in Table 5.6, innovation 
now becomes significant at the 10% level, implying that regional R&D spillovers tend to be 
important. The significance for the rest of the coefficients, however, decreases in general. An 
increase in innovation of one standard deviation increases growth by 0.25%, an effect twice as 
large as when compared with the innovation variable abstracting from regional spillovers. The 
new innovation proxy remains strongly and negatively correlated with natural resources 
(Table 5.7). When we reproduce Table 5.5 using the new innovation proxy, innovation 
becomes the most important transmission mechanism. The knowledge-based channels of 
schooling and innovation jointly rise in terms of explaining the resource curse to 53% (Table 
5.8).  
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TABLE 5.6. Growth regression as in equation (5.1) with R&D spillovers 
Dependent variable:  
G1986-2000 
(5.18) 
Constant       27.17 
LnY86  
(0.15) 
     –2.53*** 
     (0.63) 
Nat 
(0.06) 
       0.20 
     (2.05) 
Investment 
(1.01) 
       0.20* 
     (0.10) 
Schooling 
(0.38) 
       0.27 
      (0.18) 
Openness 
(0.09) 
       1.13** 
      (0.58) 
Innovation 
(0.60) 
       0.31* 
      (0.17) 
Corruption 
(1.34) 
     –0.09* 
      (0.05) 
R2 adjusted 0.55 
N  49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of 
significance. 
 
TABLE 5.7. Indirect transmission channel as in equation (5.2): Innovation 
 
Innovation 
(5.19) 
Constant  1.44 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
   –4.82*** 
      (1.22) 
R2 adjusted 0.19 
N 49 
Note: robust standard error for coefficients in parenthesis. Superscript ** corresponds to a 5 level 
of significance. 
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TABLE 5.8. Relative importance of transmission channels as in equation (5.2) with regional 
R&D spillovers (Innovation)  
Transmission channels α3  (Table 5.6) 
β1  
(Tables 5.3 and 5.7) 
Contribution to 
α2+α3β1   
Relative 
Contribution 
Natural Resources             0.20          –4% 
Investment          0.20 –4.45         –0.89          20% 
Schooling          0.27 –3.32         –0.90          20% 
Openness          1.13 –0.75         –0.85          19% 
Innovation          0.31 –4.82         –1.50          33% 
Corruption        –0.09 
  5.96         –0.54          12% 
Total           –4.48        100% 
   
 Our results in Tables 5.6–5.8 provide strong support to our findings in Chapter 3 on the 
contractionary effect of resource rents on innovation and thereof on growth. Our findings 
suggest that resource-rich U.S. states underinvest in R&D activities and do not sufficiently 
encourage their talented individuals to make full use of their potential. It is apparent that 
education and innovation are the most important reasons for the disappointing performance of 
resource-affluent U.S. states, accounting for the largest part of the negative association 
between resources and growth. Furthermore, our findings provide evidence that the role of 
R&D activities may not be confined within state borders but is likely to diffuse across 
neighbouring regions. This enhances the overall impact of innovation on the growth process 
of our U.S.-state sample. 
 
 
5.6. Some Examples 
Modifying the structural representation of equation (5.4) can further our understanding of the 
growth experience of particular states. Equation (5.5) attributes growth differences relative to 
the average growth rate (2.47%) to differences in resource abundance, investment, schooling 
and openness (the portion of them not explained by natural resources) from their mean values. 
Gi– Ga = α1[ln(Y0)i–ln(Y0)a] + (α2+ α3β1)(Ri–Ra) + α3µi + εi , (5.5) 
where the i superscript represents a single state, the a superscript represents the average state, 
µ are the residuals of equation (4.5) (which are basically the part of all explanatory variables Z 
not explained by resource abundance R) and ε is the error term of equation (5.4). In this way 
we can interpret relatively high and low growth rates over the 1986-2000 period in terms of 
each explanatory factor and an unexplained residual ε. To put it in other words, we can see 
whether a high or low growth level is due to convergence, resource abundance (including the 
indirect effect through the transmission channels), other explanatory variables (whose 
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influence is captured by the vector µi), or finally some unexplained factors (namely the error 
term εi). 
 Making use of specification (5.5), Table 5.9 displays the divergent growth experience of 
U.S. states. We briefly comment on a few cases of resource-dependent states.39 As can be 
seen, Alaska and Louisiana experienced disappointingly low growth rates over the period. The 
large contribution of the resource-abundant factor (third row entries) identifies them as typical 
examples of the resource curse. The direct and indirect effects of resource abundance on 
growth explain almost half of the negative growth differential for Louisiana, and one quarter 
of the negative growth differential for Alaska. On the other hand, New Mexico and Texas 
experienced above-average growth rates, despite the presence of an extensive resource base in 
their economies. Other things being equal, New Mexico and Texas would have experienced 
growth rates of –0.25 and –0.19 percentage points below the average, respectively, due to 
their resource abundance. New Mexico’s remarkable growth performance is attributed mostly 
to convergence and the R&D sector (apart from the unexplained residuals).40 Texas seems to 
have benefited from its openness.41 The two last examples give substance to the argument that 
the natural resource curse is by no means an iron law.  
 
                                                
39
 We select states with a relatively large contribution of natural resources and small residual, that is, where the 
model has good predictive power. 
40
 New Mexico is outdoing most U.S. states in terms of R&D expenditure in GSP and per capita (Fossum et al. 
2000, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) 2002). Much of this research is 
undertaken within the minerals sector (e.g. at the Petroleum Recovery Research Center and the New Mexico 
Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources) and natural resources in general (e.g. at the Center for Global 
Environmental Technologies and the Albuquerque Forestry Sciences Laboratory). This is indicative of the 
knowledge-intensive character of New Mexico’s primary sector. 
41
 Texas was, for instance, the first state in 2001 to enact legislation allowing undocumented aliens to attend 
taxpayer supported colleges and universities at in-state tuition fees. 
                                                     
 
 
 
TABLE 5.9. Growth differentials from the average value among U.S. regions 
U.S. State  Gi– Ga α1*
 
[ln(Y0)i –ln(Y0)a] 
(α2+ α3β1)* 
(Ri–Ra) 
α3µ
i
 -
investment 
α3µ
i
 -
schooling 
α3µ
i
 -
openness 
α3µ
i
 - 
R&D 
α3µ
i
 -
corruption 
ε
i
  
(error term) 
ALABAMA AL –0.21   0.48   0.10 –0.05 –0.11 –0.21 0.07 –0.01 –0.48 
ALASKA          AK –3.33          –1.74 –0.85 –0.03   0.04   0.16   0.01 –0.12 –0.80 
ARIZONA         AZ   0.17   0.09   0.11   0.00 –0.14   0.11 –0.02   0.08 –0.06 
ARKANSAS        AR   0.30   0.71 –0.02   0.03 –0.12 –0.17 –0.08   0.13 –0.18 
CALIFORNIA      CA –0.25 –0.57   0.11 –0.06 –0.06   0.72   0.11 –0.04 –0.47 
COLORADO        CO   0.69 –0.25   0.07 –0.06 –0.10   0.01   0.02   0.26   0.74 
CONNECTICUT     CT   0.30 –0.83   0.20   0.06   0.12   0.01   0.07   0.06   0.60 
FLORIDA         FL –0.49   0.06   0.12 –0.15 –0.09   0.37 –0.05 –0.29 –0.46 
GEORGIA         GA   0.26 –0.17   0.14 –0.14 –0.08 –0.05 –0.07 –0.10   0.73 
HAWAAI          HI –1.40 –0.57   0.15 –0.24 –0.02   0.36 –0.11 –0.13 –0.84 
IDAHO           ID   1.45  0.71 –0.15   0.07 –0.03   0.03   0.18 –0.04   0.69 
ILLINOIS        IL   0.18 –0.29   0.15   0.10   0.01   0.16   0.00 –0.29   0.32 
INDIANA         IN   0.43   0.24   0.13   0.10 –0.04 –0.19   0.03   0.11   0.05 
IOWA            IA   0.49   0.31 –0.14   0.39   0.07 –0.10 –0.04   0.22 –0.21 
KANSAS          KS –0.42 –0.01 –0.04 –0.05 –0.10 –0.08 –0.03   0.16 –0.27 
KENTUCKY        KY   0.33   0.47   0.00   0.06 –0.08 –0.18 –0.08 –0.14   0.28 
LOUISIANNA      LA –1.21 –0.06 –0.57 –0.05   0.11 –0.03 –0.02 –0.29 –0.30 
MAINE           ME –0.65   0.23   0.09 –0.16   0.01 –0.21 –0.11 –0.07 –0.42 
MARYLAND        MD –0.73 –0.38   0.19 –0.17   0.01   0.08 –0.03   0.07 –0.50 
MASSACHUSETTS   MA   0.52 –0.63   0.20   0.14   0.49   0.04   0.17   0.03   0.09 
MICHIGAN        MI –0.51 –0.12   0.16   0.14 –0.14 –0.13   0.19   0.12 –0.72 
MINNESSOTA       MN   0.35 –0.24   0.05   0.32 –0.02 –0.08   0.08   0.20   0.04 
MISSISSIPPI     MS   0.11   0.91   0.01 –0.06 –0.09 –0.20 –0.11 –0.49   0.14 
MISSOURI MO –0.30 –0.02   0.13 –0.10    0.05 –0.16   0.03 –0.09 –0.14 
MONTANA MT –0.74   0.55 –0.22 –0.15 –0.04 –0.14 –0.08 –0.05 –0.61 
Note: Coefficients α1, (α2+ α3β1) and α3’s as in regression (13) of Table 3. Average values Ga, ln(Y0)a, and Ra are equal to 2.47, 10.02, and 0.05 respectively. 
                                                                                         
 
TABLE 5.9 cntd. Growth differentials from the average value among U.S. regions  
U.S. State  Gi– Ga α1*
 
[ln(Y0)i –ln(Y0)a] 
(α2+ α3β1)* 
(Ri–Ra) 
α3µ
i
 -
investment 
α3µ
i
 -
schooling 
α3µ
i
 -
openness 
α3µ
i
 - 
R&D 
α3µ
i
 -
corruption 
ε
i
  
(error term) 
NEBRASKA        NE   0.36   0.10 –0.14   0.01   0.03 –0.08 –0.08   0.27   0.26 
NEVADA          NV –0.45 –0.57   0.09 –0.15 –0.21   0.33 –0.11   0.00   0.17 
NEW HAMPSHIRE   NH   0.95 –0.15   0.19   0.47   0.18 –0.19 –0.11   0.21   0.34 
NEW JERSEY      NJ   0.26 –0.60   0.21 –0.11 –0.07   0.35   0.13 –0.08   0.45 
NEW MEXICO      NM   0.92   0.42 –0.25 –0.12 –0.06   0.14   0.26   0.15   0.38 
NEW YORK        NY   0.02 –0.75   0.21 –0.09   0.17   0.51 –0.03 –0.22   0.23 
NORTH CAROLINA  NC   0.33 –0.02   0.13   0.09   0.03 –0.15 –0.02   0.11   0.15 
NORTH DAKOTA    ND   0.03   0.39 –0.01 –0.11 –0.10 –0.12 –0.07 –0.39   0.44 
OHIO            OH –0.14 –0.01   0.16   0.13 –0.04 –0.20   0.00 –0.19   0.01 
OKLAHOMA        OK –0.69   0.34 –0.27   0.10 –0.03 –0.06 –0.02   0.07 –0.82 
OREGON          OR   1.43   0.19   0.07 –0.09 –0.07   0.05 –0.08   0.24   1.12 
PENNSYLVANIA    PA   0.13   0.08   0.16 –0.02   0.24 –0.14   0.03 –0.07 –0.16 
RHODE ISLAND    RI   0.26 –0.07   0.16 –0.12   0.32 –0.06 –0.04 –0.01   0.07 
SOUTH CAROLINA  SC   0.14   0.44   0.17   0.00 –0.12 –0.20 –0.06 –0.07 –0.01 
SOUTH DAKOTA    SD   0.63   0.32 –0.29 –0.03   0.04 –0.08 –0.07 –0.15   0.89 
TENNESSEE       TN   0.21   0.19   0.15   0.00 –0.05 –0.19 –0.08 –0.07   0.25 
TEXAS           TX   0.16 –0.13 –0.19   0.00 –0.03   0.34   0.01   0.08   0.08 
UTAH            UT   0.54   0.37   0.05   0.13   0.13 –0.02   0.12   0.24 –0.47 
VERMONT         VT   0.22   0.27   0.09 –0.07   0.30 –0.14   0.09   0.08 –0.41 
VIRGINIA        VA –0.46 –0.37   0.17 –0.19 –0.12   0.03 –0.06 –0.12   0.20 
WASHINGTON      WA   0.06 –0.25   0.09 –0.14 –0.11   0.13 0.14   0.13   0.08 
WEST VIRGINIA   WV –0.10   0.92 –0.07 –0.11 –0.10 –0.19 –0.08   0.07 –0.54 
WISCONSIN       WI   0.24   0.12   0.06   0.43 –0.03 –0.18 –0.01   0.31 –0.45 
WYOMING WY –0.29 –0.45 –0.98   0.02   0.06   0.04 0.02   0.11    0.89 
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5.7. Conclusions 
 A number of recent studies argue that resource-affluent economies underperform in a 
series of economic fundamentals; they tend to underinvest in education and infrastructure; 
they suffer from rent seeking and corruption; they fail to diversify their economies; and 
neglect the necessity to constrain government ineffectiveness. As a consequence, many 
resource-rich countries suffer from crushing poverty and long-term stagnation. The natural 
resource curse, as described above, is often seen as a problem of developing countries that 
waste their wealth instead of managing it efficiently. In this chapter, we examined whether 
such phenomena are restricted to the international arena, or also hold across regions within the 
highly developed U.S. This is of particular interest, since resource endowments also supported 
the 19th and 20th century industrialisation process throughout the United States. We used U.S. 
state-level data to show that resource-scarce states tend to have a comparative advantage in 
development compared to resource-abundant states. The main mechanisms responsible for 
economic underperformance among resource-abundant countries are also found across 
resource-rich regions. We do not suggest that there runs a necessary causality from resource 
abundance to lower growth. New Mexico and Texas show that prudent economic policies and 
cautious planning can reverse the pattern for individual cases. 
 Our findings are important for two reasons. First, they challenge the common hypothesis 
that regions within a country converge to the same steady-state income level. There may be a 
substantial and persistent divergence between regions that deserves its own analysis. Second, 
it demonstrates that even in a relatively homogeneous sample, resource abundance can have a 
substantial negative impact through affecting various economic fundamentals such as 
investment levels, schooling rates, innovation, and openness. A better understanding of the 
indirect resource curse mechanisms is essential for adopting policy measures that can prevent 
the negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. The natural resource curse is 
not a problem of countries with weak institutions, but it is potentially a common threat to both 
developing and developed economies. 
 Empirical analysis at a regional level often suffers from data limitations, since data are 
often unavailable for extensive periods or at a disaggregated level.  We expect future progress 
on data availability to contribute substantially to the investigation of regional economic 
growth and its determinants. Such an extension could also help us to test the hypothesis of a 
reversal of the resource impact on economic development over the past century. Furthermore, 
it would be of particular interest to investigate whether similar results can be obtained when 
examining the resource curse and its explanations within regions of a developing country.  
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APPENDIX 5.1: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
(i). Alternative Specifications 
 
We run a series of alternative specifications to check whether our results are robust. We 
estimated all regressions using the Bounded Influence Estimation technique, as analysed in 
Welsch (1980) and Krasker and Welsch (1982), which attaches smaller weights to 
observations with large residuals. The main results of our analysis remain the same, as can be 
seen in Tables 5.10 and 5.11. We also replicated the growth specifications by Benhabib and 
Spiegel (1997, 2000), discerning growth determinants into “primitives” and “ancillary” 
variables. We included as “primitives” the average value of our investment measurement over 
the whole 1986-2000 period and the average annual growth of the percentage of people (25 
years old and over) that hold an advanced degree (master’s, doctorate or professional) 
between 1990 and 2000 (data on advanced degree holders are provided by the U.S. Census 
Bureau (2003) from the 1990 Census of Population) as proxies for investment in physical and 
human capital respectively. Table 5.12 presents estimations of the Benhabib and Spiegel 
neoclassical growth specification. Following Benhabib and Spiegel (1997, 2000), we included 
in regressions (5.28)-(5.30) as ancillary variables a measure of inequality (the Gini coefficient 
in 1989, provided by the U.S. Census Bureau (2003)), a measure of financial depth (the value 
of total assets held by commercial banks with respect to GSP in 1986, provided by the U.S. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)42 and interactive terms between financial depth, initial 
income and inequality. The ancillary variables perform poorly and the proxy for investment in 
human capital remains mostly insignificant. Our proxy for inequality is insignificant and of 
the wrong sign, as in Benhabib and Spiegel (1997, 2000). In column (5.31), we keep the 
primitive variables (Inv HC, Inv PC) and also include initial income (LnY86), Openness,  
Schooling, R&D, and Corruption as in our main growth specification (regression (5.7) of 
Table 5.1). The coefficient on natural resources is now positive (reinforcing our argument that 
the resource curse takes place solely through indirect mechanisms). Since human capital 
accumulation (Inv HC) is insignificant and the two variables capturing physical and human 
capital accumulation are likely to be dependent on the growth rate over the same period, we 
treat these results with caution. Table 5.13 presents regression results based on the “reduced” 
specification, as in Benhabib and Spiegel (1997), where the level of human capital (rather 
than its accumulation) and initial income (LnY86) enter the regressions in order to capture 
endogenous features and convergence. Finally, Table 5.14 presents results based on the 
                                                
42
 The same measurement has been used as a proxy of financial depth by Abrams et al. (1999). 
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structured growth specification, as in Benhabib and Spiegel (1997, 2000), where a catch-up 
term (BS-Catch-up) calculated as Schooling x (Ymax/Y86) replaces initial income (LnY86) in the 
regression analysis. In regression (5.40) of Table 5.14, we incorporate all variables appearing 
in regression (5.7) of Table 5.1 apart from initial income (LnY86), which is replaced by the 
Benhabib and Spiegel catch-up term. Although the Benhabib and Spiegel catch-up variable 
enters significantly, it does not perform as well as initial income as a convergence term. 
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TABLE 5.10. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) (Bounded Influence Estimation) 
Dependent variable: 
G1986-2000 
(5.20) (5.21) 
Constant    13.44   20.92 
LnY86  
(0.19) 
  –1.07** 
   (0.51) 
  –1.89*** 
    (0.54) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
  –3.66** 
   (2.05) 
  –0.94 
   (1.68) 
Investment 
(0.78)   
    0.26*** 
   (0.10) 
Schooling 
(0.44)  
    0.22 
   (0.17) 
Openness 
(0.17)  
    1.04* 
   (0.56) 
R&D 
(0.97)  
    0.11 
   (0.08) 
Corruption 
(1.65)  
  –0.07* 
   (0.04) 
R2 adjusted 0.08 0.39 
N 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of 
significance. 
 
TABLE 5.11. Indirect transmission channels, as in equation (5.2)                                  
(Bounded Influence Estimation) 
 
Investment 
(5.22) 
Schooling 
(5.23) 
Openness 
(5.24) 
R&D 
(5.25) 
Corruption 
(5.26) 
Constant  1.18 0.82 0.21 1.48 2.71 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
 –4.25** 
      (1.75) 
   –3.05*** 
      (0.95) 
–0.72* 
      (0.41) 
    –6.58*** 
      (2.23) 
       4.74 
      (4.64) 
R2 adjusted 0.09 0.16 0.04 0.14 0.01 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to 
a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
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TABLE  5.12. Growth regressions (Neoclassical specification) 
Dependent variable:  
G1986-2000 
(5.27) (5.28) (5.29) (5.30) (5.31) 
Constant      1.47     3.01     1.22     1.35    26.41 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
  –2.75 
    (2.52) 
  –2.86 
    (2.47) 
  –2.53 
    (2.40) 
  –3.40 
    (2.40) 
     0.93 
     (2.12) 
Inv PK 
(1.22) 
     0.19*** 
   (0.07) 
    0.18** 
   (0.07) 
     0.17*** 
   (0.06) 
    0.15** 
   (0.07) 
     0.15** 
    (0.07) 
Inv HC 
(0.05) 
    3.48* 
   (2.04) 
    3.10 
   (1.99) 
    3.62* 
   (2.07) 
    3.12 
   (1.92) 
     2.49 
    (1.67) 
Inequality 
(0.02)  
  –3.01 
   (3.61)    
Financial Depth 
(0.29)   
    0.38 
   (0.23) 
  16.59** 
   (7.44)  
Financial Depth x Inequality 
(0.12)   
 
 
    1.24 
   (3.96)  
Financial Depth x LnY86 
(2.88)   
 
 
  –1.66** 
   (0.82)  
LnY86  
(0.25) 
    
   –2.51*** 
    (0.59) 
Openness 
(0.17)   
 
 
     
     1.60** 
    (0.69) 
Schooling 
(0.44)     
     0.33** 
    (0.15) 
R&D 
(0.97)   
 
      
     0.09 
    (0.10) 
Corruption 
(1.65)   
 
      
   –0.11** 
    (0.05) 
R2 adjusted 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.55 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of 
significance. 
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TABLE 5.13. Growth regressions (Reduced specification) 
Dependent variable:  
G1986-2000 
(5.32) (5.33) (5.34) (5.35) 
Constant     19.70    21.42    19.28    41.00 
LnY86  
(0.25) 
   
    –1.75*** 
    (0.62) 
   –1.73*** 
    (0.60) 
   –1.72*** 
    (0.61) 
   –3.86*** 
    (1.25) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
   –2.90 
     (2.48) 
   –2.96 
    (2.23) 
   –2.94 
     (2.45) 
   –1.66 
     (2.00) 
Inv PK 
(1.22) 
     0.15** 
   (0.06) 
     0.13* 
    (0.07) 
     0.15** 
    (0.06) 
     0.13* 
   (0.07) 
Schooling 
(0.44) 
     0.29** 
    (0.14) 
     0.26* 
   (0.14) 
     0.25** 
    (0.14) 
     0.12** 
    (0.15) 
Inequality 
(0.02)  
   –4.40 
    (3.63)   
Financial Depth 
(0.29)   
     0.24 
    (0.16) 
    –36.63** 
   (16.41) 
Financial Depth x Inequality 
(0.12)   
 
 
    –12.92** 
     (5.76) 
Financial Depth x LnY86 
(2.88)   
 
 
      4.21** 
     (1.82) 
R2 adjusted 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.43 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of 
significance.  
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TABLE 5.14. Growth regressions (Structured specification) 
Dependent variable:  
G1986-2000 
(5.36) (5.37) (5.38) (5.39) (5.40) 
Constant       2.18 3.69 2.01     2.03     2.23 
BS-Catch-up  
(0.36) 
     0.78** 
    (0.39) 
    0.71** 
   (0.40) 
     0.82** 
    (0.41) 
    0.01 
   (0.34) 
    1.00* 
   (0.51) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
   –4.01 
     (3.38) 
   –4.03 
    (3.23) 
    –4.05 
     (3.33) 
  –4.21 
    (3.39) 
  –2.65 
    (3.28) 
Inv PK 
(1.22) 
      0.19*** 
     (0.07) 
    0.17** 
   (0.07) 
    0.17*** 
(0.06) 
    0.15** 
   (0.07) 
    0.16** 
   (0.07) 
Schooling 
(0.44) 
   –1.25* 
     (0.73) 
   –1.15 
    (0.74) 
   –1.39* 
     (0.80) 
    0.18 
   (0.68) 
  –1.67* 
    (0.91) 
Inequality 
(0.02)  
   –3.41 
    (4.03)    
Financial Depth 
(0.29)   
     0.39* 
    (0.24) 
  20.03* 
  (10.82)  
Financial Depth x 
Inequality 
(0.12)   
 
 
    0.50 
   (4.33) 
 
Financial Depth x LnY86 
(2.88)   
 
 
  –1.98* 
   (1.16)  
Openness 
(0.17)   
 
      
     0.40 
    (0.59) 
R&D 
(0.97)   
 
      
     0.13 
    (0.14) 
Corruption 
(1.65)   
 
 
     
   –0.10* 
    (0.06) 
R2 adjusted    0.26     0.26     0.27      0.27      0.32 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 
Note: BS-Catch-up calculated as Schooling * (Ymax /Y86) according to Benhabib and Spiegel (1997, 
2000) Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of 
significance. 
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(ii). Data sample and control variables 
  
 We focus our analysis on the 49 states for which data are available for all variables of 
interest. Since there is a lack of data on R&D expenditures for the District of Columbia and 
Delaware, we exclude these states from the first regressions in order to avoid a sample bias 
when comparing coefficients. To check qualitatively our results, we repeat the (first five) 
regressions of Table 5.1 for the whole sample of 51 states in Table 5.15. 
 
TABLE 5.15. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) for all 51 states 
Dependent 
variable: G1986-2000 
(5.41) (5.42) (5.43) (5.44) (5.45) 
Constant    12.47   13.13   11.15   14.77   17.74 
LnY 86  
(0.25) 
  –1.00 
    (0.79) 
  –1.03* 
   (0.61) 
  –0.87** 
    (0.64) 
  –1.26** 
   (0.58) 
  –1.58** 
   (0.71) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06)    
  –5.28* 
   (2.84) 
  –4.29 
   (2.98) 
  –2.93 
   (2.69) 
  –1.94 
   (2.57) 
Investment 
(0.78)    
    0.25*** 
   (0.09) 
    0.20** 
   (0.09) 
    0.24*** 
   (0.09) 
Schooling 
(0.50)    
    0.43** 
   (0.18) 
    0.48*** 
   (0.19) 
Openness 
(0.17)   
 
      
    0.83 
   (0.61) 
R2 adjusted 0.10 0.25 0.30 0.34 0.35 
N 
 
51 51 51 51 51 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=51; 
robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 
5, and 1% level of significance. 
 
 Furthermore, we incorporated a vector of geographical variables in our estimations. When 
we included three regional dummy variables (south, midwest and west) as in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992), in most cases they were insignificant and unstable in sign when included in 
Table 5.1.43 Additionally, it is of interest to investigate whether geographical control variables 
such as access to oceans or navigable rivers, latitude, and distance to the US capital have any 
impact on our findings. We incorporated in all regressions (see Tables 5.16 and 5.19) a 
variable measuring the Latitude of each state capital as well as a dummy variable measuring 
                                                
43
 We also checked for spatial correlation of the error terms in our growth and transmission channel 
specifications, but we did not find any substantial evidence of it. 
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access to ocean, navigable rivers or the Great lakes (Access to Water).44 Therefore, our growth 
and transmission channels specifications become: 
Gi = α0 + α1 ln(Y0i) + α2Ri + α3Zi + α4Geoi + χi,  (5.6) 
Zi = β0 + δ1Ri + δ2Geoi + ξi,  (5.7) 
where Geo is a vector of geographical regressors. We do not find that access to a coast or a 
navigable waterway provides a growth advantage. Neither do we find latitude and thus more 
temperate climates to contribute significantly to economic growth. The coefficients on 
resource abundance in all transmission mechanisms remain rather stable in magnitude and 
significance. We still find education to be the most important transmission mechanism, 
although the overall explanatory power of the channels decreases (not shown here). 
Furthermore, in Tables 5.17, 5.18, 5.20, and 5.21 we additionally incorporate two variables 
measuring Longitude and distance from the nation’s capital – Washington D.C. –  (Distance 
from W DC).45 In the growth regressions, the significance of many coefficients decreases, 
though the transmission channel estimates of resource abundance remain all significant. As 
the geographical control variables do not improve any of our results but instead add 
multicollinearity problems (due to the high correlation between Schooling and these two 
variables – Pearson correlation around –0.49) that make our growth estimations less reliable, 
we treat these results with caution.  
 
                                                
44
 Data on Latitude provided by the Department Division of the U.S. Census Bureau (2003). Data on access to 
ocean, navigable rivers and the Great Lakes as in Mitchener and McLean (2003). Using a dummy variable 
measuring solely access to ocean produces similar results. 
45
 We did not incorporate the two variables jointly due to their high correlation.  
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TABLE 5.16. Growth regressions as in equation (5.6) (Latitude, Access to Water) 
Dependent 
variable: G1986-2000 
(5.46) (5.47) (5.48) (5.49) (5.50) (5.51) (5.52) 
Constant    21.46   20.00   17.93   18.95   26.46   26.29   27.46 
LnY86  
(0.19) 
  –1.92** 
    (0.86) 
  –1.76*** 
   (0.62) 
  –1.54*** 
    (0.57) 
  –1.65*** 
  (0.57) 
  –2.49*** 
   (0.79) 
  –2.48*** 
   (0.78) 
  –2.56*** 
   (0.77) 
Latitude  
(5.78) 
    0.01 
   (0.03) 
    0.02 
   (0.02) 
    0.01 
   (0.02) 
    0.003 
   (0.02) 
    0.01 
   (0.02) 
    0.01 
   (0.02) 
    0.01 
   (0.02) 
Access to Water  
(0.41) 
  –0.15 
   (0.21) 
  –0.34 
   (0.24) 
  –0.47** 
   (0.24) 
  –0.47** 
   (0.24) 
  –0.36 
   (0.25) 
  –0.31 
   (0.24) 
  –0.25 
   (0.28) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06)    
  –5.72** 
   (2.33) 
  –4.30** 
   (2.11) 
  –3.49 
   (2.13) 
  –1.77 
   (2.14) 
  –1.38 
   (2.16) 
  –0.98 
   (2.03) 
Investment 
(0.78)    
    0.32*** 
   (0.10) 
    0.29*** 
   (0.10) 
    0.35*** 
   (0.10) 
    0.33*** 
   (0.09) 
    0.24** 
   (0.11) 
Schooling 
(0.44)    
    0.26 
   (0.17) 
    0.32** 
   (0.16) 
    0.28 
   (0.17) 
    0.32* 
   (0.17) 
Openness 
(0.17)   
 
 
     
    1.40** 
   (0.64) 
    1.24* 
   (0.70) 
    1.34** 
   (0.67) 
R&D 
(0.97)   
 
       
    0.10 
   (0.09) 
    0.07 
   (0.10) 
Corruption 
(1.65)   
 
         
  – 0.10* 
    (0.05) 
R2 adjusted 0.19 0.36 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.52 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of 
significance. 
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TABLE 5.17. Growth regressions as in equation (5.6) (Latitude, Longitude, Access to Water) 
Dependent 
variable: G1986-2000 
(5.53) (5.54) (5.55) (5.56) (5.57) (5.58) (5.59) 
Constant    20.16   19.53   17.71   18.88   26.74   26.55   27.78 
LnY86  
(0.19) 
  –1.66** 
    (0.73) 
  –1.66*** 
   (0.62) 
  –1.48** 
    (0.59) 
  –1.63*** 
  (0.64) 
  –2.48*** 
   (0.78) 
  –2.46*** 
   (0.79) 
  –2.55*** 
   (0.76) 
Latitude  
(5.78) 
    0.005 
   (0.03) 
    0.02 
   (0.02) 
    0.01 
   (0.02) 
    0.003 
   (0.02) 
    0.01 
   (0.02) 
    0.01 
   (0.02) 
    0.01 
   (0.02) 
Longitude  
(18.66) 
  –0.01 
   (0.01) 
  –0.005 
   (0.01) 
  –0.003 
   (0.01) 
  –0.001 
   (0.01) 
  –0.01 
   (0.01) 
  –0.01 
   (0.01) 
  –0.01 
   (0.01) 
Access to Water  
(0.41) 
  –0.34 
   (0.28) 
  –0.41 
   (0.28) 
  –0.50* 
   (0.29) 
  –0.48* 
   (0.30) 
  –0.41 
   (0.29) 
  –0.35 
   (0.28) 
  –0.30 
   (0.26) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06)    
  –5.22** 
   (2.24) 
  –4.04* 
   (2.20) 
  –3.47 
   (2.20) 
  –1.40 
   (2.22) 
  –1.05 
   (2.26) 
  –0.49 
  (1.96) 
Investment 
(0.78)    
    0.31*** 
   (0.10) 
    0.29*** 
   (0.10) 
    0.35*** 
   (0.10) 
    0.33*** 
   (0.09) 
    0.23** 
   (0.12) 
Schooling 
(0.44)    
    0.25** 
   (0.20) 
    0.25 
   (0.17) 
    0.22 
   (0.19) 
    0.23 
   (0.19) 
Openness 
(0.17)   
 
      
    1.58* 
   (0.63) 
    1.40* 
   (0.65) 
    1.61** 
   (0.61) 
R&D 
(0.97)   
 
 
      
    0.09 
   (0.09) 
    0.05 
   (0.09) 
Corruption 
(1.65)   
 
 
        
  – 0.11** 
    (0.05) 
R2 adjusted 0.24 0.36 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.52 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of 
significance. 
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TABLE 5.18. Growth regressions as in equation (5.6) (Distance from W DC, Access to Water) 
Dependent variable: 
G1986-2000 
(5.60) (5.61) (5.62) (5.63) (5.64) (5.65) (5.66) 
Constant    19.91   18.80   17.46   18.74   25.18   26.97   26.80 
LnY86  
(0.19) 
  –1.61** 
    (0.78) 
  –1.51*** 
   (0.56) 
  –1.44*** 
    (0.54) 
  –1.61*** 
  (0.58) 
  –2.26*** 
   (0.65) 
  –2.28*** 
   (0.65) 
  –2.38*** 
   (0.62) 
Distance from W DC 
(0.02) 
  –10.46 
   (7.11) 
   –5.77 
   (7.15) 
  –3.06 
   (6.55) 
  –0.56 
  (8.04) 
  –4.42 
  (8.27) 
  –4.02 
  (7.87) 
  –6.15 
  (6.71) 
Access to Water  
(0.41) 
  –0.35 
   (0.24) 
  –0.46* 
   (0.26) 
  –0.52** 
   (0.26) 
  –0.49* 
   (0.26) 
  –0.46* 
   (0.26) 
  –0.39 
  (0.24) 
  –0.34 
  (0.23) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06)    
  –4.88** 
   (2.14) 
  –3.92* 
   (2.12) 
  –2.66 
   (2.46) 
  –1.26 
   (2.14) 
  –0.90 
   (2.16) 
  –0.34 
  (1.89) 
Investment 
(0.78)    
    0.32*** 
   (0.08) 
    0.30*** 
   (0.08) 
    0.37*** 
   (0.09) 
    0.34*** 
   (0.08) 
    0.24** 
   (0.11) 
Schooling 
(0.44)    
    0.25 
   (0.20) 
    0.26 
   (0.19) 
    0.23 
   (0.20) 
    0.24 
   (0.20) 
Openness 
(0.17)   
 
 
     
    1.39** 
   (0.62) 
    1.23** 
   (0.62) 
    1.45*** 
   (0.55) 
R&D 
(0.97)   
 
       
    0.10 
   (0.09) 
    0.06 
   (0.09) 
Corruption 
(1.65)   
 
         
  –0.11* 
   (0.06) 
R2 adjusted    0.25     0.36     0.45      0.45      0.49      0.49      0.53 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of 
significance. 
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TABLE 5.19. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (5.7) (Latitude, Access to Water) 
 
Investment 
(5.67) 
Schooling 
(5.68) 
Openness 
(5.69) 
R&D 
(5.70) 
Corruption 
(5.71) 
Constant  –0.29 0.07 0.42 0.86   4.23 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
     –4.63*** 
      (1.59) 
   –3.53*** 
     (1.06) 
      –0.71* 
      (0.37) 
    –7.69*** 
      (1.57) 
       7.97** 
      (4.07) 
Latitude  
(5.78) 
   0.03* 
      (0.02) 
 0.02 
      (0.01) 
      –0.004 
       (0.005) 
       0.03 
      (0.02) 
     –0.05 
      (0.04) 
Access to Water  
(0.41) 
       0.33 
      (0.22) 
       0.11 
      (0.15) 
      –0.03 
      (0.05) 
     –0.50 
      (0.41) 
       0.47 
      (0.65) 
R2 adjusted 0.13 0.19 0.03 0.15 0.03 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 
10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
 
TABLE 5.20. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (5.7)                                               
(Latitude, Longitude, Access to Water) 
 
Investment 
(5.72) 
Schooling 
(5.73) 
Openness 
(5.74) 
R&D 
(5.75) 
Corruption 
(5.76) 
Constant  0.57 1.04      –0.06 0.96  5.14 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
     –3.78*** 
      (1.27) 
   –2.56*** 
     (0.81) 
 –1.18*** 
      (0.35) 
    –7.58*** 
      (1.872) 
       8.80** 
      (4.36) 
Latitude  
(5.78) 
 0.03* 
      (0.02) 
 0.01 
      (0.01) 
      –0.003 
      (0.003) 
       0.03 
      (0.02) 
     –0.05 
      (0.04) 
Longitude  
(18.66) 
     –0.01 
      (0.01) 
     –0.01* 
      (0.004) 
      –0.004*** 
       (0.001) 
     –0.001 
      (0.01) 
     –0.01 
      (0.01) 
Access to Water  
(0.41) 
       0.23 
      (0.22) 
       0.00 
      (0.14) 
        0.02 
       (0.04) 
     –0.51 
      (0.41) 
       0.38 
      (0.68) 
R2 adjusted 0.13 0.28 0.18 0.13 0.02 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 
10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
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TABLE 5.21. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (5.7)                                               
(Distance from W DC, Access to Water) 
 
Investment 
(5.77) 
Schooling 
(5.78) 
Openness 
(5.79) 
R&D 
(5.80) 
Corruption 
(5.81) 
Constant  1.24 1.69      –0.18 2.19 2.69 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
     –3.18*** 
      (1.11) 
   –2.21*** 
      (0.74) 
     –1.24*** 
      (0.32) 
    –6.90*** 
      (1.72) 
       7.44* 
      (3.92) 
Distance from W DC 
(0.02) 
–8.92* 
      (5.02) 
  –9.21** 
      (4.20) 
      4.30*** 
      (1.33) 
     –2.19 
      (8.69) 
     –4.81 
    (11.47) 
Access to Water  
(0.41) 
 0.17 
      (0.19) 
 0.03 
      (0.15) 
 0.03 
      (0.04) 
     –0.57 
      (0.40) 
       0.49 
      (0.65) 
R2 adjusted 0.11 0.26 0.19 0.13 0.01 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to 
a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
 
 
 
 To overcome the possible endogeneity of openness, as discussed in Section 5.4, we 
reproduced all growth regressions of Table 5.1 for the 1994-2000 period, using an openness 
measure (Openness 90-94) referring to an earlier period (the preceding five years: 1990-1994). 
Prior to 1990, there are no data available on international immigration disaggregated at a state 
level. All main results hold and openness still appears to be an important contributor to 
economic growth, as can be seen from Table 5.22. We also reproduced (see Table 5.23) the 
openness transmission channel for the 1990-1994 period using initial income and the share of 
the primary sector in the economy in 1990 (Natural Resources90). Finally, when including 
economic growth in the 1986-1990 period as a regressor of immigration between 1990-1994 
(not shown), we found its coefficient to be insignificant. This suggests that the causality is 
likely to run from immigration (openness) to growth rather than the other way round. 
                                                      
 
 
 
 
TABLE  5.22. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) with Openness 90-94 
Dependent variable: 
G1994-2000 
(5.82) (5.83) (5.84) (5.85) (5.86) (5.87) (5.88) 
Constant    12.94 10.02     7.67   12.09   24.91   28.51   31.66 
LnY94  
(0.15) 
  –0.94 
   (2.08) 
     –0.60 
     (1.45) 
  –0.41 
    (1.35) 
  –0.90 
   (1.33) 
  –2.24 
   (1.41) 
  –2.62* 
   (1.36) 
  –2.87** 
   (1.25) 
Natural Resources 94 
(0.06) 
  
   
    –10.23*** 
      (3.86) 
  –9.11** 
   (3.83) 
  –6.78* 
   (3.92) 
  –4.09 
   (3.57) 
  –2.55 
   (3.61) 
  –0.15 
   (3.13) 
Investment 94 
(1.01)     
    0.27 
   (0.19) 
    0.24 
   (0.17) 
    0.37** 
   (0.17) 
    0.29* 
   (0.16) 
    0.24 
   (0.18) 
Schooling 94 
(0.38)    
    0.88** 
   (0.38) 
    0.99*** 
   (0.37) 
    0.85** 
   (0.42) 
    1.04*** 
   (0.38) 
Openness 90-94 
(0.07)   
 
 
     
    5.66*** 
   (2.13) 
    4.58* 
   (2.46) 
    6.14** 
   (2.56) 
R&D 95 
(1.21)   
 
 
      
    0.33 
   (0.23) 
    0.22 
   (0.23) 
Corruption 94-00 
(1.34)   
 
         
  –0.33*** 
   (0.12) 
R2 adjusted 0     0.19     0.21      0.25      0.29      0.33      0.42 
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
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TABLE  5.23. Indirect transmission channel as in equation (5.3) for Openness 90-94 
 
Openness 90-94 
(5.89) 
Openness 90-94 
(5.90) 
Constant          0.08         0.91 
LnY90 
(0.20) 
 
   0.21*** 
       (0.05) 
Natural Resources 90 
(0.08) 
–0.19** 
        (0.09) 
  –0.31*** 
       (0.10) 
R2 adjusted 0.03 0.34 
N 49 49 
Note: Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to 
a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
 
 
(iii). Different proxies 
  
 Auty (2000, 2001) argues that minerals influence local economies in a more distortionary 
manner than crops. When using the primary sector’s production attributed to mining (metals 
and fuels) as a measure of resource abundance, results are similar to those in the main analysis 
(see Table 5.24 and 5.25). On the other hand, we found agricultural production to remain 
insignificant in most cases throughout our regression analysis both in the growth and 
transmission specifications (not shown). In this respect, the resource curse across U.S. states 
seems to be indeed mainly mineral-based. 
 In our main analysis, we follow Atkinson and Hamilton (2003), Gylfason (2000, 2001a), 
Ross (2001), and Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) among others that use relative measures of 
resource abundance in their analysis (resource rents in GDP, primary production in GDP, 
primary exports in GDP, natural capital in total capital). As Stijns (2001a, 2001b) argues, 
switching from relative measures of resource abundance to absolute measures makes the 
resource curse disappear across countries. To check for the robustness of our results, we also 
calculated the value of primary production per square mile and per capita for each state. When 
using the value of primary production per capita (Natural Resources per Capita), our results 
are very similar to the analysis presented in the main text (see Table 5.26). In contrast, the 
value of primary production per square mile is not correlated with economic growth (not 
shown). 
                                                              
 
 
 
 
TABLE  5.24. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) with mineral production  
as a proxy for resource abundance  
Dependent variable: 
G1986-2000 
(5.91) (5.92) (5.93) (5.94) (5.95) (5.96) (5.97) 
Constant    21.50   18.02   17.63   19.04   26.01   25.40   26.96 
LnY86  
(0.19) 
  –1.90** 
    (0.93) 
  –1.54*** 
   (0.60) 
  –1.53*** 
    (0.58) 
  –1.68*** 
   (0.59) 
  –2.42*** 
   (0.73) 
  –2.36*** 
   (0.68) 
  –2.48*** 
   (0.66) 
Mineral Production 
(0.05)    
  –5.75** 
   (2.82) 
  –4.29 
 (–2.86) 
  –3.54 
   (2.86) 
  –1.64 
   (2.82) 
  –1.47 
   (2.77) 
  –0.87 
   (2.55) 
Investment 
(0.78)    
    0.27*** 
   (0.10) 
    0.24*** 
   (0.09) 
    0.32*** 
   (0.09) 
    0.28*** 
   (0.09) 
    0.20* 
   (0.11) 
Schooling 
(0.44)    
    0.25* 
   (0.13) 
    0.32** 
   (0.12) 
    0.25 
   (0.16) 
    0.31* 
   (0.16) 
Openness 
(0.17)   
 
 
     
    1.30** 
   (0.64) 
    1.02 
   (0.65) 
    1.12* 
   (0.62) 
R&D 
(0.97)   
 
 
      
    0.15 
   (0.10) 
    0.10 
   (0.10) 
Corruption 
(1.65)   
 
         
  –0.11* 
   (0.05) 
R2 adjusted 0.22 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.52 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** 
correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
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TABLE 5.25. Indirect transmission channel as in equation (5.2) with mineral production  
  as a proxy for resource abundance 
 
Investment 
(5.98) 
Schooling 
(5.99) 
Openness 
(5.100) 
R&D 
(5.101) 
Corruption 
(5.102) 
Constant  1.14 0.77 0.20 1.32 2.78 
Mineral Production 
(0.05) 
     –5.46*** 
      (1.10) 
   –3.15*** 
     (0.69) 
     –0.49* 
      (0.25) 
    –5.33*** 
      (1.61) 
       8.66** 
      (4.15) 
R2 adjusted 0.12 0.13 0 0.07 0.06 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to 
a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
  
TABLE  5.26. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) (Natural Resources per Capita) 
Dependent variable:  
G1986-2000 
(5.103) (5.104) 
Constant    15.30   25.16 
LnY86  
(0.19) 
  –1.26** 
   (0.52) 
  –2.29*** 
    (0.66) 
Natural Resources per Capita 
(1.82) 
  –0.19*** 
   (0.07) 
  –0.05 
   (0.07) 
Investment 
(0.78)   
    0.19* 
   (0.10) 
Schooling 
(0.44)  
    0.27* 
   (0.16) 
Openness 
(0.17)  
    1.04* 
   (0.61) 
R&D 
(0.97)  
    0.10 
   (0.11) 
Corruption 
(1.65)  
  –0.11** 
   (0.05) 
R2 adjusted 0.39 0.52 
N 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of 
significance. 
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 We also used a measure of financial depth (the percentage of GSP attributed to finance, 
insurance and real estate) as a proxy for investment.46 A discussion and empirical 
investigation on the relationship between investment and financial depth is given by Gylfason 
and Zoega (2001). Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) also make the point that low levels of 
financial depth slow down capital accumulation because of the presence of indivisible 
projects. We verify the robustness of the positive correlation between this measure and 
growth, and the negative correlation between this measure of investment and resource 
abundance (not shown). 
 Since a highly-educated labour force can be very mobile across U.S. states, we carried out 
alternative calculations replacing our initial schooling variable with one that measures the 
percentage of people of 25 years old and over that hold an advanced degree (master’s, 
doctorate, or professional) for each U.S. state in 1990 (see Table 5.27).47 We found this 
educational proxy to enter the growth regressions positively but not with a significant 
coefficient. Educational expenditures (Schooling) is a broader measure of the private and 
public efforts directed at improving skills and labour productivity and we conjecture that its 
broad capturing of investment in human capital may compensate for its weakness in terms of 
correlations with demographic characteristics and the possible leakage of human capital to 
other states. As Table 5.28 suggests, the new educational proxy remains, however, strongly 
influenced in a negative manner by resource abundance. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
46
 Data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce (2003). 
47
 Data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau (2003). 
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TABLE 5.27. Growth regression as in equation (5.1) with advanced degree holders  
as a proxy for schooling 
Dependent variable:  
G1986-2000 
(5.105) 
Constant  30.19 
LnY86  
(0.19) 
     –2.86*** 
  (0.74) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
–0.44 
  (2.16) 
Investment 
(0.78) 
      0.29*** 
(0.10) 
Advanced Degree 
(0.02) 
9.71 
(6.89) 
Openness 
(0.17) 
  1.10* 
(0.57) 
R&D 
(0.97) 
0.08 
(0.11) 
Corruption 
(1.65) 
          –0.09* 
           (0.05) 
R2 adjusted 0.51 
N 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts * and *** correspond to a 10 and 1% level of 
significance. 
 
 
TABLE 5.28. Indirect transmission channel as in equation (5.2) with advanced degree holders 
as a proxy for schooling   
 
Advanced Degree 
(5.106) 
Constant  0.07 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
              –0.08** 
               (0.04) 
R2 adjusted 0.07 
N 49 
Note: Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscript ** corresponds to a 
5% level of significance. 
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(iv). Time Horizon 
 
To see whether our results are persistent over a longer time horizon, we constructed income 
data for an extended period (1977-2000) using nominal income figures and the U.S. GDP 
deflator (following Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992b, 1995). A serious problem for this 
extended dataset is that it suffers from not capturing inter-state price differences, which our 
1986-2000 dataset corrects for. We still found support for a strong contracting impact of 
resources (Natural Resources77) on growth for this extended period. Furthermore, when we 
correct growth for the variation in investment at the beginning of the period (Investment77) 
and schooling (Schooling77), the magnitude of the resource impact diminishes as implied by 
our original analysis. Unfortunately, there is a lack of data for the rest of the growth-relevant 
variables at a state level before the mid 80’s. Results are presented in Table 5.29. 
 
TABLE 5.29. Resource abundance and income growth for 1977-2000 
 
Dependent variable: G1977-2000  
(corrected for LnY77)  
Dependent variable: G1977-2000  
(corrected for LnY77, Investment77, 
Schooling77)  
Constant  0.37   0.21 
Natural 
Resources77 
(0.07) 
    –4.85*** 
(1.17) 
      –2.77*** 
  (0.81) 
R2 adjusted 0.38 0.18 
N 
 
49 49 
Note: Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscript *** corresponds to a 1% 
level of significance. 
  
 Furthermore, we acknowledge that we need to be careful with respect to the period 
selection. The first half of the period before the mid 1990s is characterised by relatively low 
rates of economic growth. After the mid 1970s there was a considerable productivity growth 
slowdown relative to the post-war average (see e.g. Jorgenson and Fraumeni 1992) that lasted 
approximately till the mid 1990s for the U.S. (Jones 2002). After the mid 1990s economic 
growth rates rose substantially and economists often refer to the corresponding period as the 
“New Economy” (Gordon 2000, Nordhaus 2002). We repeat the growth analysis of Sections 
5.2 and 5.3 in order to investigate the characteristics of different sub-periods within the 
overall period and the respective growth determinants. During the first period of interest 
(1986-1994), we find strong support for the absolute conditional hypothesis (results are 
presented in Table 5.30). Economic characteristics other than initial income do not account for 
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the variability in income growth among U.S. states. This holds also when we replace our 
R&D proxy with the innovation measure capturing regional spillovers. 
 For the second period of high economic growth (1994-2000), we observe that initial 
income by itself is not an important determinant of regional economic growth (see Table 
5.31). Our measures of resource abundance (Natural Resources94), investment (Investment94), 
and education (Schooling94) refer to 1994. Our innovation proxy refers to 1995 (R&D95) and 
our corruption and openness measures to 1994-2000 and 1994-1999 respectively 
(Corruption94-00 and Openness 94-99). For that period, we find variables that are considered to 
be important growth determinants at a cross-sectional level (such as resource abundance, 
investment, and schooling) to have a particularly important explanatory power when 
addressing regional variation in economic growth performance. Our R&D measure, however, 
performs poorly similarly to our results in Table 5.1. As a next step, we replace our innovation 
proxy (R&D95) with our innovation measure accounting for regional spillovers for 1995 
(Innovation95). Results are presented in Table 5.32. Innovation remains significant at the 10% 
level, justifying the importance of regional spillovers. As Table 5.33 indicates, natural 
resources remain strongly associated with reduced investment, schooling, openness, R&D 
(with and without regional spillovers), and increased corruption. In Tables 5.34 and 5.35, we 
estimate the relative importance of each transmission channel for the 1994-2000 subperiod for 
the two adopted specifications of R&D respectively. When abstracting from regional 
spillovers in R&D, we find schooling to be the most important channel, accounting for 34% of 
the negative association between resources and growth. In Table 5.35, innovation (with 
regional spillovers) again becomes the most important mechanism as in Table 5.8. The 
knowledge-based channels (innovation and schooling) account for 58% of the resource curse 
correlation. As an extension of our analysis it would be particularly appealing to identify the 
underlying mechanisms that explain such an observed differential behaviour between the two 
sub-periods.  
                                                             
 
 
TABLE 5.30. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) for 1986-1994 
Dependent variable: 
G1986-1994 
(5.107) (5.108) (5.109) (5.110) (5.111) (5.112) (5.113) 
Constant    28.88   28.97   28.48   28.33   29.06   28.74   29.40 
LnY 86  
(0.19) 
  –2.70*** 
    (0.42) 
  –2.71*** 
   (0.45)) 
  –2.68*** 
    (0.45) 
  –2.66*** 
   (0.48) 
  –2.74*** 
   (0.62) 
  –2.72*** 
   (0.57) 
  –2.77*** 
   (0.58) 
Nat
 
(0.06)    
   0.43 
  (1.78) 
    1.01 
   (1.86) 
    0.92 
   (1.98) 
    1.11 
   (2.06) 
    1.54 
   (2.04) 
    1.23 
   (2.25) 
Investment
 
(0.78)    
    0.13 
   (0.10) 
    0.14 
   (0.11) 
    0.15 
   (0.11) 
    0.11 
   (0.11) 
    0.09 
   (0.12) 
Schooling 
(0.44)    
  –0.03 
   (0.17) 
   –0.03 
    (0.16) 
  –0.08 
   (0.17) 
  –0.08 
   (0.17) 
Openness90-94 
(0.07) 
  
 
 
     
    0.37 
   (1.89) 
  –0.21 
   (1.90) 
  –0.13 
   (1.89) 
R&D 
(0.97)   
 
       
    0.16 
   (0.10) 
    0.14 
   (0.12) 
Corruption 9 1-94 
(0.47)   
 
         
  – 0.11 
   (0.19) 
R 2 adjusted 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.42 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** 
correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
 
 
  
 
 
TABLE 5.31. Growth regressions as in equation (5.1) for 1994-2000 
Dependent variable: 
G1994-2000 
(5.114) (5.115) (5.116) (5.117) (5.118) (5.119) (5.120) 
Constant   12.94   10.02   7.67   12.09   30.16   32.69   35.76 
LnY94  
(0.15) 
  –0.94 
    (2.08) 
  –0.60 
  (1.45) 
  –0.41 
    (1.35) 
  –0.90 
   (1.33) 
  –2.81* 
   (1.46) 
  –3.07** 
   (1.38) 
  –3.32*** 
   (1.26) 
Nat94 
(0.06)    
 –10.23*** 
   (3.86) 
  –9.11** 
   (3.83) 
  –6.78* 
   (3.92) 
  –2.46 
   (3.70) 
  –1.31 
   (3.69) 
    1.21 
  (3.36) 
Investment94 
(1.01)    
    0.27 
  (0.19) 
    0.24 
   (0.17) 
    0.42** 
   (0.19) 
    0.34** 
   (0.17) 
    0.30 
   (0.19) 
Schooling94 
(0.38)    
    0.88** 
   (0.38) 
    1.17*** 
   (0.37) 
    1.01** 
   (0.43) 
    1.23*** 
   (0.39) 
Openness94-99 
(0.09)   
 
      
    6.11*** 
   (1.66) 
    5.12*** 
   (1.88) 
    6.29*** 
   (1.81) 
R&D95 
(1.12) 
  
 
 
      
    0.30 
   (0.21) 
    0.19 
   (0.21) 
Corruption 9 4-00 
(1.34)   
 
         
  – 0.34*** 
    (0.12) 
R 2 adjusted –0.01 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.33 0.36 0.45 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** 
correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
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TABLE 5.32. Growth regression as in equation (5.1) with R&D spillovers for 1994-2000 
Dependent variable: G1994-2000 (5.121) 
Constant    34.90 
LnY94  
(0.15) 
  –3.27*** 
   (1.12) 
Nat94 
(0.06) 
    1.38 
   (3.08) 
Investment94 
(1.01) 
    0.27 
   (0.19) 
Schooling94 
(0.38) 
    0.92** 
   (0.47) 
Openness94-99 
(0.09) 
    5.68*** 
   (1.68) 
Innovation95 
(0.79) 
    0.54* 
   (0.32) 
Corruption 9 4-00 
(1.34) 
  – 0.28** 
   (0.11) 
R 2 adjusted 0.50 
N  49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; robust standard errors for 
coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of 
significance. 
 
TABLE 5.33. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (5.2) for 1994-2000 
 
Investment94 
(5.122) 
Schooling94 
(5.123) 
Openness94-99 
(5.124) 
R&D95 
(5.125) 
Innovation95 
(5.126) 
Corruption94-00 
(5.127) 
Constant  1.65 0.70 0.12 1.78 1.73 1.78 
Nat94 
(0.06) 
   –4.23*** 
      (1.62) 
    –2.66*** 
      (0.69) 
    –0.39*** 
        (0.14) 
    –7.56*** 
      (1.98) 
    –5.93*** 
      (1.70) 
         7.23** 
        (3.58) 
R2 adjusted 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.15 0.19 0.09 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts ** and *** correspond 
to a 5 and 1% level of significance. 
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TABLE 5.34. Relative importance of transmission channels as in equation (5.2) for 1994-2000 
Transmission channels α3  (Table 5.31) 
β1  
(Table 5.33) 
Contribution to 
α2+α3β1  
Relative 
Contribution 
Natural Resources             1.21        –13% 
Investment          0.30        –4.23         –1.27          13% 
Schooling          1.23        –2.66         –3.27          34% 
Openness          6.29        –0.39         –2.45          26% 
R&D          0.19        –7.56         –1.44          15% 
Corruption        –0.34          7.23         –2.46          25% 
Total            –9.68        100% 
 
TABLE 5.35. Relative importance of transmission channels as in equation (5.2) with regional 
R&D spillovers for 1994-2000 
Transmission channels α3  (Table 5.32) 
β1  
(Table 5.33) 
Contribution to 
α2+α3β1   
Relative 
Contribution 
Natural Resources             1.38        –14% 
Investment          0.27        –4.23         –1.14          12% 
Schooling          0.92        –2.66         –2.45          25% 
Openness          5.68        –0.39         –2.22          23% 
Innovation          0.54        –5.93         –3.20          33% 
Corruption        –0.28          7.23         –2.02          21% 
Total            –9.65        100% 
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APPENDIX 5.2: LIST OF VARIABLES USED IN MAIN ANALYSIS 
G Average annual growth in real GSP (Gross State Product) per person 
between 1986-2004, G=(ln(Y 2000/Y1986)/14)x100%. GSP data from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce (BEA 
2003). 
LnY86 The log of real GSP per capita in 1986 (Chained (1996) U.S. Dollar Prices) 
(Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of 
Commerce) (BEA 2003). 
Natural Resources The share of the primary sector’s production (agriculture, forestry, fishing 
and mining) in GSP for 1986 (values in the range of 0 to 1)  (Data from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce) (BEA 
2003). 
Investment The share of industrial machinery production in GDP in 1986 (Data from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce) 
(BEA 2003). 
Schooling The contribution of educational services in GDP in 1986. Data from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce (BEA 
2003). 
Openness The ratio of net international migration (the difference between migration 
to an area from outside the United States and migration from that area) for 
the 1990-99 for each state to the population of the state in 1990. Data from 
the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau 2003). 
R&D The share of R&D expenditure in GSP for 1987. Data provided from the 
Industry, Research and Development System (IRIS) of the National 
Science Foundation (NSF 2003). 
Corruption The number of prosecuted corrupted public officials over 1991-2000 per 
100000 citizens. Data from the Criminal Division of the United States 
Department of Justice (U.S. Department of Justice 2003). 
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APPENDIX 5.3: TRANSMISSION CHANNELS WITH INITIAL 
INCOME AS AN ADDITIONAL EXPLANATORY VARIABLE 
TABLE 5.36. Indirect transmission channels as in equation (5.3) 
 
Investment 
(5.128) 
Schooling 
(5.129) 
Openness 
(5.130) 
R&D 
(5.131) 
Corruption 
(5.132) 
Constant  3.76      –3.98      –4.82      –5.92        1.90 
LnY 75 
(0.19) 
      –0.25 
       (0.41) 
 0.48 
 (0.30) 
     0.50*** 
     (0.12) 
0.74 
      (0.73) 
       0.08 
      (1.30) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
    –4.42*** 
      (1.24) 
     –3.47*** 
 (0.79) 
     –0.91*** 
      (0.32) 
      –6.39*** 
       (1.84) 
       5.93 
      (3.63) 
R2 adjusted 0.07 0.19 0.34 0.11 0.01 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 
Note: robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscript *** corresponds to a 1% 
level of significance. 
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APPENDIX 5.4: TWO-STAGE LEAST-SQUARES ESTIMATION OF 
GROWTH REGRESSION (5.1) 
TABLE 5.37. 2SLS regression of equation (5.1) with international migration in 1990 
(Openness90) as an instrument for average openness 
Panel A: Dependent variable: G1986-2000 (5.133) 
Constant  26.10 
LnY86  
(0.19) 
    –2.39*** 
(0.68) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
–0.63 
  (2.16) 
Investment 
(0.78) 
   0.19* 
  (0.11) 
Schooling 
(0.44) 
   0.31* 
 (0.17) 
Openness 
(0.17) 
 0.88 
(0.65) 
R&D 
(0.97) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
Corruption 
(1.65) 
 –0.11* 
             (0.06) 
R2 adjusted 0.50 
N 49 
  
Panel B: Dependent variable: Openness  
 
Openness90 
(1.65) 
       1.04*** 
 (0.05) 
R2 adjusted  0.95 
N 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=49 of 
regression (7); robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts * and *** 
correspond to a 10 and 1% level of significance. 
Chapter 5 
~ 126 ~ 
 
APPENDIX 5.5: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSMISSION 
CHANNELS WITH ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
TABLE 5.38. Relative importance of transmission channels. Specification (5.3) adopted for the 
openness channel and specification (5.2) for the rest 
Transmission channels α3  
β1  (γ2 for 
openness) 
Contribution to the 
overall effect (column 
(5.16) of Table 5.4)* 
Relative 
Contribution 
Natural Resources   –0.14          3% 
Investment          0.21        –4.45 –0.93          20% 
Schooling          0.34        –3.32 –1.13          24% 
Openness          1.28        –0.91 –1.16          25% 
R&D          0.10        –6.16 –0.62          14% 
Corruption        –0.11          5.96 –0.66          14% 
Total 
  
–4.66        100% 
* The coefficient of resource abundance after substituting equation (5.3) for openness and 
equation (5.2) for the rest of the transmission variables into (5.1). 
 
TABLE 5.39. Relative importance of transmission channels. Specification (5.3) adopted for all 
transmission channels 
Transmission channels α3  γ2  
Contribution to the 
overall effect (column 
(5.17) of Table 5.4)* 
Relative 
Contribution 
Natural Resources   –0.14          3% 
Investment          0.21        –4.42 –0.93          20% 
Schooling          0.34        –3.47 –1.18          25% 
Openness          1.28        –0.91 –1.16          25% 
R&D          0.10        –6.39 –0.64          13% 
Corruption        –0.11          5.93 –0.65          14% 
Total 
  
–4.72        100% 
* The coefficient of resource abundance after substituting equation (5.3) into (5.1) for all 
transmission variables. 
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6. A LONG-TERM INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE 
RESOURCE IMPACT * 
Recent research has emphasised the influence of colonisation on the institutional development and 
economic performance in former European colonies. Where European colonisers settled, they 
replicated the investment-conducive institutions found at home. It has been argued that a harsh 
disease environment and a highly urbanised native population worked against colonisation. We 
show evidence for another significant element explaining the endogenous character of colonisation 
strategies and the formation of institutions. We find that the presence of precious metals (gold and 
silver) resulted in an increase in European settlements and an improvement in institutional quality. 
Highly valued gold and silver reserves attracted Europeans in large numbers and resulted in an 
institutional upgrade of mineral-rich areas.  
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 A number of recent studies has placed a particular emphasis on the role of institutions in 
explaining the large differences in income per capita observed across the world (see e.g. 
Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002, Knack and Keefer 1995, Mauro 1995, 1998). An average citizen 
in the U.S. receives an annual income more than 20 times larger than an average civilian in 
Ethiopia or Sri Lanka. “Good” institutions create an environment conducive to investment in 
physical and human capital, and thereby contribute to substantial income improvements. On 
the other hand, “bad” institutions discourage individuals from undertaking investments by 
creating uncertainty and low expected returns. 
 The distinction between “good” and “bad” institutions for long-term development is, 
however, not obvious. To some extent, “institutions” is such a vague notion that can include 
almost everything that affects long-term income. It can comprise the extent of democratic 
liberties, the degree of corruption, the level of political stability, as well as all kinds of 
regulations that encourage (or discourage) investment, schooling or trade. A major 
institutional feature itself is the system that governs how prices are determined or how the 
market for production and inputs is regulated. 
 In this chapter, we capture institutional differences among countries by focusing on the 
variation in the extent of property rights. The importance of property rights in encouraging 
investment, entrepreneurship, and income growth has long been established in the literature 
(Hayeck 1960, North 1991, Landes 1998). In this context, good institutions relate to secure 
                                                
*
 This chapter is a slightly revised version of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2005).   
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and effective rights for private property, that ensure secure investment opportunities (and thus 
returns) to a broad section of society. On the other hand, bad institutions imply a high risk of 
expropriation for investors, a limited allocation of property rights within the local population, 
as well as severe difficulties in enforcing them. In that respect, we largely follow Acemoglu et 
al. (2001, 2002), who also emphasise the importance of property rights for investment, 
industrialisation, and long-term development. 
 Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) argue that institutional development outside Europe was 
influenced to a large extent by the colonisation policies of the European powers. The 
colonising powers developed two different strategies that created an institutional divergence 
within colonies. In some colonies, Europeans settled in large numbers, importing the 
institutions prevailing in their countries of origin. They tried to replicate the institutional 
framework of their metropolises, largely based on the protection of private property rights. In 
the other colonies, Europeans settled in small numbers, and mainly limited the institutional set 
up to an efficient administration for extracting resources from the local economies. Acemoglu 
et al. find two explanations for the two different settlement strategies of the colonisers. First, 
they claim that the disease environment played an important role (see Acemoglu et al. 2001). 
Secondly, they argue that sparsely populated (and urbanised) regions enabled Europeans to 
settle in larger numbers compared to densely-populated areas (Acemoglu et al. 2002). 
 We build on the same framework and extend it, analysing another determinant of 
European settlements. The resource affluence of the colonising area also determined the 
settlement strategy of colonisers. We argue that the variability of endowments in the precious 
metals of gold and silver across colonised areas is likely to have affected the settlement 
planning of Europeans. Precious metals were to a large extent the main minerals reaching 
Europe from the New World countries. Gold and silver were exported to meet demand by the 
elites of the European societies. The prestigious character of these precious metals of relative 
high value and low labour-intensive production established their producing regions as 
prominent settlement destinations among colonisers. In the eyes of settlers, the sparkle of gold 
and silver made their countries of origin gleam as well. Figure 6.1 illustrates the variation in 
the production of precious metals outside Europe in 1900. 
 Our analysis is of particular relevance to the wider discussion on the impact of resource 
abundance on economic prosperity. Our findings in Chapters 2–5 as well as a large body of 
empirical and theoretical work (e.g. Atkinson and Hamilton 2003, Auty 1994, Bulte et al. 
2005, Gylfason 2000, 2001a, 2001b, Leite and Weidmann 1999, Mehlum et al. 2003, 
Neumayer 2004, Rodriguez and Sachs 1999, Ross 1999, 2001a, 2001b, Sachs and Warner 
1995, 2001, Stevens 2003, and Torvik 2001, 2002) establish a negative link between resource 
affluence and economic performance. Other studies either cast doubt on these findings; 
criticising the assumptions adopted, or the statistical estimations, or they accentuate the 
beneficial role of natural resources on development in the past (see Davis 1995, Manzano and 
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Rigobon 2003, Stijns 2001a). We argue that in colonial history, mineral endowments 
supported income improvements by attracting colonisers and stimulating the set up of good 
market institutions. The impact of resources on colonisation strategies is still reflected in the 
income distribution observed nowadays across the world. In that respect, we claim that 
institutions have been a positive transmission mechanism through which resource affluence 
raised income levels outside Europe.  Even if natural resources had a negative impact on 
growth rates the last three decades through several indirect channels as suggested in Chapter 
4, they may have had a long-lasting impact on income levels through an institutional 
mechanism during the colonisation era. 
 Section 6.2 summarises the various hypotheses on the causes of colonisation strategies 
and it tests them empirically. Specifically it analyses the significance of precious metals as an 
additional explanatory variable for both settlement behavior and institutional development. 
Section 6.3 briefly extends the analysis to agricultural commodities. Section 6.4 concludes. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.1. Precious metals in colonised countries 
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6.2. Patterns of Colonisation 
(i). The Mortality Hypothesis 
The Mortality Hypothesis presupposes a negative relationship between European mortality 
rates in colonised areas and European settlements, and a positive relation of the latter with the 
establishment of a pro-growth institutional framework. According to this hypothesis, 
Europeans settled in small numbers in regions with higher mortality rates, mainly caused by 
malaria and yellow fever (see Curtin 1964, 1998). On the other hand, Europeans settled in 
larger numbers in areas where they faced a less harsh disease environment, outnumbering in 
some cases the indigenous population. In turn, the magnitude of the settlers’ influx to the 
colonised regions was a major determinant of the institutional policies established there. 
Europeans attempted to reproduce a European structural organisation in the newly-colonised 
areas, and succeeded to replicate the home institutions when settling in large numbers 
(Denoon 1983). In that respect, institutions of extensive and well-guarded property rights 
were broadly established to accommodate the demands of colonisers to imitate the capitalist 
structure of their societies (e.g. La Porta et al. 1998, 1999). 
 Acemoglu et al. (2001) establish the link between the disease environment of the 
colonised world and its institutional development, using data on the mortality rates of soldiers, 
bishops and sailors between the 17th and 19th centuries. They argue that local diseases were 
often fatal to many European settlers, while the indigenous populations had developed 
immunity to them.48 Awareness, back in Europe, of this disease environment influenced to a 
large extent the settlement decisions of the colonising powers. In that respect, mortality rates 
determined consecutively settlement policies, institutional development, and economic 
affluence. 
 
(ii). The Urbanisation Hypothesis 
The Urbanisation Hypothesis stresses the importance of urbanisation patterns across different 
parts of the colonised world in shaping the immigration patterns of European settlers (for a 
discussion on the issue see Sokoloff and Engerman 2000 and Acemoglu et al. 2002). 
Europeans had a preference for sparsely populated areas, where they could settle in large 
numbers without engaging in frequent conflicts with the native populations. To the extent that 
urbanisation reflects the level of development, highly urbanised local societies corresponded 
to affluent and well-structured social structures, which were more likely to rebel against the 
imposition of European law and order than the less organised sparsely-distributed populations. 
Densely-populated areas were thus less desirable for European emigration, and when 
                                                
48
 See Diamond (1997) for a broader discussion on the effect of diseases and climate on human history. 
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Europeans moved to these areas, they preferred to settle in small numbers and to set up 
institutions for resource wealth extraction, rather than to imitate the pro-growth institutional 
framework of their home countries. The extractive institutions were framed to force the local 
labour force to work in plantations, and to reap a share of local income through taxation. In 
such densely and highly-urbanised areas, the Europeans established administrations based on 
the concentration of power in the hands of a few settlers, which could create income through 
oppression (see Dunn 1972). 
 Acemoglu et al. (2002) provide econometric evidence on the linkage between 
urbanisation patterns and the development of subsequent institutions across the colonised 
world using population density data and numbers of population centers consisting of more 
than 5,000 people. They claim that countries that were more prosperous and densely 
populated in 1500 became disadvantaged in terms of their institutional inheritance by 
European colonisers. Affluent densely-populated regions attracted few European settlers who 
established extractive institutions. Ultimately, this colonisation pattern resulted in a reversal 
of fortune. 
 
(iii). The Precious Metals Hypothesis 
According to the Precious Metals Hypothesis, the mineral endowment of colonies influenced 
to a large extent the colonising policies of Europeans. The hypothesis rests on the following 
premises. First, newly discovered regions provided Europe with substantial amounts of gold 
and silver. Those newly-discovered countries were not homogeneous in terms of their 
resource endowment. Some countries had a larger potential as producers of precious metals, a 
distinction the importing European countries were aware of. Second, the extent of resource 
endowment influenced the settlement decision of Europeans. Gold and silver – high-valued 
commodities exported to the elites of the European societies – added a prestigious reputation 
to their areas of origin. The lucrative nature of those metals was reflected enticingly in the 
settlement decisions of Europeans. Third, the settlement pattern in a specific area substantially 
influenced the institutional framework established. This third premise is shared with the 
Mortality and Urbanisation hypothesis. Fourth, in addition to settlement decisions, precious 
metals also affected the institutional set up more directly. Settlers in a resource-rich 
environment demanded better institutions than settlers in a resource-poor environment. Fifth, 
institutions of safe and extensive property rights support the process of economic 
development and, thus, facilitate the attainment of a higher level of income per capita. This 
fifth premise is also shared with the other hypotheses. 
 We focus on gold and silver because of their relatively high value per weight, but also due 
to the fact that these were the main minerals exported to the colonising powers. Furthermore, 
most non-ferrous mineral production (such as copper, zinc, aluminium, chromium, and lead) 
was either of negligible amount or non-existent during the colonisation process of most 
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countries. Our analysis bears resemblance to the approach by Easterly and Levine (2003) that 
also focuses on the impact of primary commodities on institutions, although they use recent 
dummy variables rather than detailed historical data and they do not relate their findings to the 
colonisation strategies of Europeans. Furthermore, they do not discern between agricultural 
commodities and minerals, and they exclude gold production from their dummy index, while 
we specifically focus on gold as probably the most valuable mineral at the time of 
colonisation. 
 Table 6.1 presents two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimates of causes of recent economic 
prosperity in the colonised countries, as captured by the log of GDP in 1995 (data provided by 
the World Bank (WB) 1999). Panel A shows that institutions have a large and very significant 
effect on the level of economic affluence across the colonised world. Following Acemoglu et 
al. (2001) we use an index of protection against expropriation risk averaged over 1985-1995 
(Institutions 85-95) varying in the 0 to 10 range, where higher values correspond to better 
enforcement of property rights.49 
 Panel B of Table 6.1 exposes the endogenous character of institutions as dependent on 
factors related to European colonialism. To test the Mortality Hypothesis, we use the death 
rate among 1,000 soldiers for the first year in the 19th century for which data are available 
(Log Settler Mortality), as in Acemoglu et al. (2001). To test the Urbanisation Hypothesis, we 
use the percentage of indigenous population living in urban centers of at least 5,000 
inhabitants in 1500 (Urbanisation 1500), as in Acemoglu et al. (2002). For the Precious 
Metals Hypothesis, new in the analysis, we use the value of gold and silver per square 
kilometer in 1900 (Gold and Silver 1900) as a measure of resource affluence (data on prices 
and quantities are provided by Schmitz 1979). For all three independent variables, we also 
tested the impact on income through alternative channels to institutions, by running a 
regression with income dependent on institutions and settlements, and Log Settler Mortality, 
Urbanisation 1500, and Gold and Silver 1900. None of these variables has explanatory power, 
implying that their only impact on income goes indirectly through their effect on settlements 
and institutions. This justifies the use of these variables as valid instruments. 
 As depicted in Panel A of Table 6.1, there is a strong positive correlation between 
institutions and income per capita. This finding has been largely exposed also in Acemoglu et 
al. (2001, 2002). What is more of interest, though, is the endogenous character of institutional 
development outside Europe. Acemoglu et al. (2001) accentuate the importance of the disease 
environment in attracting settlers and institutions across the globe (i.e. the Mortality Rate 
Hypothesis). Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2002) emphasise the influence of urbanisation and 
population density on shaping colonisation strategies and institutional development (i.e. the 
Urbanisation Hypothesis). These two hypotheses are tested in columns (6.2)-(6.3) of Table 6.1 
                                                
49
 Acemoglu et al. (2001) comment on how institutions persist over time.  Their institutional measure at the end 
of the 20th century is strongly correlated with its values at the beginning of the century.  
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independently and jointly. The focal point of our analysis lies in a third factor, the role of 
precious metals on the flow of settlers and the corresponding import of their institutional 
background. In Panel B, columns (6.2)-(6.3), we confirm the negative role that urbanisation 
patterns and the disease environment played in the institutional development of the colonised 
world. Column (6.3), however, casts some doubt on the role of early urbanisation in shaping 
institutions when controlling for the disease environment. Subsequently, columns (6.5)-(6.6) 
add precious metals to the list of explanatory variables and find a strongly significant 
contribution thereof to the establishment of income-supporting institutions. The Precious 
Metals Hypothesis is robust when tested jointly with the urbanisation and settler mortality 
hypotheses. When testing all hypotheses simultaneously (column (6.6)), we find the Precious 
Metals and Settler Mortality Hypotheses to complement each other in explaining institutional 
divergence across the world, while urbanisation seems to bear a lower explanatory power. 
 In column (6.7) we further analyse the role of precious metals and settler mortality in 
shaping institutions, when we control for the fraction of the population of European descent in 
1900 (Settlements 1900, as in Acemoglu et al. 2001). Urbanisation 1500 turns out to be 
insignificant and we drop it from the regression. A benefit thereof is that we can use a much 
larger sample. Both coefficients for Precious Metals and Log Settler Mortality fall, compared 
to column (6.4), but remain highly significant. This suggests that a large part of the impact of 
precious metals and the disease environment on institutions went through influencing 
colonisation strategies, but that both variables also had a more direct impact on institutional 
shaping.  
 Whereas the first table analysed the effect of precious metals and a less urbanised and 
milder disease environment on institutions, in Table 6.2 we go back one step, to the settlement 
decisions, and examine the variables’ effects on colonisation strategies, and subsequently on 
present-day income. Table 6.2 presents two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimates of recent 
income levels in former colonies, using the settlement variable as an intermediate channel. 
The settlement proxy is positively correlated with the institutional measure at the 1% level of 
significance. Panel A of Table 6.2 reveals that, indeed, areas where Europeans settled in large 
numbers managed to achieve higher levels of economic prosperity through the course of time. 
Panel B examines the endogenous character of settlement decisions. Columns (6.9)-(6.10) 
reveal that a high urbanisation level and a harsh disease environment discouraged European 
migration. Both variables are also significant when tested jointly (column (6.10)). In columns 
(6.11)-(6.13), we add precious metals to the list of independent variables and find strong 
evidence for a tendency of European settlers to migrate to regions abundant in precious 
metals. The last column (6.13) reveals that, when testing jointly for all three hypotheses, 
precious metals had a more significant influence on settlements than the disease environment. 
 To sum up, our findings extend the analysis by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) on the link 
between settlements, institutions and income levels in the following manner. When examining 
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all hypotheses jointly (column entries (6.6) and (6.13)), we find indigenous urbanisation 
patterns to negatively and significantly affect the establishment of European settlements, but 
to impose a rather limited effect on institutional development. Conversely, we find settler 
mortality to be of limited power in explaining settlements policies, while being negatively and 
significantly correlated with institutional quality. Precious metals, at the same time, had a 
long-lasting effect on income both through increasing the number of European settlements 
and by leading to improved institutions, consecutively. 
 To study whether, indeed, precious metals have a particular and positive effect on present-
day income, we analyse the statistical association between current production levels of various 
minerals and present-day income levels when examined jointly with gold production  (Gold 
1995).  We obtain data on the value of several minerals per square kilometer in 1995 from the 
1995 Commodity Yearbook of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(United Nations (UN) 1995). In Table 6.3 we present some tentative results using 
disaggregated data for mineral production. Our results must be treated, though, with caution, 
since disaggregated mineral data do not exist for a large sample of countries. Our results 
confirm that countries rich in gold tend to be relatively more prosperous nowadays, perhaps 
reflecting the long-term effect implied by the Precious Metals Hypothesis. This tendency 
holds when controlling for the production levels of other minerals. On the other hand, all 
other minerals have an insignificant effect on income levels, and some minerals (zinc, bauxite, 
copper, lead and nickel) even seem to impose a contractionary impact on income. The special 
character of gold is reflected by its strong association with institutional quality, as depicted in 
Table 6.4, column (6.25). For a large part, the correlation between gold and income goes 
through the early development of institutions, indeed, as column (6.26) shows. When 
controlling for Gold and Silver 1900, the coefficient on current gold production and its 
significance drop substantially. Also, when including the institutional proxy in the regressions 
of Table 6.3, the coefficient of gold production typically halves. For as much as gold is 
concerned, there is no evidence of a reversal of the resource fortune. 
                                             
 
 
 
TABLE 6.1.  GDP per capita and institutions  
Panel A: Dependent variable:  
log GDP per capita in 1995  
(Two-Stage Least Squares) 
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) (6.7) 
Constant  2.04 3.37 4.49 2.73 4.35 4.53 2.59 
Institutions 85-95 
(1.47, 1.45, 1.47) 
     0.92*** 
(0.17) 
     0.74*** 
(0.16) 
     0.58*** 
(0.07) 
     0.82*** 
(0.13) 
     0.60*** 
(0.08) 
     0.57*** 
(0.07) 
     0.84*** 
(0.12) 
R2 adjusted 0.36 0.24 0.52 0.41 0.43 0.53 0.45 
N 38 38 38 64 38 38 63 
        
Panel B: Dependent variable: 
Institutions 85-95 
(First Stage Regressions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant 9.37 6.30 12.11 8.64 7.28 11.21 7.76 
Gold and Silver 1900  
(0.98, 1.23, 0.99)                   
     0.43*** 
(0.12) 
     0.55*** 
(0.10) 
  0.25* 
(0.15) 
      0.23*** 
(0.08) 
Log Settler Mortality  
(1.25, 1.25, 1.24) 
    –0.61*** 
 (0.15)  
    –1.21*** 
 (0.21) 
     –0.49*** 
 (0.15)  
    –1.01*** 
 (0.25) 
  –0.35** 
 (0.18) 
Urbanisation 1500 
(5.10)  
     –0.11** 
 (0.04) 
     –0.04 
 (0.03)  
     –0.10*** 
 (0.04) 
     –0.05 
 (0.03)  
Settlements 1900 
(0.26)       
      1.79*** 
(0.65) 
R2 adjusted  0.26  0.25  0.50  0.32  0.32  0.53  0.36 
N 64 38 38 64 38 38 63 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=64 (N=38 and 63 when a second and third standard deviation 
is mentioned); robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
                                                
 
 
 
TABLE 6.2.  GDP per capita and settlements 
Panel A: Dependent variable: 
 log GDP per capita in 1995 
(Two-Stage Least Squares) 
(6.8) (6.9) (6.10) (6.11) (6.12) (6.13) 
Constant  7.24 7.85 7.71 7.41 7.90 7.85 
Settlements 1900 
(0.26, 0.29) 
     4.96*** 
(1.20) 
     2.66*** 
(0.57) 
     3.23*** 
(0.88) 
     3.91*** 
(0.80) 
     2.47*** 
(0.32) 
     2.68*** 
(0.41) 
R2 adjusted 0.34 0.25 0.37 0.39 0.36 0.40 
N 63 38 38 63 38 38 
       
Panel B: Dependent variable: 
Settlements 1900 
(First Stage Regressions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant 9.37 0.44 0.97 0.50 0.36 0.60 
Gold and Silver 1900 
(0.99, 1.23)              
     0.11*** 
(0.04) 
     0.12*** 
(0.03) 
     0.10*** 
(0.03) 
Log Settler Mortality  
(1.25, 1.24) 
    –0.11*** 
 (0.03)  
   –0.14** 
 (0.07) 
     –0.08*** 
 (0.03)  
     –0.06 
 (0.07) 
Urbanisation 1500 
(5.10)  
    –0.03** 
 (0.01) 
    –0.02*** 
 (0.01)  
     –0.03*** 
 (0.01) 
     –0.03*** 
 (0.01) 
R2 adjusted 0.29 0.12  0.37  0.42  0.51  0.51 
N  63  38 38 63 38 38 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=63 (N=38 when a second standard deviation is mentioned); 
robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance.  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.3. Current resource abundance and income per capita 
Dependent variable: 
log GDP per capita 
in 1995 
 
(6.14) 
Oil 95  
(6.15) 
Zinc 95  
(6.16) 
Coal 95  
(6.17) 
Lignite 95  
(6.18) 
Bauxite 95  
(6.19) 
Constant  7.63 7.92 7.90 7.73 7.96 8.07 
Gold 1995 
(0.21, 0.22, 0.22, 
0.23, 0.25, 0.27) 
     2.75*** 
     (0.76) 
     2.60*** 
      (0.77) 
    3.14*** 
       (0.77) 
    3.09*** 
       (0.86) 
          2.86 
        (2.00) 
          1.74 
        (1.82) 
Alternative Fuel or 
Mineral 1995  
(–, 5.44, 0.15, 1.15, 
0.04, 0.48)    
       0.02 
      (0.03) 
       –0.72 
        (1.14) 
        0.12 
       (0.18) 
          8.05 
        (7.59) 
        –0.27 
        (0.47) 
R2 adjusted 0.28 0.26 0.36 0.31 0.06 –0.04 
N 
 
42 24 21 21 7 10 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample of each regression; robust standard errors for coefficients in 
parentheses. Superscript *** corresponds to a 1% level of significance. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.3 cntd. Current resource abundance and income per capita 
Dependent variable: 
log GDP per capita 
in 1995 
Copper 95 
(6.20) 
Iron 95  
(6.21) 
Lead 95  
(6.22) 
Nickel 95  
(6.23) 
Phosphate 95  
(6.24) 
Constant  7.80 7.91 7.96 8.16 7.69 
Gold 1995 
(0.17, 0.26, 0.22, 
0.23, 0.24) 
   3.30** 
       (1.48) 
   1.84** 
      (0.81) 
    2.87*** 
       (0.78) 
     2.19*** 
       (0.77) 
        2.96** 
       (1.19) 
Alternative Fuel or 
Mineral 1995  
(0.30, 0.20, 0.05, 
0.10, 0.08) 
      –0.46 
       (0.92) 
        1.35 
      (0.95) 
       –0.75 
        (3.73) 
       –0.19 
        (0.35) 
        1.23 
      (3.54) 
R2 adjusted 0.16 0.20 0.31 0.19 0.25 
N 
 
19 22 21 18 13 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample of each regression; robust standard errors for coefficients in 
parentheses. Superscripts  ** and *** correspond to a 5 and 1% level of significance. 
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TABLE 6.4. Current resource abundance and institutions 
Institutions85-95 (6.25) (6.26) 
Constant  6.07 6.00 
Gold 1995 
(0.21) 
    3.21** 
     (1.35) 
  1.83* 
(1.01) 
Gold and Silver 1900 
(0.99)   
    0.55*** 
(0.15) 
R2 adjusted 0.17 0.33 
N 
 
42 
 
42 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample of each 
regression; robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** 
correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
 
 
6.3. From Precious Metals to Resource Abundance  
The analysis above focuses on the beneficial role of precious metals through attracting 
European settlers and improving institutions. In this section, we briefly examine whether we 
can extend the Precious Metals Hypothesis to agricultural productivity as another natural 
resource highly valued at the time of colonisation. In the eyes of potential European settlers, 
the colonised areas were perceived as regions producing precious metals but also agricultural 
commodities (mainly coffee, tea, cocoa, and sugar). In many colonies, large plantations were 
established where production was feasible. In general, countries with a high agricultural 
potential could sustain and feed a much larger native population, and as such they provided a 
large native labour force for plantations. At the same time, however, these countries were 
more densely populated and urbanised, discouraging Europeans to settle in large numbers, but 
rather establish a small local elite that could regulate agricultural exploitation. 
 In Table 6.5, columns (6.27) and (6.28), we replicate columns (6.5) and (6.4) of Table 6.1, 
incorporating in Panel B the value of the production of coffee, sugar, cocoa, and tea per 
square kilometer in 1970 (Plantations 1970) as a proxy for the agricultural potential across the 
colonised world. We focus on the production of coffee, sugar, cocoa, and tea, since these were 
the major agricultural export commodities from European colonies at the time. Although other 
secondary agricultural products may have been exported to Europe, we believe that focusing 
on these four commodities depicts in a reasonably accurate manner the agricultural potential 
of an area and the importance of plantations as an economic activity. We acknowledge that 
earlier data would be preferable, but extensive disaggregated information on commodity 
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volumes and prices do not exist for earlier periods (see United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), Commodity Yearbook 2000). Furthermore, the potential to 
produce these agricultural commodities during the period of colonisation should be still 
largely captured by our proxy, to the extent that climatic and hydro-geologic conditions that 
largely determine such a capacity are persistent. Similarly, Easterly and Levine (2003) used 
dummy variables for primary commodities reflecting whether a country produced a 
commodity or not in 1998-1999, assuming that production patterns persist over time. 
 In line with the findings for precious metals, we find agricultural production to positively 
affect the establishment of good institutions (as in Easterly and Levine 2003). In that respect, 
our findings contradict the “crops hypothesis” by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Sokoloff 
and Engerman (2000) that argue in favour of a negative impact of large-scale plantations on 
institutional quality. The coefficients for the other variables are not affected by the inclusion 
of agricultural potential. 
 Subsequently, in columns (6.29) and (6.30), we replicate columns (6.12) and (6.11) of 
Table 6.2, adding agricultural productivity as an additional regressor to examine whether the 
positive association between institutions and plantations can be attributed to European 
settlements. Or in other words, is it the case that areas of high agricultural potential 
established better institutions by attracting relatively more European settlers? Panel A 
reaffirms the beneficial role of European settlements on income levels, but in Panel B, we find 
that, in contrast to the abundance of precious metals, agricultural productivity discouraged 
immigration. The relation even holds after controlling for the possibility that areas with a high 
agricultural potential could sustain high levels of native population, and thereby discourage 
European immigration. This finding is consistent with Sokoloff and Engerman’s (2000) 
argument that privileged elites in areas with plantations often imposed institutions 
discouraging European immigration in order to preserve their exclusive position. To 
summarise, colonies rich in agricultural products did not attract many European settlers, but 
nonetheless, the presence of plantations is positively correlated to better institutions.  
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TABLE 6.5.  GDP per capita, institutions and settlements (Precious metals and plantations) 
Panel A: Dependent variable: log 
GDP per capita in 1995 (Two-Stage 
Least Squares) 
(6.27) (6.28) (6.29) (6.30) 
Constant  2.65 4.08 7.46 7.99 
Institutions 85-95 
(1.47, 1.45) 
     0.83*** 
(0.13) 
     0.64*** 
(5.68)   
Settlements 1900 
(0.25, 0.29)   
     3.58*** 
(0.66) 
     2.08*** 
(0.36) 
R2 adjusted 0.42 0.46 0.37 0.30 
N 64 38 63 38 
     
Panel B: Dependent variable: 
(First Stage Regressions) Institutions 85-95 Settlements 1900 
Constant 8.44 7.18 0.55 0.39 
Gold and Silver 1900 
(0.95, 1.23, 0.99) 
     0.45*** 
(0.13) 
     0.57*** 
(0.11) 
    0.10** 
(0.04) 
     0.12*** 
(0.03) 
Plantations 1970 
(0.73, 0.54, 0.43) 
        0.34** 
       (0.17) 
       0.39** 
      (0.16) 
     –0.08** 
      (0.03) 
    –0.09*** 
    (–0.03) 
Log Settler Mortality  
(1.24) 
   –0.45*** 
      (0.16)    
    –0.09*** 
(0.03)  
Urbanisation 1500 
(5.10)  
   –0.10** 
 (0.04)  
     –0.03*** 
(–0.01) 
R2 adjusted  0.32  0.32  0.43  0.52 
N 64 38 63 38 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=64 
(N=38 when a second standard deviation is mentioned); robust standard errors for coefficients in 
parentheses. Superscripts ** and *** correspond to a 5 and 1% level of significance. 
 
 
6.4. Conclusions 
Many scholars have been concerned with explaining the divergent development paths of non-
European economies after the era of European colonisation.  Recently, much attention has 
been given to the institutional aspect of economic development and its origin in European 
immigration. Europeans immigrated and imported their income-supporting institutions in 
regions of scarce indigenous populations and of mild disease environments. In our analysis, 
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we highlight another factor that significantly describes the endogenous character of 
colonisation strategies, namely the endowment of precious metals. We find that regions rich 
in highly-valued gold and silver were prominent settlement destinations, and that 
subsequently these areas were fortunate enough to inherit better institutions. This finding 
suggests that, even if nowadays minerals have a contractionary impact on economic growth as 
suggested by the resource curse hypothesis, in the past natural resources have been beneficial 
for income levels. 
 We consider several extensions of our analysis that are of interest for studying the 
institutional dimensions of economic development and its relationship to European 
immigration. The hypothesis that European immigration resulted in an investment-conducive 
institutional framework should be tested, for instance, for a more extensive array of 
institutional proxies. Additionally, we want to search for other intermediate variables as 
determinants of long-term income, and see whether these are linked to colonisation policies. 
Thirdly, although the focal point of the analysis lies in the impact of precious metals on 
colonisation policies and institutions, we believe the association between agricultural 
production and institutional quality deserves further investigation. Although beyond the scope 
of our analysis at this stage, we believe it is of interest to examine in more detail the 
mechanisms through which agricultural potential resulted in good institutions. Specifically, 
we would like to further investigate the relation between resource affluence, population 
density, schooling, and institutional quality. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1. Research Conclusions 
Concerns over the impact of resource wealth, and windfall gains in general, on the process of 
economic development have been at the heart of economic thinking for centuries. In that 
respect, sixteenth century philosopher Jean Bodin stated:   
  
 Men of a fat and fertile soil are most commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas 
contrariwise a barren country makes men temperate by necessity, and by consequence 
careful, vigilant and industrious (Bodin, 1962 [1576]). 
 
A century later, Adam Smith commented in his influential manuscript “An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”: 
  
 Projects of mining, instead of replacing the capital employed in them, together with the 
ordinary profits of stock, commonly absorb both capital and stock. They are the projects, 
therefore, to which of all others a prudent law-giver, who desired to increase the capital 
of his nation, would least chuse to give any extraordinary encouragement (Smith, 1976 
[1776]). 
 
The disappointing economic performance of many resource-affluent economies (such as the 
OPEC cartel countries) over the last three decades has revived interest in the impact of 
resource wealth on economic development. Overvalued currencies, underinvestment, low 
levels of human capital, and extensive corruption have accompanied resource rents in most 
cases. In this thesis we explored several aspects of the resource curse hypothesis, in order to 
elucidate the tendency of resource-dependent countries to underperform in terms of economic 
growth. We obtained both theoretical and empirical insights into this paradoxical relationship 
in order to derive both explanations and policy remedies of the phenomenon. 
 
(i). Theory 
During the last few decades there have been numerous attempts to deviate from neoclassical 
models of economic growth and allow for endogenous technological change. A key feature of 
such models is their adopted assumption that technological progress is not exogenously given 
to the economic system but endogenously determined by choices and actions within the 
system.  
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 The research undertaken within Chapters 2 and 3 has been much inspired by recent 
developments in economic thinking on income growth and its endogenous character. In 
Chapter 2 we developed an OverLapping-Generations (OLG) model, to show how savings 
adjust downwards to income from natural resources. Our analysis provided a theoretical 
justification to the empirical observation that resource-dependent countries generally do not 
reinvest resource rents in other forms of capital. We believe that the mechanisms behind the 
failure of many resource-dependent countries to reinvest resource rents deserves particular 
attention. In our model, a continuous stream of resource wealth reduces the necessity to save 
and thus results in decreased levels of investment and manufactured output. A high 
responsiveness of labour productivity to capital accumulation enhances the negative impact of 
resource wealth on the steady-state levels of capital and man-made income per person. We 
showed that such knowledge spillovers matter a lot in terms of determining overall income 
levels. The contracting effect of natural resources on physical capital and manufactured output 
outweighed by far any positive direct impact of resource income in the case of strong 
knowledge spillovers. The existence of such knowledge spillovers is essential for the analysis, 
since the resource curse becomes an issue of concern only when such spillovers exist.  
 In Chapter 3 we developed a variation of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with 
endogenous growth features in order to provide insights into the impact of resource booms on 
innovation activities. In the literature, approaches attempting to explain the resource curse 
paradox through the impact of resource rents on labour productivity usually take technological 
progress as a side-effect (learning-by-doing) without inputs being devoted explicitly to R&D 
activities. Chapter 3 assumed on the contrary that innovation is the outcome of intentional 
actions rather than the by-product of other activities. The analysis is novel in that respect, 
since it attempted to elucidate how resource abundance may distort the incentives to engage in 
R&D activities. In our analysis, individuals trade off consumption and leisure in terms of 
utility and as a result an increase in resource wealth induces a reduction in the steady-state 
labour supply. This is a consequence of the fact that resource revenues allow agents to pay for 
extra consumption without additional work effort. Furthermore, we illustrated how resource 
rents induce a smaller proportion of the labour force to engage in innovation. Reducing work 
intensity and R&D participation are likely to constrain the growth capability of the economy. 
 
(ii). Empirics 
In Part III of the thesis we moved from theory to empirics in order to confirm the resource 
curse hypothesis and attribute it to several transmission mechanisms. The main purpose of the 
analysis was twofold. On the one hand, we verified the hypothesis and tested the contracting 
effects of resource rents on a number of growth determinants as suggested in the resource 
curse literature. Secondly, we confirmed that the theoretical mechanisms exposed in Part II of 
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the thesis explain a large part of the negative correlation between resource abundance and 
economic growth. In Chapter 4 we devoted our analysis to cross-country growth regressions 
for the 1975-1996 period and found resource rents to be negatively associated with 
institutional quality, investment, openness, terms of trade, and education. Additionally, we 
found that the negative indirect impact of resource affluence on growth disappears when we 
account for the aforementioned indirect channels. This implies that at a country level natural 
resources are not harmful to economic growth per se. Furthermore, an important contribution 
of our analysis lies in allowing the evaluation of the relative importance of each transmission 
channel in explaining the negative correlation between resources and growth. We found 
investment to be the most important intermediate mechanism through which the resource 
curse takes place across countries, accounting for almost half of the correlation. This confirms 
that the theoretical investment mechanism exposed in Chapter 4 can be particularly relevant in 
terms of elucidating the occurrence of resource curse phenomena. 
 In Chapter 5 we investigated whether “resource curse” phenomena are relevant at a 
regional level as well. We compiled a novel U.S. state-disaggregated database and conducted 
cross-state growth regressions in order to test the existence of a regional U.S. resource curse. 
Confirming our hypothesis, we found evidence of a negative correlation between resource 
dependence and economic growth for the 1986-2000 period. Our empirical analysis confirmed 
that several crowding-out mechanisms identified in our cross-country analysis (such as 
investment and corruption) apply across regions. Furthermore, we found innovation to be a 
significant channel through which resource rents inhibit economic growth across states. 
Innovation and education played the major role in explaining the resource curse across U.S. 
states, giving substance to the theoretical mechanism exposed in Chapter 3. Our analysis is 
novel in two respects. Our approach challenged the absolute convergence hypothesis – often 
adopted in regional empirical analysis – that focuses on initial income levels as the sole 
determinant of growth rate variation across regions. We identified a number of growth-
relevant variables including resource abundance to be significant determinants of economic 
growth, as found across sovereign countries. Secondly, to our knowledge this is the first 
empirical study of the resource curse at a regional level conducted in such an elaborate 
manner. In that respect, it was of particular interest to discover that intermediate mechanisms 
bear different relative importance across countries and regions. 
 In Chapter 6 we examine the impact of natural resources on income levels from a long-
term historical perspective.  Contrary to the negative impact of resource wealth on economic 
growth during the last few decades, as suggested by the resource curse hypothesis, we found 
mineral resources to be beneficial for institutional quality and thus indirectly on income levels 
in the far past. This suggests that the resource curse is a relatively recent phenomenon. Our 
analysis extends existing approaches on exogenous determinants of institutions and therefore 
indirectly of long-term income. Europeans settled in large numbers in some colonies and 
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established the investment-conducive institutional framework found in their countries of 
origin. Such institutions protected property rights and supported high levels of income. In 
other colonies where Europeans decided to settle in small numbers, they established local 
elites in order to regulate production and extract resources. It has been documented in the 
literature the extent to which the settlement decisions of colonisers were influenced by the 
urbanisation patterns and disease environment found in the newly-discovered regions. 
Europeans preferred to immigrate to areas with a mild disease environment and scarce 
indigenous populations. We built on the same framework and revealed that regions rich in 
precious metals (gold and silver) became prominent settlement locations, attracting European 
colonisers and institutions. On the other hand, we found the production of a series of 
agricultural commodities reaching Europe at the time of colonisation (coffee, tea, cocoa, and 
sugar), to discourage European immigration, but nonetheless, to be positively correlated to 
institutional quality. 
 
 
7.2. Policy Issues 
Many countries in the developing world possess large amounts of resource wealth, yet they 
continue to suffer from poverty. Despite the well-documented failure of most countries to convert 
resource rents into increased overall income levels, national governments still continue investing 
in resource-based projects. Resource-dependent countries are generally characterised by 
underinvestment, low levels of human capital, corruption, overvalued currencies, and 
technological stagnation. Although there is no single recipe to deal with the resource curse, there 
are some policy remedies that could potentially transform the curse into a blessing.   
 
(i). Transmission Mechanisms  
Our findings in both Parts II and III of the thesis suggest that the resource curse is not 
attributed to resource affluence itself but rather to the crowding-out impact of resources on 
several growth-promoting activities. This implies that the policy focus has to shift to those 
crowding-out mechanisms responsible for the curse. In Chapter 2, we showed how resource 
rents can create a false sense of confidence and reduce domestic savings and investment. 
Governments in developing countries are often tempted to transfer resource rents to the public 
in order to prolong their stay in power. This reduces public awareness for the need to save and 
invest for the future. In that respect, it is vital to ensure that rents are invested in projects with 
high rates of return rather than given as a supplement to domestic consumption. In our formal 
model, a transfer of resource revenues in the form of public expenditures such as social 
security came out as a very bad policy. It is wise perhaps to create resource funds with an 
explicit aim in reinvesting resource rents domestically and abroad. In Chapter 4 we found that 
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the contracting impact of natural resources on investment accounts for the largest part of the 
negative correlation between resource rents and economic growth across countries. This 
suggests that investment policies are likely to play a crucial role in avoiding the resource curse 
trap. 
 In our formal model of Chapter 3, we showed how resource income can induce a shift of 
talented individuals outside the R&D sector by essentially distorting wage differentials. 
Talented individuals find it more profitable to engage in other sectors, especially since they 
cannot reap fully their social marginal product. In Chapter 5 we concluded that knowledge 
(schooling and innovation) is the most important mechanism in explaining the negative 
correlation between resource abundance and economic growth among U.S. states. Our 
findings provided evidence of the fact that resource-dependent regions even within a 
developed country may experience a comparative disadvantage in growth terms. Policy 
attention has to be drawn to this issue in countries where regional inequality is a major 
concern. Entrepreneurial talent is often limited in the economy and a shift of high-skilled 
individuals outside innovative activities can have a substantial impact on labour productivity. 
It is important in this respect that the government uses such resource rents to correct for the 
contracting effect of resources on innovative activities. Injecting funds into R&D sectors and 
providing stimulating incentives for research can increase innovation and productivity growth 
in the economy. 
 As additional policy remedies, governments should also attempt to tackle issues of 
corruption, underinvestment in human capital, and limited trade openness. Even if these 
channels bear smaller explanatory power in elucidating the resource curse paradox, they are 
still relevant and potentially play a very significant role for individual countries. For instance, 
devaluations can increase the competitiveness of exporting sectors in economies of 
overvalued currencies. Governments should direct resource funds to promote educational 
standards and diversify the economy in order to increase demand for human capital. For 
instance, governmental support for industries adding value to raw materials can immediately 
increase the need for more skilful personnel. Finally, wherever this is possible without 
external intervention (from international organisations and agencies), governments should 
improve transparency on the disclosure and use of all revenues from primary sector 
companies. In this respect there should be a well-monitored allocation of resource rights and 
independent inquiries on the amount of resource rents and their corresponding use.  
 
(ii). Neutralisation of Resource Impact 
Since the inherent nature of the resource curse appears to be related to distortionary effects of 
resource income, an obvious policy remedy would be to protect the domestic economy from 
an abrupt influx of resource revenues. Shielding the local economy against such resource 
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windfalls can take place in a number of ways. The most obvious manner to decrease the 
inflow of resource income domestically is to develop the resource sector at a slower pace. 
Rapid development of extractive projects can be particularly appealing for politicians 
especially when income injections in the local economy seem to be much needed. What may 
benefit the primary sector and the local economy in the short run, however, can turn out to be 
disastrous for the economy in the long term in the case that the resource curse materialises.  
 Alternatively, instead of discouraging the expansion of the primary sector, policy makers 
can promote the establishment of stabilisation funds that insulate the economy from rapid 
resource shocks. Resource revenues are deposited in these funds and are subsequently 
invested abroad. Usually, the interest earned on the resource assets re-enters the local 
economy while most of the resource revenues remain in the fund. Additionally, such a fund 
may help smooth consumption over time by allowing governments to channel more resources 
into the economy in periods of recession. Apart from accumulating resources for future 
investment, resource funds achieve a fairer intergenerational distribution of resource wealth. 
What is of particular importance, however, is that resource funds are not misused by 
government officials either for political or individual purposes. In that respect, there must be 
transparent rules governing the fund and independent monitoring of its activities and assets. 
 An alternative method to insulate the local economy from abrupt resource shocks is to use 
the resource rents to repay accumulated public debts. This policy is particularly relevant for 
resource-rich countries, which in general use their resource base as collateral to facilitate their 
foreign borrowing. Additionally, resource windfalls often create an artificial optimism that 
materialises in excessive spending and budget deficits. A fall in primary commodity prices 
makes obviously debt repayments difficult and increases the probability to default. In that 
respect, a scheme to utilise the resource rents as debt repayments will have multiple benefits. 
It will shield the local economy from the resource rents and will reverse the economic 
behaviour with respect to foreign borrowing. Following the oil booms in the 1970s, Indonesia 
adopted such prudent policy measures for its debt management by controlling budget 
expenditure and impeding the foreign borrowing of state enterprises. Furthermore, using the 
resource revenues to decrease the debt burden is important in terms of sustainability, since 
ultimately debts have to be paid back and it is unfair to postpone these payments for future 
generations to incur. 
 Finally, instead of reducing the amount of resource rents entering the economy in absolute 
terms, it can be equally desirable to control the relative importance of the primary sector in the 
local economy. Such a policy does not necessarily focus on discouraging the development of 
resource projects, but rather on encouraging projects in other sectors possibly with the support 
of the resource rents. In order to promote such diversification, resource rents may be used to 
develop, for instance, industries that add value to the resources. One problem for this policy 
approach, lies in the fact that developed countries often impose lower tariffs on imported raw 
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materials compared to processed resources. Such tariff differentiation can obviously hamper 
the development of alternative industries and the respective potential for economic 
diversification. 
 
(iii). International Intervention 
Many of the extractive projects in developing countries are funded to a large extent by 
multinational development banks and international organisations such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund. This implies that there is great potential for external 
pressure on local governments on how to utilise their resource rents. Lending agencies should 
demand that local governments and resource firms disclose complete information on their 
activities and accounts. Furthermore, they should ensure that resource revenues do not accrue 
to a few individuals, such as politicians or members of the local elites, or accommodate the 
needs of specific societal layers, ethnic or religious groups and geographic areas. For that 
purpose, loans for extractive projects might be provided in the form of conditional aid. 
International lenders should fund projects in countries where governments agree in advance to 
an independent monitoring of the resource rents and ways to spend them. It is essential to 
specify beforehand ways the way in which resource rents will be utilised to alleviate poverty 
and improve welfare levels. In that respect, most of the resource rents should reach the largest 
base of the society in terms of investments in education, health projects, infrastructure, rural 
development and environmental programmes dealing with the negative externalities of 
extraction. 
 
 
7.3. Future Research 
More than ten years after the seminal paper by Sachs and Warner (1995) on resource abundance 
and economic growth, much research has been undertaken at a theoretical and empirical level on 
investigating the mechanisms behind the resource curse. Clearly the whole issue of what 
determines whether resource affluence is a curse rather than a blessing is a rather complex one 
and, in that respect, the thesis is not meant to be exhaustive in illuminating all paradoxical aspects 
of the phenomenon. Below, we briefly mention some additional research questions that can 
potentially develop further our understanding of the resource curse hypothesis. 
 Firstly, we believe that the informal character of resource production in many developing 
countries can have serious implications for their development potential, and as such it deserves 
explicit policy attention. In many parts of the developing world where property rights are loosely 
defined, it is not uncommon for natural resources to be informally exploited. Individuals illegally 
engage in harvesting tropical timber or extracting diamonds, since such activities can prove to be 
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particularly profitable. The presence of easily lootable resources stimulates predatory 
behaviour in the economy and entices individuals to direct their work effort to such activities. 
Having an extensive informal sector can be particularly harmful to economic development, 
especially when individuals compete aggressively for the acquisition of the resource. Labour 
productivity improvements in terms of infrastructure investment, educational projects or 
health programmes are mostly financed by public revenues in developing regions. This 
implies that a contraction of the formal economy due to an extensive informal resource sector 
will directly constrain the capability of public officials to obtain tax revenues and reinvest 
them for the benefit of all individuals.  
 Secondly, it is of particular interest to examine the evolution of the resource impact on 
income over time. It is challenging to examine whether the resource curse has been a recent 
phenomenon of the last four decades, investigating at the same time whether resources have 
been supporting the development process in earlier periods. Perhaps, in an era of continuously 
declining transportation costs, domestic natural reserves become less of a prerequisite for 
successful development strategies. If this indeed holds, going back over time would imply an 
overall increasing role of resources in supporting income levels. Furthermore, this potentially 
implies that the past beneficial role of resource affluence is likely to have had an enduring 
impact on income levels that can be still traced in the current world income distribution. In 
other words, even if resources retarded economic growth in the last half of the twentieth 
century, this does not necessarily mean that resource-dependent countries are necessarily 
poorer than resource-scarce ones.  
 An appealing extension of the analysis would be to enrich our dataset with new variables 
and time-disaggregated data. For instance, it would be of interest to also incorporate a credible 
measure of technological intensity for our cross-country sample in Chapter 4, as we did in our 
cross-U.S. state analysis in Chapter 5. Overcoming the scarcity of data and, thus, expanding 
the time disaggregation of our variables will allow us to perform a panel data analysis for 
subperiods in order to reinforce our findings of Chapters 4 and 5. 
 A promising additional area of research, perhaps more for political scientists rather than 
economists, may focus on the role international lending agencies can play in facilitating a 
prudent spending of resource rents. To the extent that resource-based projects are financed by 
international loans, such agencies can demand that local governments commit themselves in 
advance on ways to spend resource revenues. A recent attempt in that direction has been the 
arrangement between the World Bank and the Chad government to deposit oil revenues into 
an offshore account and jointly monitor their spending. It is particularly appealing to examine 
whether such measures of international pressure can reverse the resource curse pattern and 
bear fruitful results in practice.   
 Finally, it is perhaps of interest to forecast the effect natural resource dependence will have on 
economic development for the forthcoming decades. Current rising oil prices pose a challenge, for 
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instance, on whether this windfall will be sensibly used by the producing states to promote 
development. If high prices of oil persist, however, there could be an additional repercussion 
especially for the poorest group of the underdeveloped countries. Booming economies such as 
China and India drive oil prices high and can afford to continue importing large amounts of oil for 
their expanding industries. High oil prices, however, can inhibit the development process of poor 
countries that are growing at a more modest pace. As a consequence, there may be a significant 
divergence within developing countries with respect to their capability to cope with oil prices and 
their capacity to grow. 
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SUMMARY 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KING MIDAS:  
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Introduction (Part I) 
 
Common economic intuition suggests that resource windfalls should provide additional 
revenues that help improve living standards and reduce poverty levels. Resource-rich 
developing countries should benefit from accrued resource rents as these can help to reduce 
formerly accumulated debts, overcome credit constraints, and implement ambitious 
development programmes. If a “big push” in terms of a positive income shock is needed to 
escape from a vicious circle of stagnation, then injections of resource revenues should assist in 
attaining a development path of robust growth. In that direction, economic historians 
accentuated the importance of mineral reserves in supporting the industrial expansion of 
economies such as the United States and the United Kingdom at the turn of the 20th century. 
More recently, countries such as Norway and Botswana took advantage of their resource 
earnings from oil and diamond reserves, respectively, promoting income expansion.  
 In recent years interest in the impact of resource affluence on economic development has 
been invigorated in the economic literature. Many studies asserted that resource abundance 
had adverse rather than beneficial consequences for (the rate of) economic growth over the 
last three decades. The tendency of resource-rich countries to be underperformers in terms of 
income growth became known as the “resource curse” hypothesis. Although concerns over the 
potential contracting impact of resource windfalls can be traced back to the writings of Adam 
Smith, the topic rejuvenated attention when in the 1950s Prebisch and Singer explicated the 
potential failure of resource-dependent development pointing to declining relative prices for 
primary commodities relative to manufactured goods. The appreciation of the Dutch guilder 
and corresponding decline in manufacturing in the Netherlands, following the discovery and 
exploitation of large gas fields in the Groningen area in the 1960s, gave rise to a literature on 
the “Dutch disease” that highlighted the harmful role of resource windfalls on trade 
competitiveness. Finally, in their seminal NBER paper in the mid 1990s, Sachs and Warner 
provided the first extensive statistical analysis and gave an empirical justification for the 
resource curse hypothesis. Their work has stimulated further interest and discussion on the 
issue. This thesis is part of this literature on the paradoxical negative association between 
resource abundance and economic growth, focusing on the intermediate mechanisms through 
which the phenomenon takes place. 
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 Part I of the thesis provides an introduction to the resource curse literature and existing 
explanations of the phenomenon. Additionally, it briefly comments on the implications of 
unsuccessful resource-based development in terms of sustainability. A contracting economy 
following a resource windfall can be perceived both as a missed chance to catch up with 
economies that were more successful, and as a failure to translate resource income into 
opportunities for future generations. At the end, Part I provides an overview of the thesis and 
it outlines the research questions that are explored in Part II and III. 
 
Formal Analysis (Part II) 
 
Part II of the thesis consists of Chapters 2 and 3 that theoretically explore two mechanisms 
that can explain the deleterious effect of resource affluence on economic development. The 
analysis in both chapters makes extensive use of insights found in the endogenous growth 
literature, assuming that technological progress (or improvements in labour productivity) is 
either a side-effect of production (learning-by-doing in Chapter 2) or a deliberate outcome of 
R&D activities within the economy (Chapter 3). 
  The research focus in Chapter 2 lies in exploring the interrelationship between resource 
windfalls and aggregate savings in resource-rich economies. Resource abundance can easily 
create a false sense of security and reduce the need to exercise care in economic planning. 
Reliance on a continuous stream of resource revenues is likely to induce economic agents to 
become short-sighted and devote inadequate attention to prudent economic behaviour. An 
important aspect of economic planning deals with decisions regarding the division of income 
between savings and consumption. We develop an OverLapping-Generations (OLG) model, 
where individuals live for two periods, implying that at each time interval there is an overlap 
of a young and an old generation. Individuals work when young and live from their savings 
when they turn old and enter the second period of their life cycle. Each generation values 
consumption at both periods of its life cycle, and it maximises the utility derived from 
consumption subject to the budget constraint it faces, i.e. total wage income. We show how 
resource rents can induce savings to adjust downwards in the case that resources are 
considered public property and are used to pay for public expenditures such as social security. 
Under such a scenario, resource revenues reduce the necessity to save, since they become a 
means to enhance future income levels. The immediate consequence of a savings contraction 
is a decline in investment and future physical capital. Additionally, there will be a decrease in 
manufactured output, to the extent that its production is capital-intensive. This reduction in 
manufactured income is exacerbated when, in turn, labour productivity (through technology or 
education) depends on the level of physical capital. We show that in the case of strong 
knowledge diffusion within the economy, any positive short-term impact of natural resources 
on welfare is likely to be outweighed by their contracting indirect effect on physical capital. If 
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this is the case, total welfare will decline and the resource curse will come into effect. To a 
large extent, the effect of resource rents on savings depends on the distribution of resource 
rents over generations. Savings adjust to a smaller extent when resources are considered 
common property and the rents are equally distributed over all consumers. 
 In Chapter 3 we shift our attention to an alternative model, where technological progress 
depends on R&D activities. The engine of economic growth lies in the work effort 
specifically directed towards innovation and entrepreneurship. The model assumes infinitely-
living households that choose over time the level of consumption and the share of time 
devoted to leisure, both of which contribute to their utility. There is necessarily a trade-off 
between consumption and leisure due to the fact that consumption depends positively on 
labour income. The economy consists of four sectors. First, there is a manufacturing sector 
using as input a share of the labour force and a range of intermediate capital goods, the latter 
representing distinctive designs of capital. Secondly, there is a capital goods sector, where 
firms produce the intermediates using raw capital and the corresponding innovative ideas 
(patents). Third, we assume an R&D sector, where the designs for new intermediate goods are 
produced adding to the stock of knowledge in the economy. The R&D sector employs the 
remainder of the labour force not employed in manufacturing. Last, there is a primary sector 
depending positively on the resource endowment of the economy. Our primary concern is 
with the effect of an expanded primary sector on income growth. We analyse how resource 
rents decrease the fraction of time allocated to work and increase leisure correspondingly. An 
increased amount of resource wealth gives the opportunity to enjoy the same level of 
consumption for a reduced labor effort. In the model, we show that an additional indirect 
repercussion of increased resource revenues is to affect the allocation of entrepreneurial 
activity between the manufacturing and the R&D sector in favor of the former. Economic 
growth slows down for two reasons: due to the fact that individuals devote less time to 
working and that a smaller share of them engages in R&D. Broadly perceived, the analysis 
describes the failure of resource-rich countries to make efficient use of their labour force and 
its potential in terms of skills and entrepreneurial talent. 
 
Empirical Analysis (Part III) 
 
In Part III of the thesis we move from theory to empirics in order to explore statistically the 
impact of resource abundance on economic growth. The purpose of the analysis is twofold. 
First, it aims at verifying the resource curse hypothesis and investigating whether it is mainly 
attributed to the negative impact of resources on several growth-related variables as suggested 
in the literature. The association of natural resources with several growth determinants is often 
referred to as the resource curse transmission channels. On the other hand, the empirical part 
of the thesis simultaneously explores the importance of our theoretical mechanisms exposed 
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in Part II in terms of accounting for the detrimental effect of resources on growth. In that 
respect, the formal and empirical parts of the thesis complement and reinforce each other. 
 The focal point of our analysis in Chapter 4 lies in examining the direct and indirect 
impact of resource rents on economic growth across countries for the 1975–1996 period. To 
identify the dependence of economic growth on resource dependence we estimate cross-
country growth regressions, i.e. we examine the role of several variables in accounting for 
growth differences among the sample of countries. The set of our growth-determining 
variables include initial income, a resource abundance proxy, and indices for investment, 
human capital, institutional quality, trade openness and competitiveness. As a proxy of 
resource abundance we use the share of mineral production in GDP (overall value of 
production in the economy) at the beginning of the period. When incorporating solely initial 
income and our resource proxy in our analysis we find a strong and negative statistical 
association between economic growth and resource abundance. We progressively add the 
other growth-related variables in our statistical analysis and observe the negative association 
between resources and growth gradually to fade away. This implies that resource rents are not 
bad to economic growth per se but their growth-contracting effect goes indirectly through 
their association with other growth-related variables. The set of these growth-related indices is 
shown to be rich enough to account fully for the initial negative association between resources 
and growth. We successively verify that mineral production indeed decreases investment, 
schooling and openness and deteriorates trade competitiveness and institutional quality. An 
important contribution of our analysis lies in evaluating the relative contribution of each 
transmission channel in explaining the resource curse hypothesis. We find investment to be 
the most important mechanism, through which natural resource inhibit the economic growth 
progress. The contracting impact of resource rents on investment accounts for almost half of 
the initial negative association between resource abundance and growth. The openness and 
terms of trade explanations follow in terms of relative importance. This finding underpins the 
relevance of our theoretical investment mechanism exposed in Chapter 2 in elucidating the 
“resource curse” phenomenon. Not only we provide empirical justification to the investment 
channel but we also corroborate its importance in explaining the disappointing economic 
performance of resource-rich countries. 
 The analysis in Chapter 5 poses the research question of whether the “resource curse” 
may be a relevant phenomenon across regions within a country as much as across countries. 
In order to explore the issue we utilise a U.S. state-disaggregated dataset to test whether 
resource-rich states underperform in terms of economic growth. Our analysis challenges the 
“absolute convergence” hypothesis often adopted in regional economics, which assumes that 
initial income is the only important factor across regions accounting for differences in growth 
rates. We explore whether U.S. states are dissimilar in a number of other characteristics that 
may matter in capturing differences in growth rates. Following a similar approach to Chapter 
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4, we explore whether economic growth across U.S. states for the 1986–2000 period depends 
on a number of growth-related variables, found to be important across sovereign countries. 
First, we include a resource proxy (the share of primary sector in Gross State Product (GSP) 
i.e. the state equivalent of GDP) to confirm that resource-rich U.S. states such as Alaska and 
Louisiana experienced a relative disadvantage in terms of income growth over that period. We 
consecutively include proxies for investment, schooling, openness, corruption and innovation 
in the growth analysis and verify their important role in explaining growth performance. 
Similar to our findings in Chapter 4, the negative impact of natural resources on growth across 
U.S. states disappears once we incorporate all aforementioned variables in our growth 
analysis. This suggests the existence of transmission mechanisms being important in 
explaining a resource curse phenomenon across U.S. states. Indeed, we find resource-
dependent U.S. states to suffer from lower levels of investment, schooling and innovation and 
be at the same time less open to immigration and more corrupted as economies. Contrary to 
our cross-country results, though, we find the knowledge-based channels of schooling and 
R&D to play a much larger role than investment. A “resource curse” across relatively-wealthy 
regions within a developed country seems to be therefore of a different nature and mostly 
related to differences in educational standards and R&D expenditure rather than differences in 
infrastructure and trade openness. 
 Chapter 6 turns towards the relation between resources and welfare from a long-term 
historical perspective. Many scholars have emphasised the importance of natural resources in 
the industrial expansion of many resource-rich countries in the 18th and 19th centuries. This 
line of argument suggests that the negative effect of resource affluence on economic growth is 
most likely to be a recent phenomenon of the last few decades to the extent that declining 
transportation costs and trade barriers make the availability of domestic resource supplies less 
of a prerequisite for economic development. To the degree that this holds, the earlier positive 
role of resource abundance on income growth may have had a long-lasting effect that can be 
still reflected in the current world income distribution. Our approach focuses on the 
relationship between current income levels, institutions, colonisation policies and resource 
endowments. In places where Europeans settled in large numbers, they imported the 
investment-conducive institutional framework found in their countries of origin, largely based 
on the protection of private property rights. In other areas Europeans preferred to settle in 
small numbers and rather to establish a local elite to regulate local production. The differences 
in colonisation strategies and imported institutions have had an important effect reflected in 
current relative welfare levels. We analyse the endogenous character of the colonisers’ settling 
decisions and confirm earlier literature that state that settlers had a preference for areas of a 
mild disease environment and less-organised indigenous populations. More important for the 
subject of this thesis, we find regions rich in precious metals (gold and silver) to be prominent 
settling destinations in the past and fortunate to inherit the settlers’ institutional framework. 
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On the other hand side, we find a series of important agricultural commodities at the time of 
colonisation (coffee, tea, cocoa and sugar), to discourage European immigration, but 
nonetheless, to be positively correlated to better institutions. Our findings suggest that indeed 
natural resources have played a beneficial role in economic development in the past, despite 
the current trend of resource-rich countries to experience lower rates of income growth. 
 Finally, Chapter 7 summarises and brings together the main conclusions of all chapters. 
At the same time, it draws policy recommendations based on our research findings and 
suggests remedies to tackle the resource curse. Policy has to focus on those intermediate 
mechanisms responsible for the resource curse. Savings and investment policies are likely to 
play a major role in avoiding the resource curse trap in resource-rich developing countries. 
Also, utilising resource rents to correct for the contracting effect of resources on R&D 
activities seems a relevant strategy. Additionally, resource rents may be deposited in 
investment funds that ensure transparent and efficient management of resource revenues. It is 
needless to say that this thesis is far from exhaustive in terms of elucidating all paradoxical 
aspects of the resource curse. Chapter 7 provides suggestions on future extensions of the 
research undertaken in this thesis. Expanding the current dataset, obtaining historical data of 
resource abundance and examining the informal nature of resource production in many 
developing countries are some potential directions of future research. Since current rising oil 
prices are likely to create a new positive income shock for many countries, it is of great 
interest to see what has been learnt from past resource mismanagement and the capacity oil 
producing countries have built to transform resource rents into overall economic prosperity in 
the near future. 
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
DE ECONOMIE VAN KONING MIDAS: 
NATUURLIJKE HULPBRONNEN EN ECONOMISCHE GROEI 
 
Introductie (Deel I) 
 
Het algemeen geaccepteerde economisch inzicht is dat een ruime voorziening in natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen extra opbrengsten genereert die de welvaart kan verhogen en de armoede kan 
verlichten. Ontwikkelingslanden die grote voorraden hulpbronnen hebben, zouden baat 
moeten hebben bij de toegenomen inkomsten uit de hulpbronnen. Deze inkomsten dragen bij 
aan het aflossen van eerder aangegane schulden, het opheffen van kredietbeperkingen en het 
implementeren van ambitieuze ontwikkelingsprogramma’s. Als een positieve inkomensschok 
nodig is om te ontsnappen aan een vicieuze cirkel van schuld en stagnatie, dan zou de 
exploitatie van natuurlijke hulpbronnen de economische ontwikkeling moeten kunnen sturen 
naar een pad van robuuste groei. Inderdaad benadrukken historici het belang van minerale 
voorraden voor de economische ontwikkeling. Deze waren essentieel voor de industriële 
ontwikkeling van de Verenigde Staten en het Verenigd Koninkrijk aan het begin van de 20e 
eeuw. Meer recentelijk hebben landen zoals Noorwegen en Botswana gebruik gemaakt van de 
inkomsten uit hun hulpbronnen, respectievelijk olie en diamanten, om een substantiele 
inkomensgroei te realiseren. 
 De relatie tussen natuurlijke rijdkom en economische ontwikkeling heeft veel aandacht 
gekregen in de economische literatuur van de afgelopen jaren. Veel studies beweerden dat, 
bekeken over de laatste drie decennia, natuurlijke rijkdom eerder negatieve dan positieve 
gevolgen had voor de economische groei. Landen met grote voorraden natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen bleken onder de maat te presteren in termen van inkomensgroei en dit werd 
bekend als de hypothese van de “resource curse” – de vloek van de natuurlijke rijkdom. 
Zorgen over het mogelijk negatieve effect op de economie van inkomen uit hulpbronnen kan 
al gevonden worden bij vroegere schrijvers als Adam Smith, maar het onderwerp kreeg 
hernieuwde aandacht door een publicatie in 1950 van Prebisch en Singer. Zij lieten zien dat 
op de wereldmarkt de relatieve prijs van primaire goederen daalde ten opzichte van de prijs 
van industriële goederen. Het gevolg was dat landen die veel primaire goederen exporteerden 
hun inkomsten zagen dalen in plaats van stijgen. De ontdekking en exploitatie van de grote 
gasvelden bij Groningen rond 1960, en de daarop volgende appreciatie van de gulden en 
afname van industriële productie in Nederland gaven aanleiding tot een stroom artikelen over 
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de “Dutch disease”. Deze literatuur benadrukte de schadelijke invloed van inkomsten uit 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen op de concurrentiepositie in de internationale markt voor industriële 
goederen. Een mijlpaal werd bereikt met een innovatief artikel halverwege de jaren 1990, 
waarin Sachs en Warner de eerste uitgebreide statistische analyse leverden en zo een 
empirische onderbouwing konden geven voor de “resource curse” hypothese. Hun werk 
stimuleerde de aandacht voor en de discussie over het onderwerp. Dit proefschrift maakt deel 
uit van deze literatuur waarin de paradoxale negatieve samenhang tussen natuurlijke rijkdom 
en economische groei centraal staat. In dit proefschrift gaat de aandacht daarbij vooral uit naar 
de tussenliggende mechanismen door middel waarvan dit fenomeen zich voltrekt. 
 Deel I van dit proefschrift geeft een inleiding in de literatuur over de “resource curse” en 
de bestaande verklaringen van dit fenomeen. Ook geeft het een kort commentaar op de 
betekenis van het gebruik van hulpbronnen en economische ontwikkeling voor duurzaamheid. 
Een krimpende economie ondanks een grote natuurlijke rijkdom kan gezien worden als een 
gemiste kans om economieën in te halen die meer succes hadden én als een mislukte poging 
om inkomen uit hulpbronnen te vertalen naar mogelijkheden voor toekomstige generaties. Als 
afsluiting van Deel I is er een overzicht van dit proefschrift en een uiteenzetting van de 
onderzoeksvragen die behandeld worden in Delen II en III. 
 
Formele Analyse (Deel II) 
 
Deel II van dit proefschrift bestaat uit de hoofdstukken 2 en 3, die op theoretische wijze twee 
mechanismen onderzoeken die het negatieve effect van natuurlijke rijkdom op economische 
ontwikkeling kunnen verklaren. In beide hoofdstukken maakt de analyse uitvoerig gebruik 
van inzichten uit de literatuur over endogene groei. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt verondersteld dat 
technologische vooruitgang en de daaraan gekoppelde toename van arbeidsproductiviteit een 
direct bijkomend effect is van productie (“learning-by-doing”), terwijl in hoofdstuk 3 wordt 
verondersteld dat technologische vooruitgang een uitkomst is van doelgerichte onderzoek en 
ontwikkeling (O&O) activiteiten. 
 De aandacht van hoofdstuk 2 is gericht op het onderzoek naar de samenhang tussen 
inkomsten uit natuurlijke hulpbronnen en geaggregeerde besparingen in economieën die 
beschikken over grote voorraden natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Natuurlijke rijkdom kan een 
onterecht gevoel van zekerheid creëren en zo de behoefte aan een zorgvuldige economische 
planning beperken. Door te vertrouwen op een continue stroom van inkomsten uit natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen kan er toe leiden dat economische actoren kortzichtig worden en onvoldoende 
aandacht besteden aan voorzichtig economisch gedrag. Een belangrijk element van dergelijke 
voorzichtigheid heeft betrekking op de verdeling van het inkomen over besparingen en 
consumptie. We ontwikkelen in dit hoodstuk een levenscyclus model waarin individuen 
gedurende twee perioden leven; ze zijn de eerste periode ‘jong’, en de tweede periode ‘oud’. 
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In elk tijdsinterval leeft een jonge en een oude generatie samen (in het engels staat dit model 
bekend als een “Overlapping Generations” (OLG) model). Individuen werken en sparen als ze 
jong zijn en leven van hun spaargelden als ze oud zijn geworden in de tweede periode van hun 
levenscyclus. We laten zien hoe inkomsten uit natuurlijke hulpbronnen ertoe kunnen leiden 
dat besparingen verminderen, in het geval dat deze inkomsten worden gebruikt voor publieke 
uitgaven zoals sociale zekerheid. De reden is dat de publieke voorzieningen de noodzaak 
verminderen van besparingen voor de oude dag. Het directe gevolg van verlaagde besparingen 
is een afname van investeringen en toekomstig kapitaal. Bovendien zal er een afname 
optreden in de industriële productie, afhankelijk van de kapitaalintensiteit van deze productie. 
Deze teruggang in inkomen uit productie wordt versterkt als de arbeidsproductiviteit op haar 
beurt afhankelijk is van het kapitaal (via technologie of opleidingen). We laten zien dat, in het 
geval van sterke kennisverspreiding binnen de economie, het korte-termijn positieve effect 
van natuurlijke hulpbronnen op de welvaart tenietgedaan wordt door het negatieve lange-
termijn effect van lagere investeringen en kennisontwikkeling. Als dit het geval is, zal de 
totale welvaart afnemen en treedt de “resource curse” op. We merken nog op dat het negatieve 
effect van natuurlijke rijkdom op besparingen minder sterk is als de inkomsten uit natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen gelijkelijk verdeeld worden over de generaties, in plaats van dat ze voornamelijk 
gebruikt worden voor de sociale zekerheid en pensioenvoorzieningen. 
 In hoofdstuk 3 verschuiven we onze aandacht naar een alternatief model, waarin 
technologische vooruitgang afhangt van O&O activiteiten. De motor van economische groei 
is de inspanning die specifiek geleverd wordt ten behoeve van innovatie. Het model gaat uit 
van oneindig lang levende huishoudens die een keuze moeten maken tussen het 
consumptieniveau met de daarbij behorende arbeidsinspanning, en vrije tijd. 
Noodzakelijkerwijs is er een afweging tussen consumptie en vrije tijd, omdat beiden bijdragen 
aan het nut. De economie bestaat uit vier sectoren. Ten eerste is er de productiesector, met 
arbeid en kapitaalgoederen als input. Ten tweede is er de kapitaalgoederensector. De 
productiviteit van kapitaal hangt af van de variëteit in kapitaalgoederen, en deze is weer 
afhankelijk van het aantal  innovatieve ideeën (patenten) dat beschikbaar is. Deze ideeën 
worden geproduceerd in de derde sector, de O&O sector, met arbeid als productiefactor. Als 
laatste is er de primaire sector die positief afhankelijk is van de mate waarin natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen beschikbaar zijn voor de economie. Hoofdzakelijk zijn we geïnteresseerd in het 
effect van een toenemende primaire sector op de inkomensgroei. We analyseren hoe 
inkomsten uit natuurlijke hulpbronnen de keuze voor vrije tijd doen toenemen, en het deel van 
de tijd dat besteed wordt aan werk verminderen. Een toegenomen rijkdom aan hulpbronnen 
geeft de mogelijkheid om hetzelfde consumptieniveau te genieten bij een lagere 
arbeidsinspanning. In het model laten we zien dat een bijkomstige indirecte effect is dat de 
allocatie van arbeid tussen de productie en de O&O sectoren verschuift ten koste van de 
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laatste. De economische groei vertraagt door twee redenen: het feit dat individuen minder tijd 
besteden aan werk en het feit dat een kleiner deel van hen O&O activiteiten ontplooit. 
 
Empirische Analyse (Deel III) 
 
In Deel III van dit proefschrift gaan we van theorie naar empirie; we proberen het effect van 
inkomsten uit natuurlijke hulpbronnen op economische groei statistisch te onderzoeken. Het 
doel van de analyse is tweeledig. Ten eerste probeert het de “resource curse” te verifiëren en 
te onderzoeken of de resource curse voornamelijk te wijten is aan het negatieve effect van 
hulpbronnen op een aantal groeigerelateerde variabelen (zoals investeringen). De verbanden 
die bestaan tussen natuurlijke hulpbronnen en de zogenaamde groeideterminanten worden de 
transmissiekanalen van de “resource curse” genoemd. Ten tweede verkent het empirische deel 
van dit proefschrift het belang van de mechanismen die zijn onderzocht in Deel II. Op dit punt 
complementeren het formele en het empirische deel van dit proefschrift elkaar. 
 In hoofdstuk 4 gaat de aandacht vooral uit naar een vergelijking tussen landen over de 
periode 1975-1996. Om de relatie tussen economische groei en natuurlijke rijkdom te duiden 
schatten we cross-country regressies van groei; m.a.w., we onderzoeken de rol van 
verschillende variabelen voor de verklaring van verschillen in economische groei tussen de 
landen. De variabelen waarvan de relatie met economische groei wordt onderzocht zijn 
initieel inkomen, natuurlijke rijkdom, investeringen, menselijk kapitaal, institutionele 
kwaliteit, openheid van de economie en de internationale concurrentiepositie. Als benadering 
voor natuurlijke rijkdom gebruiken we het aandeel in het Bruto Nationaal Product (BNP; de 
totale waarde van productie in de economie) van de productie van mineralen aan het begin 
van de periode. Indien we in onze analyse alleen kijken naar initieel inkomen en onze 
benadering voor natuurlijke rijkdom, dan vinden we een sterke en negatieve statistische relatie 
tussen economische groei en natuurlijke rijkdom. Door steeds meer groeigerelateerde 
variabelen toe te voegen aan onze statistische analyse verdwijnt beetje bij beetje deze 
negatieve relatie tussen natuurlijke rijkdom en groei. Dit suggereert dat natuurlijke rijkdom op 
zich niet slecht is voor economische groei, maar dat het groeibeperkende effect indirect werkt 
via het verband met andere groeigerelateerde variabelen. De set van deze determinanten van 
groei blijkt rijk genoeg te zijn om het initiële negatieve verband tussen natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen en groei volledig te verklaren. Daarna laten we zien dat productie van mineralen 
inderdaad een negatieve invloed heeft op investeringen, onderwijs, openheid van de 
economie, internationale concurrentiepositie en institutionele kwaliteit. Een belangrijke 
bijdrage van onze analyse is gelegen in de evaluatie van de relatieve bijdragen van elke 
transmissiekanaal in het verklaren van de “resource curse” hypothese. We tonen aan dat de 
investeringen het belangrijkste transmissiekanaal zijn waardoor natuurlijke hulpbronnen de 
economische groei beperken. Dit transmissiekanaal neemt bijna de helft van het initiële 
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negatieve verband tussen natuurlijke rijkdom en groei voor zijn rekening. Openheid van de 
economie en de concurrentiepositie volgen wat betreft relatief belang. Deze bevindingen 
ondersteunen de relevantie van het transmissiekanaal van investeringen, dat theoretisch wordt 
aangetoond in hoofdstuk 2, voor het verhelderen van het fenomeen van de “resource curse”. 
Niet alleen geven we een empirische rechtvaardiging van het investeringsmechanisme, maar 
we bekrachtigen het belang ervan voor het verklaren van de teleurstellende economische 
prestaties van landen die rijk zijn aan natuurlijke hulpbronnen. 
 De analyse in hoofdstuk 5 stelt de onderzoeksvraag of de “resource curse” ook een 
relevant fenomeen is voor de vergelijking van regio’s binnen een land. Om dit vraagstuk te 
verkennen gebruiken we datasets voor individuele staten in de Verenigde Staten. Hiermee 
testen we of staten die rijk zijn aan hulpbronnen onder de maat presteren in termen van 
economische groei. Onze analyse stelt de absolute-convergentie hypothese op de proef, vaak 
aangeroepen binnen de regionaal-economische theorie. Deze hypothese stelt dat regio’s 
binnen een land convergeren naar hetzelfde inkomensniveau, zodat het initiële inkomen de 
enige belangrijke factor is in het verklaren van interregionale verschillen in de groeivoet. Met 
dezelfde aanpak als in hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we of economische groei in de staten van de 
Verenigde Staten in de periode 1986-2000 afhangt van een aantal groeideterminanten die ook 
belangrijk zijn gebleken tussen soevereine landen. Ten eerste nemen we als benadering van 
inkomsten uit natuurlijke hulpbronnen het aandeel van de primaire sector in het Bruto 
Staatsproduct (BSP; het equivalent van BNP op het niveau van staten), en we bevestigen dat 
staten die rijk zijn aan hulpbronnen, zoals Alaska en Louisiana, een relatief lagere 
inkomensgroei hadden in die periode. We voegen opeenvolgend indicatoren toe voor 
investeringen, onderwijs, openheid, corruptie, en innovatie, en bevestigen hun belang in het 
verklaren van groeiprestaties. Gelijk aan onze bevindingen in hoofdstuk 4, verdwijnt het 
negatieve effect van natuurlijke rijkdom op groei indien we alle eerdergenoemde variabelen 
opnemen in onze analyse. Dit suggereert dat de ‘resource curse’ ook bestaat tussen staten 
binnen de Verenigde Staten, en dat dezelfde transmissiekanalen bestaan en een belangrijke 
verklaring vormen voor het fenomeen. We concluderen specifiek dat de staten die rijk zijn aan 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen te maken hebben met lagere niveaus van investeringen in kapitaal, 
onderwijs en innovatie, terwijl ze tegelijkertijd minder open zijn wat betreft immigratie én 
meer corruptie kennen. In aanvulling op onze cross-country resultaten, blijkt dat de kanalen 
die op kennis gebaseerd zijn, onderwijs en O&O, een grotere rol spelen dan investeringen in 
kapitaal. 
 Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt het verband tussen natuurlijke hulpbronnen en welvaart vanuit 
een lange-termijn historisch perspectief. Veel wetenschappers hebben het belang van 
natuurlijk hulpbronnen benadrukt voor de industriële ontwikkeling in de 18e en 19e eeuw. Dit 
argument suggereert dat het negatieve effect van natuurlijke rijkdom op economische groei 
een recent fenomeen is dat pas de laatste decennia optrad, ermee rekening houdend dat 
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afnemende transportkosten en handelsbarrières de aanwezigheid van binnenlandse natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen wellicht minder cruciaal maakten voor economische ontwikkeling. Voor zover 
dat inderdaad zo is, kan een eerdere positieve bijdrage van hulpbronnen op inkomensgroei 
inderdaad een langdurig effect zijn geweest, dat nog steeds te zien is in de huidige verdeling 
van inkomens in de wereld. Onze aanpak richt zich op het verband tussen de natuurlijke 
rijkdom van kolonieën, het beleid van de kolonisator, de ontwikkeling van instituties, en de  
huidige inkomensniveaus in voormalige kolonieën. Op die plaatsen waar Europeanen zich in 
grote getale vestigden, importeerden zij uit hun thuislanden het institutionele raamwerk dat 
voornamelijk gebaseerd is op de bescherming van private eigendomsrechten en daarmee 
investeringen begunstigt. In andere kolonieën verkozen vestigden zich minder Europeanen en 
werd een lokale elite gevestigt die de lokale productie moest reguleren van goederen die 
werden ge-exporteerd naar de kolonisator. Het verschil tussen deze kolonisatiestrategieën en 
de geïmporteerde instituties hebben een belangrijke effect gehad dat terug te vinden is in de 
huidige relatieve welvaartsniveaus. We analyseren het endogene karakter van het 
vestigingsbeleid van kolonisten en bevestigen de stellingen van eerdere literatuur, dat 
kolonisten een voorkeur hadden voor gebieden met een relatief laag ziekte- en sterfterisico en 
waar de oorspronkelijke bevolking een lage organisatiegraad kende. In aanvulling daarop 
laten we zien dat regio’s die rijk waren aan edelmetaal (goud en zilver) vooraanstaande 
vestigingsplaatsen waren in het verleden en dat deze regio’s het institutioneel kader van de 
kolonist overnamen. Tegelijkertijd zien we dat een aantal belangrijke landbouwgoederen ten 
tijde van de kolonisaties (koffie, thee, cacao en suiker) Europese immigratie ontmoedigden, 
maar desondanks positief gecorreleerd zijn aan betere instituties. Onze bevindingen 
suggereren dat in het verleden natuurlijke hulpbronnen inderdaad een gunstige bijdrage 
hebben geleverd aan economische ontwikkeling, in tegenstelling tot de huidige trend dat 
landen die rijk zijn aan hulpbronnen een lagere economische groei laten zien. 
  In hoofdstuk 7, tot slot, worden de belangrijkste conclusies van alle voorgaande 
hoofdstukken samengevat en bijeen gebracht. Daarnaast worden aanbevelingen voor beleid 
ontwikkeld die zijn gebaseerd op de bevindingen van ons onderzoek en worden handreikingen 
gegeven om de “resource curse” aan te pakken. Beleid moet zich richten op de intermediaire 
mechanismen die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de “resource curse”. Beleid dat besparingen en 
investeringen stimuleert kan waarschijnlijk een grote rol spelen in het vermijden van de 
“resource curse”. De inkomsten uit natuurlijke hulpbronnen kunnen bijvoorbeeld 
ondergebracht worden in investeringsfondsen die deze transparant en efficiënt moeten 
beheren. Bovendien lijkt het een goede strategie om de inkomsten uit natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
te gebruiken om O&O activiteiten te stimuleren. Het behoeft niet gezegd te worden dat dit 
proefschrift bij lange na niet uitputtend is en dat er vele paradoxale aspecten van de “resource 
curse” niet onderzocht zijn. Hoofdstuk 7 geeft suggesties voor richtingen waarin dit 
onderzoek in de toekomst uitgebreid kan worden. Uitbreiden van de huidige dataset voor 
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zogenaamde panel data analyse, het verkrijgen van historische gegevens over rijkdom aan 
hulpbronnen, en het onderzoeken van de informele aard van exploitatie van hulpbronnen in 
veel ontwikkelingslanden zijn enkele van die toekomstige richtingen. Aangezien de huidige 
prijsstijgingen van olie waarschijnlijk leiden tot een nieuwe positieve inkomensschok voor 
veel olieproducerende landen, is het zeer interessant om te zien welke lessen men heeft 
getrokken uit eerdere fouten en in hoeverre olieproducerende landen het vermogen hebben om 
hun extra inkomsten om te zetten in algemene economische welvaart voor de nabije en 
verdere toekomst. 
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ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ (SUMMARY IN GREEK) 
 
Η ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΒΑΣΙΛΙΑ ΜΙ∆Α: 
ΑΦΘΟΝΙΑ ΦΥΣΙΚΩΝ ΠΟΡΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΑΝΑΠΤΥΞΗ 
Εισαγωγή (Μέρος I) 
 
Η κοινή οικονοµική λογική υpiοδεικνύει ότι οι φυσικοί piόροι δίνουν την δυνατότητα εpiιpiλέον 
εσόδων piρος αξιοpiοίηση για την βελτίωση των συνθηκών διαβίωσης και µείωσης της 
φτώχειας. Αναpiτυσσόµενες χώρες piλούσιες σε φυσικούς piόρους θα piρέpiει λογικά να 
εpiωφεληθούν αpiό τα εpiιpiλέον έσοδα αξιοpiοιώντας τα για την αpiοpiληρωµή συσσωρευµένων 
χρεών, για την βελτίωση της piιστοληpiτικής τους ικανότητας και την υιοθέτηση φιλόδοξων 
αναpiτυξιακών piρογραµµάτων. Εάν αυτό piου αpiαιτείται για την έξοδο αpiό έναν  φαύλο κύκλο 
οικονοµικής στασιµότητας είναι µια γενναία εισοδηµατική ενίσχυση, τότε τα έσοδα αpiό 
φυσικούς piόρους θα µpiορούσαν να βοηθήσουν στην µετάβαση σε µια εύρωστη αναpiτυξιακή 
τροχιά. Ως piρος τούτο, οικονοµολόγοι ιστορικοί εpiέτειναν την σηµασία των αpiοθεµάτων σε 
φυσικούς piόρους στην βιοµηχανική εpiέκταση σε οικονοµίες όpiως αυτές των Ηνωµένων 
Πολιτειών και του Ηνωµένου Βασιλείου στην αλλαγή του 20ου αιώνα. Πρόσφατα, χώρες 
όpiως η Νορβηγία και η Μpiοτσουάνα εκµεταλεύτηκαν τα έσοδα αpiό το εµpiόριο piετρελαίου 
και διαµαντιών αντιστοίχως για να ενισχύσουν την οικονοµική τους ανάpiτυξη.  
 Τα τελευταία χρόνια έχει αναζωpiυρωθεί το ακαδηµαϊκό ενδιαφέρον  γύρω αpiό τον 
αντίκτυpiο της αφθονείας φυσικών piόρων στην οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη. Πολλές µελέτες 
ισχυρίζονται ότι τα έσοδα αpiό φυσικούς piόρους είχαν αρνητικές piαρά θετικές συνέpiειες για 
τον ρυθµό οικονοµικής ανάpiτυξης τις τελευταίες τρεις δεκαετίες. Η τάση των piλουσίων σε 
φυσικούς piόρους χωρών να µειοψηφούν ως piρος την οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη έγινε γνωστή στη 
βιβλιογραφία ως η ‘κατάρα της φυσικής αφθονείας’ (resource curse). Παρόλο piου η ανησυχία 
για τον αρνητικό αντίκτυpiο των φυσικών piόρων µpiορεί να εντοpiιστεί ήδη στα συγγράµµατα 
του Adam Smith, το ενδιαφέρον ενισχύθηκε την δεκαετία του 50, όταν οι Prebisch και Singer 
συσχέτισαν την αpiοτυχία αναpiτυξιακών piολιτικών βασισµένων σε φυσικούς piόρους µε την 
συνεχή φθίνουσα τάση των σχετικών τιµών των φυσικών αγαθών µε αυτών των 
βιοµηχανικών. Η ανατίµηση του ολλανδικού νοµίσµατος και η µείωση της ζήτησης 
βιοµηχανικών piροϊόντων µετά αpiό την ανακάλυψη και εκµετάλλευση φυσικού αερίου στο 
Groningen το 60, αpiοτέλεσε την αφετηρία για την σύσταση βιβλιογραφίας piάνω στο 
φαινόµενο ‘Dutch disease’ (Ολλανδική Ασθένεια), piου εpiικεντρώθηκε στον αρνητικό 
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αντίκτυpiο των φυσικών piόρων στην ανταγωνιστικότητα του εµpiορίου. Τέλος, το NBER 
άρθρο των Sachs και Warner στα µέσα του 1990, αpiοτέλεσε την piρώτη εµpiεριστατωµένη 
εµpiειρική µελέτη και στατιστική εpiιβεβαίωση του φαινοµένου. Η εργασία τους τόνωσε το 
ενδιαφέρον στο αντικείµενο και ενέτεινε το ακαδηµαϊκό ενδιαφέρον. Η διατριβή αpiοτελεί 
µέρος της βιβλιογραφίας γύρω αpiό την piαράδοξη αρνητική συσχέτιση φυσικών piόρων και 
οικονοµικής ανάpiτυξης, εpiικεντρώνοντας στους ενδιάµεσους µηχανισµούς µέσω των οpiοίων 
το φαινόµενο λαµβάνει χώρα.  
 Το Μέρος Ι της διατριβής piαρέχει µια εισαγωγή στην βιβλιογραφία της κατάρας των 
φυσικών piόρων και των υpiαρχουσών piροσεγγίσεων της.  Εpiιpiλέον, σχολιάζει εν συντοµία τις 
συνέpiειες µιας ανεpiιτυχής αναpiτυξιακής piολιτικής βασισµένης σε φυσικούς piόρους  για την 
διατηρήσιµη ανάpiτυξη (sustainability). Μια συρρικνώµενη οικονοµία piλούσια σε φυσικούς 
piόρους αpiοτελεί piαράδειγµα χαµένης ευκαιρίας για piροσέγγιση µε τις αναpiτυγµένες 
οικονοµίες και  αpiοτυχηµένης piροσpiάθειας να µεταφράσει τους φυσικούς piόρους σε 
ευηµερία για µεταγενέστερες γενεές. Στο τέλος, το Μέρος Ι piαρέχει µία εpiισκόpiηση της 
διατριβής και σχεδιαγραφεί τα ερωτήµατα piρος διερεύνηση στα Μέρη ΙΙ και ΙΙΙ. 
 
 
Θεωρία (Μέρος II) 
 
Το Μέρος ΙΙ της διατριβής αpiοτελείται αpiό τα Κεφάλαια 2 και 3 piου καταpiιάνονται µε δύο 
θεωρητικούς µηχανισµούς, ικανούς να εξηγήσουν τον αρνητικό αντίκτυpiο της αφθονίας 
φυσικών piόρων στην οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη. Η ανάλυση και στα δύο κεφάλαια χρησιµοpiοιεί 
εκτενώς ιδέες αpiό την βιβλιογραφία ενδογενούς οικονοµικής µεγένθυσης, υιοθετώντας την 
άpiοψη ότι η τεχνολογική piρόοδος (ή οι βελτιώσεις στην piαραγωγικότητα της εργασίας) είναι 
piαράpiλευρη συνέpiεια της piαραγωγικής διαδικασίας (learning-by-doing: Κεφάλαιο 2) ή 
οικειοθελές εpiακόλουθο του τοµέα έρευνας (Κεφάλαιο 3). 
  Το εpiίκεντρο του Κεφαλαίου 2 είναι η εξερεύνηση της συσχέτισης φυσικών piόρων και 
αpiοταµίευσης στις piλουτοpiαραγωγικές χώρες. Η αφθονία φυσικών piόρων µpiορεί εύκολα να 
δηµιουργήσει µία αίσθηση εφησυχασµού ως piρος την ανάγκη piροσεκτικού σχεδιασµού της 
οικονοµικής piολιτικής. Η εξάρτηση αpiό µία συνεχή ροή εσόδων αpiό φυσικόυς piόρους είναι 
ενδεχοµένως ικανή να οδηγήσει σε χαλάρωση της οικονοµικής piολιτικής και αύξηση της 
σpiατάλης. Μία σηµαντική συνιστώσα ορθού οικονοµικού σχεδιασµού είναι η σωστή 
κατανοµή του εισοδήµατος µεταξύ αpiοταµίευσης και κατανάλωσης. Σε αυτό το κεφάλαιο 
αναpiτύσσουµε ένα µοντέλο εναλλασσόµενων γενεών (OverLapping-Generations (OLG)), 
όpiου διαδοχικές γενεές ζουν για δύο διαδοχικές piεριόδους, έτσι ώστε σε κάθε piερίοδο 
υpiάρχει συνύpiαρξη µιας νέας και µίας piαλαιάς γενεάς. Κάθε γενεά εργάζεται στην νεαρή 
piερίοδο της ζωής της και ζει αpiό τις αpiοταµιεύσεις της όταν εισέλθει στην ηλικιωµένη 
piερίοδο. Κάθε γενεά έχει ως στόχο την µεγιστοpiοίηση της χρησιµότητας (ευχαρίστησης) piου 
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αpiολαµβάνει αpiό την κατανάλωση στις δύο διαδοχικές piεριόδους της ζωής της, δεδοµένου 
του εισοδηµατικού piεριορισµού piου αντικρίζει. Αpiοδεικνύουµε τον τρόpiο µε τον οpiοίο οι 
φυσικοί piόροι µpiορούν να µειώσουν την αpiοταµίευση όταν αpiοτελούν δηµόσια piεριουσία 
και χρησιµοpiοιούνται για την piληρωµή συντάξεων. Κάτω  αpiό αυτό το σενάριο, τα έσοδα 
αpiό φυσικούς piόρους µειώνουν την ανάγκη για αpiοταµίευση  µέσω της ενίσχυσης 
µελλοντικών εισοδηµάτων. Η άµεση συνέpiεια της συρρίκνωσης των αpiοταµιεύσεων είναι η 
µείωση της εpiένδυσης και µελλοντικού φυσικού κεφαλαίου. Εpiιpiλέον, η βιοµηχανική 
piαραγωγή µειώνεται στον βαθµό piου βασίζεται στο φυσικό κεφάλαιο. Η µείωση στο 
βιοµηχανικό piροϊόν ενισχύεται όταν η piαραγωγικότητα της εργασίας (µέσω τεχνολογίας ή 
εκpiαίδευσης) εξαρτάται αpiό το εpiίpiεδο του φυσικού κεφαλαίου. Αpiοδεικνύουµε ότι σε 
piερίpiτωση piου η γνώση διαχέεται εκτενώς στην οικονοµία, οpiοιαδήpiοτε βραχυpiρόθεσµες 
θετικές συνέpiειες των φυσικών piόρων στο εpiίpiεδο ευηµερίας είναι piιθανόν να 
υpiερσκελιστούν αpiό τον έµµεσο αντίκτυpiο τους στο φυσικό κεφάλαιο. Σε αυτή την 
piερίpiτωση, το συνολικό εpiίpiεδο ευηµερίας θα µειωθεί και η κατάρα των φυσικών piόρων θα 
εpiακολουθήσει. Σε ένα µεγάλο βαθµό, ο αντίκτυpiος των φυσικών piόρων εξαρτάται αpiό τον 
καταµερισµό τους µεταξύ γενεών. Οι αpiοταµιεύσεις συρρικνώνονται σε µικρότερο βαθµό 
όταν οι φυσικόι piόροι θεωρούνται κοινό κτήµα και τα έσοδα τους καταµερίζονται ισότιµα 
µεταξύ καταναλωτών. 
 Στο κεφάλαιο 3 µετατοpiίζουµε την piροσοχή µας σε ένα εναλλακτικό µοντέλο, όpiου η 
τεχνολογική piρόοδος εξαρτάται αpiό έναν τοµέα έρευνας. Η γεννήτρια της οικονοµικής 
ανάpiτυξης είναι η εργασία piου αφιερώνεται αpiοκλειστικά στην εφευρετικότητα και την 
εpiιχειρηµατικότητα. Το µοντέλο υpiοθέτει αθάνατα νοικοκυριά, piου εpiιλέγουν σε κάθε 
piερίοδο το εpiίpiεδο της κατανάλωσης τους και το µερίδιο του χρόνου piου αφιερώνουν στην 
ανάpiαυλα, αpiό τα οpiοία εξαρτάται η χρησιµότητα τους. Αναγκαστικά υpiάρχει υpiοκατάσταση 
µεταξύ κατανάλωσης και ανάpiαυλας δεδοµένου ότι η κατανάλωση εξαρτάται αpiό το 
εισόδηµα εργασίας. Η οικονοµία αpiοτελείται αpiό τέσσερις τοµείς. Υpiάρχει ο βιοµηχανικός 
τοµέας, ο οpiοίος χρησιµοpiοιεί ως piαραγωγικούς συντελεστές την εργασία και µια σειρά αpiό 
ενδιάµεσα κεφαλαιουχικά αγαθά, τα οpiοία αpiοτελούν διαφορετικά είδη φυσικού κεφαλαίου. 
Έpiειτα, υpiάρχει ο τοµέας κεφαλαιουχικών αγαθών, όpiου οι εpiιχειρήσεις piαράγουν τα 
ενδιάµεσα αγαθά χρησιµοpiοιώντας µη εpiεξεργασµένο φυσικό κεφάλαιο και τις σχετικές 
εφευρετικές ιδέες (piατέντες). Στη συνέχεια, έχουµε τον τοµέα έρευνας, όpiου τα νέα σχέδια 
ενδιάµεσων κεφαλαιουχικών αγαθών piαράγονται, αυξάνοντας το εpiίpiεδο γνώσης στην 
οικονοµία. Ο τοµέας έρευνας αpiασχολεί το υpiόλοιpiο της εργασίας piου δεν αpiασχολείται στη 
βιοµηχανία. Τέλος, υpiάρχει ο piρωτογενής τοµέας piου εξαρτάται αpiό τους φυσικούς piόρους 
της οικονοµίας. Το κύριο ενδιαφέρον µας εστιάζεται στον αντίκτυpiο µιας εpiέκτασης του 
piρωτογενούς τοµέα στην οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη. Αναλύουµε τον τρόpiο µε τον οpiοίο τα έσοδα 
αpiό φυσικούς piόρους µειώνουν το piοσοστό χρόνου piου αφιερώνεται στην εργασία και 
αυξάνουν αντιστοίχως την ανάpiαυλα. Μία αύξηση στον υpiαρκτό φυσικό piλούτο δηµιουργεί 
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την δυνατότητα αpiόλαυσης του ίδιου εpiιpiέδου χρησιµότητας µε µειωµένο εpiίpiεδο 
εργασιακού χρόνου. Στην ανάλυση, αpiοδεικνύουµε ότι ένας έµµεσος αντίκτυpiος των 
αυξηµένων εσόδων αpiό φυσικούς piόρους είναι η µετατόpiιση εφευρετικότητας (ευρηµατικής 
εργασίας) αpiό τον τοµέα έρευνας στον βιοµηχανικό κλάδο. Η οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη 
εpiιβραδύνεται για δύο λόγους: piρώτον, διότι αφιερώνουµε λιγότερο χρόνο στην εργασία, και 
δεύτερον διότι ένα µικρότερο piοσοστό του piαραγωγικού δυναµικού αpiοφασίζει να ασχοληθεί 
µε τον τοµέα έρευνας.  
 
Οικονοµετρική Ανάλυση (Μέρος III) 
 
Στο Μέρος ΙΙΙ της διατριβής µετατοpiίζουµε το εpiίκεντρο του ενδιαφέροντος αpiό την θεωρία 
στην εµpiειρική ανάλυση και εξετάζουµε την στατιστική συσχέτιση µεταξύ της αφθονίας 
φυσικών piόρων και της οικονοµικής ανάpiτυξης. Ο σκοpiός είναι διpiλός. Πρώτα, στοχεύουµε 
να piιστοpiοιήσουµε την ύpiαρξη της κατάρας των φυσικών piόρων και να εξετάσουµε εάν 
οφείλεται στον αρνητικό αντίκτυpiο των φυσικών piόρων σε µια σειρά µεταβλητών piου 
εpiηρεάζουν την οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη, όpiως piροτείνεται στη βιβλιογραφία. Η συσχέτιση των 
φυσικών piόρων µε τις µεταβλητές οικονοµικής ανάpiτυξης αναφέρεται συχνά ως τα 
ενδιάµεσα κανάλια µετάδοσης (της κατάρας των φυσικών piόρων). Αpiό την άλλη, το 
εµpiειρικό τµήµα της διατριβής εξετάζει ταυτόχρονα την εγκυρότητα των θεωρητικών 
µηχανισµών του Μέρους ΙΙ. Ως piρος αυτό, το θεωρητικό και εµpiειρικό µέρος ενισχύουν και 
συµpiληρώνουν το ένα το άλλο. 
 Το κεντρικό ενδιαφέρον της ανάλυσης του Κεφαλαίου 4 είναι η εξέταση του άµεσου και 
έµµεσου αντίκτυpiου των φυσικών piόρων στην οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη χωρών την piερίοδο 
1975-1996. Για να εξετάσουµε την εξάρτηση της οικονοµικής ανάpiτυξης στους φυσικούς 
piόρους, εκτιµούµε τον ρόλο µίας σειράς µεταβλητών στην ερµηνεία διαφορών στον ρυθµό 
ανάpiτυξης µεταξύ των χωρών του δείγµατος. Η σειρά των µεταβλητών piου εpiηρεάζουν την 
οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη αpiοτελείται αpiό το αρχικό εισόδηµα, µια µεταβλητή φυσικής αφθονίας 
και δείκτες εpiένδυσης, ανθρώpiινου κεφαλαίου (δεξιότητες), piοιότητας θεσµών, ελευθερίας 
του εµpiορίου και ανταγωνιστικότητας. Ως δείκτη φυσικής αφθονίας, χρησιµοpiοιούµε το 
piοσοστό piαραγωγής ορυκτών στο ΑΕΠ (piαραγωγή του συνόλου των αγαθών) στην αρχή της 
piεριόδου. Όταν ενσωµατώνουµε µονάχα το αρχικό εισόδηµα και τους φυσικούς piόρους, 
υpiάρχει µία σηµαντική αρνητική συσχέτιση µεταξύ οικονοµικής ανάpiτυξης και φυσικής 
αφθονίας. ∆ιαδοχικά piροσθέτουµε τις υpiόλοιpiες µεταβλητές και piαρατηρούµε ότι η αρνητική 
συσχέτιση µεταξύ φυσικών piόρων και οικονοµικής ανάpiτυξης σταδιακά µειώνεται. Αυτή η 
µείωση µας οδηγεί στο συµpiέρασµα ότι οι φυσικοί piόροι δεν είναι ανασταλτικός piαράγοντας 
της οικονοµικής ανάpiτυξης ως έχει, αλλά ο αντίκτυpiος τους λαµβάνει χώρα εµµέσως µέσω 
της συσχέτισης τους µε τις άλλες µεταβλητές οικονοµικής ανάpiτυξης. Το σύνολο των 
υpiολοίpiων µεταβλητών είναι εpiαρκές ώστε να εξηγήσει piλήρως την αρνητική συσχέτιση 
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µεταξύ φυσικών piόρων και ανάpiτυξης. ∆ιαδοχικά piιστοpiοιούµε ότι η piαραγωγή ορυκτών 
piραγµατικά µειώνει την εpiένδυση, την εκpiαίδευση, το εµpiόριο, την ανταγωνιστικότητα και 
την piοιότητα των θεσµών. Μία σηµαντική piροσφορά της ανάλυσης είναι η εκτίµηση της 
σχετικής συνεισφοράς των καναλιών µετάδοσης στην κατάρα των φυσικών piόρων. 
Βρίσκουµε την εpiένδυση τον piιο σηµαντικό µηχανισµό µέσω του οpiοίου οι φυσικοί piόροι 
µειώνουν την οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη. Ο αρνητικός αντίκτυpiος των φυσικών piόρων στην 
εpiένδυση αναλογεί piερίpiου στο ήµισυ της συσχέτισης µεταξύ φυσικής αφθονίας και 
ανάpiτυξης. Το εµpiόριο και η ανταγωνιστικότητα ακολουθούν ως piρος την σχετική 
συνεισφορά στην εξήγηση του φαινοµένου. Τα αpiοτελέσµατα αυτά βεβαιώνουν την 
σηµαντικότητα του θεωρητικού µηχανισµού του Κεφαλαίου 2 ως piρος την εξήγηση της 
κατάρας των φυσικών piόρων. Εpiιβεβαιώνεται όχι µόνο εµpiειρικά η εpiένδυση ως κανάλι 
µετάδοσης της κατάρας αλλά και η σηµαντική συνεισφορά του µηχανισµού στην εξήγηση της 
αpiογοητευτικής οικονοµικής ανάpiτυξης των piλουσίων σε φυσικούς piόρους χωρών.  
 Η ανάλυση στο Κεφάλαιο 5 θέτει το ερώτηµα εάν η κατάρα των φυσικών piόρων είναι 
ένα σχετικό φαινόµενο µεταξύ piεριοχών µέσα στην ίδια χώρα piέρα αpiό µεταξύ κρατών.  
Προκειµένου να ερευνήσουµε το θέµα, χρησιµοpiοιούµε µία βάση δεδοµένων για τις 
Ηνωµένες Πολιτείες εξετάζοντας εάν οι piλούσιες σε φυσικούς piόρους piολιτείες 
αναpiτύσσονται µε µικρότερους ρυθµούς. Η ανάλυση µας έρχεται σε αντίθεση µε την έννοια 
της “αpiόλυτης σύγκλισης” piου συχνά υιοθετείται στα οικονοµικά piεριφερειακής ανάpiτυξης, 
η οpiοία θεωρεί το αρχικό εισόδηµα ως τον µοναδικό piαράγοντα piου εξηγεί τις διαφορές 
στους ρυθµούς ανάpiτυξης µεταξύ piεριοχών. Ερευνούµε εάν οι piολιτείες είναι διαφορετικές 
ως piρος έναν αριθµό χαρακτηριστικών piου συνήθως εξηγούν διαφορές στην αναpiτυξιακή 
piορεία χωρών. Ακολουθώντας ανάλογη µεθοδολογία µε αυτή του Κεφαλαίου 4, εξερευνούµε 
εάν η οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη µεταξύ των Ηνωµένων Πολιτειών για την piερίοδο 1986-2000 
εξαρτάται αpiό ανάλογες µεταβλητές. Κατ’αρχάς ενσωµατώνουµε έναν δείκτη φυσικών 
piόρων (το piοσοστό του piρωτογενούς τοµέα στο Ακαθάριστο Προϊόν Πολιτείας (ΑΠΠ), το 
οpiοίο αναλογεί στο ΑΕΠ σε εpiίpiεδο piολιτείας) και εpiιβεβαιώνουµε ότι piλούσιες 
piλουτοpiαραγωγικά piολιτείες όpiως η Αλάσκα και η Λουϊζιάνα έχουν ένα σηµαντικό 
µειονέκτηµα στην οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη. ∆ιαδοχικά ενσωµατώνουµε δείκτες για την 
εpiένδυση, την εκpiαίδευση, το εµpiόριο, την διαφθορά και την εφευρετικότητα και 
piιστοpiοιούµε τον σηµαντικό τους ρόλο στην οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη. Παρόµοια µε το 
Κεφάλαιο 4, ο αρνητικός αντίκτυpiος των φυσικών piόρων στην ανάpiτυξη εξαφανίζεται 
σταδιακά µε την ενσωµάτωση των piροαναφερθέντων µεταβλητών στην ανάλυση. Αυτό 
υpiαινίσσεται την ύpiαρξη ανάλογων ενδιάµεσων µηχανισµών της κατάρας των φυσικών 
piόρων σε εpiίpiεδο piολιτειών. Οι piλούσιες σε φυσικούς piόρους piολιτείες υpiοφέρουν αpiό 
µικρότερα εpiίpiεδα εpiένδυσης, εκpiαίδευσης και εφευρετικότητας και piαράλληλα είναι 
λιγότερο ανοικτές στην µετανάστευση και piερισσότερο εpiιρρεpiείς στην διαφθορά. Σε 
αντίθεση µε τα αpiοτελέσµατα µας µεταξύ χωρών, βρίσκουµε τους µηχανισµούς γνώσης της 
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εκpiαίδευσης και έρευνας να piαίζουν σηµαντικότερο ρόλο αpiό την εpiένδυση. Η κατάρα των 
φυσικών piόρων µεταξύ piεριοχών µέσα σε µία αναpiτυγµένη χώρα φαίνεται να είναι 
διαφορετικής φύσης και να σχετίζεται µε διαφορές στα εpiίpiεδα εκpiαίδευσης και έρευνας 
piαρά στις διαφορές σε υpiοδοµές και εµpiόριο. 
 Το κεφάλαιο 6 στρέφεται στην σχέση µεταξύ φυσικών piόρων και ευηµερίας µέσω µιας 
µακροχρόνιας ιστορικής piροοpiτικής. Πολλοί οικονοµολόγοι δίνουν έµφαση στη σηµασία των 
φυσικών piόρων στην βιοµηχανική εpiέκταση piολλών piλούσια piλουτοpiαραγωγικά χωρών τον 
18ο και 19ο αιώνα. Αυτή η εpiιχειρηµατολογία έµµεσα υpiονοεί ότι ο αρνητικός αντίκτυpiος 
των φυσικών piόρων στην οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη είναι piιθανότατα ένα piρόσφατο φαινόµενο 
των τελευταίων δεκαετιών στον βαθµό piου τα µειούµενα µεταφορικά κόστη και εµpiόδια 
εµpiορίου κάνουν την ύpiαρξη εγχώριων φυσικών piόρων λιγότερο αναγκαία για την 
εξασφάλιση γρήγορων ρυθµών ανάpiτυξης. Στον βαθµό piου αυτό αληθεύει, ο piροηγούµενος 
θετικός ρόλος των φυσικών piόρων στην οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη µpiορεί να άφησε έναν 
µακροpiρόθεσµο αντίκτυpiο στην τωρινή κατανοµή του piαγκόσµιου εισοδήµατος. Η 
piροσέγγιση µας εpiικεντρώνεται στη συσχέτιση µεταξύ τωρινών εpiίpiεδων εισοδήµατος, 
θεσµών, piολιτικών εpiοικισµού και φυσικών piόρων. Οι Ευρωpiαίοι εισήγαγαν το θετικό για 
την εpiένδυση θεσµικό υpiόβαθρο της χώρας καταγωγής τους, βασισµένο στην piροστασία των 
δικαιωµάτων piροσωpiικής ιδιοκτησίας, όpiου µετοίκισαν σε µεγάλους αριθµούς. Σε άλλες 
piεριοχές οι Ευρωpiαίοι piροτίµησαν να µετοικήσουν σε µικρούς αριθµούς και να 
δηµιουργήσουν µία τοpiική αριστοκρατία ικανή να ρυθµίζει την τοpiική piαραγωγή. Οι 
διαφορές στις αpiοικιοκρατικές piολικές και εισαγόµενους θεσµούς είχαν έναν σηµαντικό 
αντίκτυpiο piου ακόµα αντικατοpiτρίζεται στην σηµερινή κατανοµή εpiιpiέδων ευηµερίας. 
Αναλύουµε τον ενδογενή χαρακτήρα των αpiοικιοκρατικών αpiοφάσεων των εpiοίκων και 
εpiιβεβαιώνουµε αpiοτελέσµατα υpiάρχουσας βιβλιογραφίας ως piρος την piροτίµηση των 
εpiοίκων για piεριοχές µε piεριβάλλον λιγότερο εpiιρρεpiή σε ασθένειες και µε χειρότερα 
οργανωµένους αυτόχθονους piληθυσµούς. Ακόµη piιο σηµαντικό για το θέµα της διατριβής, 
βρίσκουµε ότι οι piεριοχές piλούσιες σε φυσικούς piόρους (χρυσό και ασήµι) αpiοτέλεσαν 
ιδιαίτερα εpiιθυµητούς piροορισµούς για εpiοικισµό και κληρονόµησαν το θεσµικό υpiόβαθρο 
των µητροpiολιτικών χωρών. Αpiό την άλλη, βρίσκουµε µία σειρά αpiό σηµαντικά αγροτικά 
piροϊόντα κατά την αpiοικιοκρατική piερίοδο (καφές, τσάι, κακάο και ζάχαρη) να 
αpiοθαρρύνουν την ευρωpiαϊκή µετανάστευση, αλλά piαρόλαυτα να συνεισφέρουν θετικά 
στους οικονοµικούς θεσµούς. Τα ευρήµατα µας υpiονοούν ότι οι φυσικοί piόροι 
διαδραµάτισαν θετικό ρόλο στην οικονοµική ανάpiτυξη στο piαρελθόν piαρά την σύγχρονη 
τάση των piλούσιων piλουτοpiαραγωγικά χωρών να µεγεθύνονται οικονοµικά µε µικρότερους 
ρυθµούς. 
 Τέλος, το Κεφάλαιο 7 αpiοτελεί την piερίληψη της διατριβής και των συµpiερασµάτων ανά 
κεφαλαίο. Εpiιpiλέον, σχεδιαγραφεί συστάσεις οικονοµικής piολιτικής βασισµένων στα 
συµpiεράσµατα της έρευνας της διατριβής και piροτείνει µέτρα αντιµετώpiισης της κατάρας 
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των φυσικών piόρων. Η οικονοµική piολιτική piρέpiει να εpiικεντρωθεί στους ενδιάµεσους 
µηχανισµούς υpiεύθυνους για την κατάρα. Πολιτικές αpiοταµίευσης και εpiένδυσης piιθανότατα 
θα βοηθήσουν σηµαντικότατα χώρες να αpiοδράσουν αpiό την piαγίδα της κατάρας των 
φυσικών piόρων. Εpiιpiλέον, η χρησιµοpiοίηση των εσόδων αpiό φυσικούς piόρους για έρευνα 
αpiοτελεί µια εναλλακτική εpiιλογή. Εpiιpiρόσθετα, τα έσοδα µpiορούν να κατατεθούν σε 
εpiενδυτικά piρογράµµατα piου εξασφαλίζουν διαφάνεια και αpiοτελεσµατική διαχείριση. 
Πρέpiει να piροσθέσουµε ότι η διατριβή είναι αδύνατον να διαλευκάνει όλες τις piαράδοξες 
piλευρές του φαινοµένου της κατάρας των φυσικών piόρων. Το κεφάλαιο 7 piροτείνει 
εpiεκτάσεις της ανάλυσης για µελλοντική έρευνα. Εpiεκτάσεις της τωρινής βάσης δεδοµένων, 
η αpiόκτηση ιστορικών στοιχείων φυσικών piόρων και η εξέταση του ανεpiίσηµου χαρακτήρα 
του piρωτογενή τοµέα σε piολλές αναpiτυσσόµενες χώρες είναι µερικές αpiό τις δυνατές 
κατευθυντήριες γραµµές για µελλοντική έρευνα. ∆εδοµένου ότι οι ανερχόµενες piετρελαϊκές 
τιµές είναι piιθανόν να δηµιουργήσουν ένα θετικό σοκ εισοδήµατος για piολλές χώρες, είναι 
ιδιαίτερα σηµαντικό να κρατήσουµε υpi’όψιν µας τα λάθη αpiό την piροηγούµενη 
κακοδιαχείριση των φυσικών piόρων και να αξιολογήσουµε τις νέες δυνατότητες για 
µετατροpiή των εσόδων αpiό φυσικούς piόρους σε µακροχρόνια οικονοµική ευµάρεια.
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